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A HISTORY
OF THE 334TH INFANTRY
84TH DIVISION
BY
CPL PERRY S. WOLFF
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This book is dedicated to the men of
the 334'h Infantry Regiment who died
in action during the campaign in the
European Theatre of Operations.
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Preface
'History', Napoleon once said, 'is a fable agreed upon.'
While the statement is excessive, it is a good example of the
epithets a military historian must face. A report of an action
is not the action, and it is reasonably certain that someone
from Army to squad will label the report inaccurate, biased,
or say, 'why in hell doesn't he get up here and see for himself?' Consider, for example, the communiques the day our
First and Second Battalions took Miillendorf and Wiirm.
SHAEF said:
'The Ninth Army front was quiet .. .'
Ninth Army said:
'Local attacks ... '
84th Division said:
'The 334 th Infantry straightened its lines .. .'
334 th Infantry said:
'After an intensive artillery preparation our First and
Second Battalions captured Miillendorf and Wiirm. There
were few casualties.'
What the friends of the casualties said is not known; but
they probably considered the action more important than the
report handed down from SHAEF. Which of the above statements is true? All are true, none is less true; yet the first
contradicts the last. Obviously, the historian's choice is dictated by the audience for whom he is writing. Even a regiment
is divi-ded into three battalions and five special units, each
with a different view of an action. The Third Battalion's
interest in the Wiirm-Miillendorf attack was more cousinly
than apt.
6

It must be confessed that this history will satisfy only
those whose point of view is similar to ours. Yet there is a
sense of belonging, an interest in one's family, which doughboys feel about a regiment and do not feel about austere
echelons such as Corps or Army. Ji is certainly true that the
actions of a regiment exceed the combined actions of its component parts and that there is an ineffable spirit or characteristic about a regiment which distinguishes it from another
regiment. Ask an infantryman, 'What's your outfit?' and the
first or second unit he names will be his regiment.
It is because this spirit exists that we feel a regimental
history is of interest. Perhaps each company will feel it has
been slighted for the profit of another, but it is a good idea
that a History of the 334th Infantry be written while it is
new in our minds. If the History is no more than a springboard into a pool of remembrances, it has done its job.
P.S.W.
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TWO YEARS OF PREPARATION
The 334th Infantry Regiment was activated 15 October
1942 at Oamp Howze, Texas. For a regiment which Wras later
to grind i1ts way through the Sliegf'fied Line, dli~organize three
of Germany',s finest diV'ilstons hi the Ardennes, and spearhead
the Ninth Army's drive across the Roer anid into. the Getrman
heartland, the beglinnings were no·t sensaltion!al. In 1942 S.elelctirve Serv'ice began to look more oa·r efully into the manpowerr
pool, and the Army began to develop a fieservo~r of Infantry.
Many original men of tihe fiegiment had been classti.tfied 4F by
lenient draft boa1r1ds who s ubsequently reclassified them when
the quotas were made more stringent.
·
In October 1942 the War wa·s nine months old, and while
many men were convinCied it should be fought, few were
volunteering for the Army, and f•e wer for t:he Inf.antry. The
Air Forces were called: the A1Jr Corps, a place for gentlemen
and ald venturers, and the Infantry was coo1ie labor, a tutored
mob. The :fiks't men to join the regiment had a "raw deal"
they told themselves around the beer tables in the PX. First,
they didn't like the Army; second, they weren't physically
:Bit; third, thei1r talents were niQt befing used. As the men
looked ruround and listened, they invented a satisfying rumm,
compensaJtiion for their "mw de'al," a rumoir that was going
to last until we heard the first sotun:ds of Long Toms and 240's
outside Gulpen and Wrua1wliiler, Hoillarili•:
"We',re a repliacement outfit. The 334th isn't godng anywhere. If it does, we're Army of Occupation. Man, they can't
send this outfit into combat!"
Although the lines .a,t s'i:ck call were long wLtih misf:its and
hopefuls, the Regiment started 13 weeks of ba~sic tmining:
Physical 'T raining, the School of the Soldier, Sanitation, First
Aid, hikeiS, care and cleaning of equipment- a rigid minuteby-minute traiining designed to turn ouit a uniform soldier
with a baJSd:c knowledge of htjls a'rms and tasks in the Infantry.
A few men extended themselves, noting the vacancies for
non -commi1s'sli oneld officers.
But Ca:mp Howze was a col'lection of tJar shacks on the
tDeeless htlls otf 1Jhe Texas prlairie, and' during the firslt winter
of training the temperature dropped to 15 degrees below zero.
9

A steady stream o:f arrivals and departures went om, the normal tmlffic in Army circles. The men spent their evenings in
Gali nesville or Munste r, Textas, ·and spent weekend passes in
Dallas and Fort Wmth. Though Lieut•e nant General Leslie
McNair had pointed out that every man in the Army Ground
Forces Wlas being trained for oversea1s service, fa•s cism was
distant, the training program was immediate, and many men
doubted if they wou'ld see combat.
After three months o·f basic trairning, the Regiment had
lost mosrt physically unfit men. T.rairring p11ogressed from tndiv:1dual to unit progrrams. An aJttempt wars made to rotate
men f1rom one job to anort!her. Inereasingly mo:re time was
spent in the field, culminating in a "D" training series before
maneuvers.
Every group has one or tw.o activities which are remembered a1s the peaks of an operation, and it is unique tha't an
A'r my rememib1ers most .t he moments it suffered, rather than
the times it completed its mission well. Newcomers to the
barnad{1s were totld of "D" Series when the weather was partli.cula:rly adverse. "You should have been with us on 'D'
Series!" gave way in later days •to "When we crossed the
Srabine during maneuvers . . . " and late[", "Back in Camp
Howze" or "Seven•teen days in the fielld," and "From Pa1enberg to Prummerrn and Beeck ... " These were the phrr:ase1s o[
the 334th Infantry entiHirng the teller to a respeeit different
£rom that pa;irl to stripes or bam. The rap~d turnover in personnel meant the newcomer would have a phrase o[ his own
in a short time.
The Regiment left Camp Howze 12 September 1943 forr
the Lou]s~ana-Texas Maneuver Area. Maneuvers were undergone :fJor sixty days in the :flteld. They corui.s.ted of tact'ical
problems spaced in five O'r sioc day intervals. Again, weather
conditions wE!re aJd'\Oerse bu't the ai!tituide Wlas "garrison"
whJich meant no equipment othelr than author:ized cou<
l d be
used. While maneuvers were d:isliked intensely, they were
the b est possii!ble tmining for combat. The lalter rigors of the
mud in the SiegfTd:ed Line and the cold in the Ardennes were
extremes of whaJt the Regiment faced in the Texas-Louisiana
area.
Maneuvers and other problems were particularly valuable
even in light of the turnover in personnel. A few men in key
posiitiions learned how to handl-e theirr jobs; wire crews, In1
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Reverse slope n ear Beeck.

Direct h it on First Battalion
CP. Prummern.

telligence and Reconnaissance Plat'Oons, Ammunition and
Pioneer Platoons could learn their work only in the field.
In the Last evalUJ1l!ti'on, the Infantry's job is in the fteld. The
In:flantry is not designed fo1r garrison or rearr echelon dluties.
Maneuvers simulated comba1t; our action around Prummern
demonstrated that they were the most valuable part of training in the Zone of the Interior.
It was during maneuvers that the Regiment was first called
upon to supply men for overseas duty. This caO.'l, coupled wit<h
discharges given to physically unfit men, lowered the personnel of the Regim'ent far below that called for in the Tab'l es
of O:r:ganization. When the Regimen:t a·rrived a't Camp Claiborne, Loutsd!ana, its next permanent station, it was fa'!"
understrength.
·
A:t Claiborne the Regilm ent was in its sophomOT.e period.
It had maneuvered without a fuJI complement of anti-tank
guns, and the AT Company had supplemented its issue with
wooden g.un:s. The men who didn't want to go overseas were
certatin thaJt the RegimenJt had not done a good job during
maneuvers. None o,f the officers had seen combat. To the
oiUrtJslider it would have seemed that the org,a nization o,f the
Regiment as we'll as its military snap was Sitrong, but to individual soldiers, .f ramed in khaki and unable to see far bayond
the platoon, it seemed that the tra:in'IDg would go on forever.
The platoons were at times only squad strength, and squads
consisted. of thTee oT more in some rifle companlies. The
framework of the Regiment needed filling out if the 334th
were to become a combat crutHt.
It w,a s in this period, about 1 Ap11il 1944, that men separated from the hrmy Specialized Training PTogra'm were
senJt to the Regiment a\3 fillers. The advent of these men
created a mloirale pr'o blem and strain only er1ased when the
Regiment went into action. The ASTP Trainees had been told
thart; they were a selected group in the Army, that ther·e was
a strong pOISsibirity of a commlisssion after graduation, and
they had been excused from most military training so that the
rigors of a :Dour year college course oon:densed into eighteen
manlths would not be too extenu'a1!ing. The press of events
forced thie Army to discon:tinUie 1fue progJram and send most
of the trallinees to the Infantry. The Infantry was not yet
regarded aL<; the Queen of Battle, and the ASTP men lt'hought
it the drudge and lackey of the Army. Some non-coms
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There's a sniper to the left.

The tank's machine gun is firing Ge'ilenkirchen.

viewed the "college boys" suspiciously, :Deeling they were
after the stripes which represented "D Series and theS1abine."
When the trainees came, they were treated cu'r'tly and responded •i n an eqUial manner. 'l'hey were "you new men" and
they banded together with the ASTP cry of "Hahba, habba,
hiabba!"
Gar,rison _Life is no:t private. It Wlas oot ~ong before the
"new men" we1re hi'tchiking to Alexand.rii'a with the old men
in thetilr squads, or lending nlickels in the company day room
to o]der members o.f the Regiment. The problem eased down.
hfter combat tihe'l'e were only the remembrances of college
]ife, but the siiJtuaUorn was poignantly put when the tartte,red
reml1Janbs oif K Comp:any puliLed o:ut of the Nne nearVerdlenne,
Belgium. They had not shaiVed fo'r six days, they were stained
with combat, wrapped in blankets of many nationalities, and
numbed wi!th bat1:Jl,e fatigue. One tattereld rifleman saw a
fri,end and roused himself from his weariness long enough
to remaTk, "Habha., habba, chum."
"Damn college boy," growled a squad leader.
Camp Claiborne was a slightly better garrison than
Camp Ho:wze, bUit ilt was' none too comfortable. The camp
WlaJS so large that a whole division, over 15,000 men, wa's only
a smaH section of the t01tal military popuilJa,t ion. Tra.'in:ing
contimued with emphasis on larger units; battaliion an:d regimental probl,e ms were common.
The Regli.ment was spend'i ng more time ·in the field. While
there was talk of the 3341th being notlhing more than a
tminin:g regilrnent £rom which •replacements would be drawn,
the invasion of E1urope on 6 June 1944 and t!he checldng of
the Allied northwacvd .drive 'i n Italy were indications that
·strong forces of Infantlry woUJltl be needeid be:time the war
in Europe was over.
Louisri ana wa;s hot in the summer of 1944. In Anny slang,
the Regiment was "get1Jing hot" - avai~able for overseas
shipment. Nolbody was certain. On one hand, 1Jhe outfit wa'S
given new clothing, stored away in duffe1 bags after beli ng
maTkeld!, and every:one knew wh1at that meant. On the other
hand, a group of physically unfit men were kept in the Regiment even t'hou:gh it was obvious they could' not pass the
Overseas Phy:si:cal. The wive's otf the soldiers in Alexandria
were adept a!t noting tendencies. In the hotels and restaurants
there were always rumors to be picked up:
14

"They're getting them POM qualified."
"They haven't haid landing boat training. They'Jl he going
to Europe."
"There's a buck sergeant in the 784trh Ordnance who saw
tWJo warehoiUISeful's of white helmets with 'MP' written on
them. At least that's, a safe job."
"My aJu:n)t works wli~th the rlailiroard. She says that passenger trains scheduled to carry a whole reg~.iment are coming
in on . . . "
Sltay or go, there were rumms substantiating ea.c:h. But
suddenly the furrlouigh r'a/te went up to 15%. That was the
tip-off. A new Army dirrectiive hiad been pubhshed providing
that every man shipped ov,ertSea\S wo!u1d have a furlough s1ioc
months pri:or to departure. The Alexandr~~a Town Talk was
fililed wtilth adverttisements od' TOioms to let. The Regiment's
nadio progti".a m, Fatigues anld Leg,g ins, went off the air two
d!ays bed'o['e the 334th entr!alineid. Two hundred wives became
alarmed and drove to the cam'P ent!'ance, pleading for a last
look. Church attendance iniCreaseid. S1trict censorship w:as
clamped an the mail:s:, telephone connections were disoontinued on 5 September, and on 6 September the Regiment
moved to Oamp Kilmer, New Jersey, its StJaging area.
Two we.e ks were spent at Kilmer and passes were given
freely. New York City was an hour's ride aw:ay with concerts,
shoW\S., women, ]tquor, churches: a man could say goodbye
any way h iJs experiences haid taught him to act the word.
We were one of the first regiments to be issued the new
comfblat jacket. New Ymk, fa shioned-minded and crowld'ed
with soldiers, pa:itd more attention to the combat jackets ~than
to the new fall suits in the windows of Fi,f th A venue. The
city was fzjiendly, strangerls entert;a!i ned aJt most bars, and the
soldiers were costumed in a 'new attitude - significance.
:At this time the XXI Group was attempting to flank the
Siegfried Line atArnhem with theFirstAllied1AirborneArmy.
As the men waited ·f or shipment, Orientation, a subject which
had been ,tucked away in the training program, ~appeared
important. Alth'olllgh the men did not know combat, they
were infantrymen and they could guess. "W e'H be there for
the bli:g pUJsh" was the most popular statemenlt, said more
regretfully than miilitantly. R'adio commentators Slaid the
warr WOIU:ld be over in six weeks. The soberE!s:t miliitary commentatio!Ts predicted four months. That was the note of
1
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optimism wh'ich hung in our throats when the Regiment embarked from the Brooklyn Na'Vy Ya:rd, 20 September 1944.
The trip was pleasant, w~th little rough wea:tlh er. Long
periods of letter Wr!iting, augmented by a regimental new:spaper named The Daily Duffel.bag, prepared shows, and daily
spontaneous prlograms all hell.IPed re~ieve tedium. Most
popuLar were the poker games, one of which continued
stea!dii:ly for ten days. 'Dhe sihip was the USAT Barry, a
reconverted luxury liner.
Although the personnel of theRegimentwas not .informed,
contact with numerous submarines was rp.ade. The conV'Oy
changed aourse severtal tilrnes, delaying the crossing by a few
dla.ys. Near the coaJSt of England the convoy Wlas dispersed.
A few fasteJ." shliJps, in1cluding ·t he Barry, were brought around
southern England, and the rest of the group .w as spread from
Sco;tland to Southampton. The original plan had been to
land the 84th Division in Fmnce at Che11bourg, but the harb01r
Wla;s choked w~tih 1shipping. The 334th debarked a1t Southampton and preceeded to an assembly area near Wd:nchester on
10 Oc1Jober 1944.
Autumn WaJS a few days alWay. The Lanes near Winchester
had a iharvest orf blackberries which 'the men pLucked as· they
took ·conditioning hikes. Training Wa'S no ·l onger rigo•r ous but
special ca•r e Wals taken to ti nform the it roops in English customs.
The Fi,mlt and Second Battali'o ns w;ith the Special Units were
bt]leted in the b3.rmcks of the Roy al Winchester Rifles n ear
the center of torwn. The Third Ba1ttalion waiS sent to•Tichibome
Abbey, near ~lresford, and quartered in Niessen huts. Almost
ev.ery main received one pass to London and .eiVery ot!her:
evening •off. AmUISements were plenltiiful, from the roaring
Picadilly Circus in lJondon io the ancient auste:&>ty of Winchester Cathed11al. Engl:and was differen1t, no doubt of that ;
there was weak, warm !beer lilliStead od' Buidwelise'r, bread
puddling instead of ice cream, andi lefrt; side drhning whiah left
Service Company in aontinuous apprehension. The people
w ere shy but friendly. Everyone wore a unliform, and ~-n contrast 't•o the States, service seemed neilther dmlmla•t ti. c nO'r unique. There were hundreds of difrferences, some of which irked
the Armericans. Yet thlis interval was the rnost plea,s ant
m onth in the European 'Dheatre.
The Regiment re-embarked on 31 October, this time foil'
France. The Channel wa:s smooth but the Regiment was
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packed in seve~ral LCT's and the converted crulilser H. M. S.
Cheshire. The ·landiing was made at Omahia Beach, neaJ' the
neck of the Cherbourg peninsula, on the afternoon of 1 November. The hed:ger:ows had not been cleared of mines, necessitating a ten-mile forced march to 'a bivouac area near Mosle,
France. Three daY's were spent here awla iting orders. On
5 NovEmber 1944 the 334th moved v'ia truJck to another
bivouac area near Dreaux, France. It was in this move that
we first saw sli,gns of battle; Carentan and Saint Lo had been
swept back from the sltreehs where they ha:d lain. Therr:e were
a few knocked out enemy vehiJCles. The realction of some wa:s,
"It's just like the movies." B'ult reality wa:s only a few days
away .
. The cliimb across northern F.m nce continued. In the next
day's motor march we passed through Paris; through the Bois
de Bou1ogne, and along the right bank of the Seine. We
glimpsed the Champs Elysees and the Eiffel Tower. One of
the serials in the convoy had lunch beside Le Bourget Airfield
where IJinrdbergh had landed in hi·s first flight acr;oss lth\a
Atlantk. SwaybelfJiied C47''s were landing on the airs;trip
every thirty 's econds. Thtis day's march finally broug:ht us to
a l:Yivouruc one mile east of La:on, France.
Two days were spent in this area. On t'he 7th we entru.cked
for a cold ride to Wittem, HoHan:d, V'la Charleroi, arriving in
the mornring hours o;f the 8th. As we stepped :f\rom. the tr'llicks,
to the east we could hear our artillery firing against the Siegfried Line. The preparatilon was over. We were ready fo1r
battle.

2
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THE "BIG PICTURE"
The 334rth never should have entered combat. The Germans should ha~e quit before we ar11ived at W~ttem . After
the disaster in France, the Wehrmacht had fallen back to the
Sieg!l'ri'ed Line, content to horl d ar defensive position. ]t was
obvtioms that the Germans could not win the war. nt was
further obvtious that the rest of the flighting was to be, w1th
the exception of the Ardennes campaign, on German soil.
The Gen:nans had fallen into a mysticirsm, born of the:ir
Fuhrer's astrological hunches, in wM·c h they depended on a
Secret Weapon to defe'art the Allies. The V Bombs were heartbreakrlng harassments, yet they did not slow the Allied
advance. Stated simply, there is no weapon to defeat Infantry, other than stronger and more s!trongly sUJpported Infantry. The German General Starff must have known this.
Having waged war on other countries they also must have
known what a mli.tlitary campalign would do to the German
home1and. Their deCiision to :flight when there was no mathematical chance for victory was not motivated by any loftier
ideal than that of sraving their necks and soi(Jial positions.
Roughly, the Siegfried l.Jine ran from a point outside ArnhE!m, Holland., to the Swiss border. It varied in depth from
six to thtirty miles. The pillboxes were permanent fortifications, some with steel relinforcing concrete to a depth of
six feet. Most were mutUJal·ly supporiling, so that if one were
attacked others coU'ld come to ~Its defense. There wa:s little
chance o[ br1i1lilant tadical maneuvering. The Line could be
breached only by frontal pressure; surp:ril.se was impossible
except in looa:l engagements. The Germans knew exac:t dis- .
tances from point to pCJiint, enabling rt hem to shell road crossings and other tactlically important posdtions without fo:r'W'a'I'Id
observers. The ter:ra'in wars slightly undularting, offering little
defilade. The Germans had taken advantage of the undulation, for, as Captain Charles Hliiartrt, the CO of G Company
put i:t: "The hiUs fit tJhe rtmajectory. We were exposed to
grazing fire on a ·r everse slope." It was the mosrt highly fortified area in the world, yet it was taken in part by .the " civilians in uniliform" of the 334th.
ll'he Ninth Army, called in tJhose days a "ghost army''
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because it had not bee:n reported since it hJad ClaiptUJTed Brest
iour months previously, was assembled on the left flank of
the Amerkan First Army, and on 1Jhe right flank of the Br:Hish
XXX Corps. The 84th Division held the northernmost seotor
of the Ninth Army front, which meant it was the division
-on the left flank of the AEF.
The overall strategy of the British and the American
Ninth was to setize the commanding groiUllld overloolrrng the
Cologne-DuJSSeldorf plain by seizing the high ground on the
west bank of the Roer R'iver. The first step in the 84tlh Diviisi:on sector waJS the c~pture of the r a:illroad jundtio.n of Geilenkirchen, and the h[gh ground 1Jo the north on which the o'irt:y
<>f Prummern stood. Geilenkirche:n was to be taken frontally
by the 333d Regiment, while the British on the left were to
be one w.ing of a double envelopment. The 334th, wi,t h the
m!issi:on of talcing Prummern, was the other wing of thle
envelopment, as well as a thrreat to Lindern, Brachelen, and
the Roer River. 'Dhis was the first battle.

2*
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Pfc waggle, F Company, looks over the fiat terrain.

Wtirm -

Leiffarth

W R U R IC H E N

TO PRLENBERG

18 NOVEMBER-18 DECEMBER
THE SIEGFRIED LINE
D Day and H Hour were chosen as 0700, 18 November
1944. The Fd.rst Battalion Wats on the right, the Second Battalion on the le:f1t, and the Third Battalion in reserve. Each
a'1ltacking battalion had attached one pliatoon of anti-tank
guns, one-half a mine platoon, and a squadron of British
tanks, the Sherwood Rangers. The mine fields were cleared
a few hours before the attack and two gaps were marked
with tape, one for each attacking battalion. An intensive
artillery preparation was fired. We were to move through
the gaps, deploy on the other side in the high ground
between the front lines and Prumlmern, and move :f1orward
in a•s sault. The ground wa:s soggy, the weather was aold, and
the attack, scheduled for sulllrise, pushed off under cloudy
sk!ies that gave only a gr;ey hint of morn!ing.
The first dfufficulty was thrut the tanks could not get
through the .left gap. The stlugg,i sh mud was causing them to.
belly do·w n. The in:fiantry was ordered ili.Tougth the gaps.
without tank support, and the tanks were .ordered to catch
up when possible. The lead companies, A and E, went
through 1Jhe gaps without diffi,culty, the second compan!ies,
Band F, met some fire, but the reserve companies, C and G,
met intensdve 88, mortar and Slillall arms fiire when they
attempted to follow the lead companies. B anrl G Companies.
s.tamted a slow infirl :trahon tJh:r:ough the gaps by creeping and
cr.a1wling. In .the mean~time, the first two compames of each
battalion weTe deploying into their first objectives, the high
ground before Prummern. A Company ran mto six pillboxes:
during this deployment. The ass a:ult company olf the Second
Battalillon a'1sro ran into the expected heaiVy resirstance. As
planned, the leaiding letter compaJnies of each battalion were
left as battalion ·r es.eTVe whiile C and G Compand.es which had
infiltrrated by 1000, took thetir places in the assault. The advance conbnued. F Company knocked out six machine guns.
on the rwest flank of Geilenkirrchen. The Fj.rst Bratltailion moved
on Prummern; the Second Battalion moved toward the high
1
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German pillboxes and communication trench near Leiffarth (Note Panther Tank by pillbox)

ground west of the town, high ground which would command
both Prurn'mern and Geilenkirchen.
The Germans could see us comiil!g. They were str10ngly
emplaced, w€111 armed, and were on'l y slilghtly surprised by
the attack. It w.as later revealed that they had bee:n expediing
a push in this sector and had fortified it with two new divisions. The str'ongest partt of these divisiiooo were being held
up at Linnlch by our air s.uppor1t which was keeping the roads
rea•sonably free of German vehicles.
By noon, the German piisoners had been started back in
a steady stream. A Oompany had found 200 in a trench beside
the railroad be1tween Breil ail!d Prummern. Interrogation
reveaJled we were meeting the 9th Panzer DiV'is~on, the 15th
Panzergrenadier Division, and the 343d Regtimeil!t of the 183d
Volksgrenadier Division. 'Dhey had been forewarned of our
attack and had made preparations for it. The day before the
334ith jumped off, the Amer:Ucan 102d Di!vi.s'iiOn and 2d Armored Division had attrucked on our right. Th1e intensity of
the altJtacks made the Germans apprehensive in all sectors.
"We had been told th'a t we were to be attacked by green
troops," saJid 10ne offi1cer at the 343d, "and we though!t it wou1ld
be easy. I have fought in Africa and Russia, and have n ever
seen soldiers attack with the ferocity of your division.''
The Regiment pushed forward aggressively. The Second
Ba·ttali!on :fiorced itself on'to the objective, the !high ground
sou:thwes.t of Prummern, gua·r anteei:ng the 333d's aJttack on
Geilenki.rchen. At 1510 this ground WaJs seou(Te. On the right,
the Fivst Battailion moved into Prummern frontally . Band C
Companies were the first to enter t he town. The sky was
darkening, and our al:r cover was less useful.
At 1600 hligher headquarters issued an order for a continuJation of the aJttack. The First Ba:tltla'lion was to take the
gr1ound directly nor:th of Prummern; the Secoil!d Ba<ttalion
was to continue nor,th of its present position.
We knew little of the strength am1 pos:i.itlions of the Germans in tihe new objective. We had made plans for a continuation of t!he attack as far as the Roer, but paslt Prtummern
the method of act:i!on was more sketchy and not as detaJiJled.
As the new pl!ans were bein1g put into effect the First Batt1ai1Jion reported !heavier resistance inside Prummern. The
ruined building1s were excellent hideaways for German
snipers who were making the streets untenab.le. Enemy arti.l25

lery was shelling the town. The German reserves, previously
hindered by our ai1r support, were moving up to counter'attack. The F~irst Battalion morved to an area in tJhe southwest
corner of Prummern, an orchard, and dug irn for the night.
An oversight was the failure to notify the Chaplain, the Fi!'lst
BaJttahon Medics, and the attached pliatoon of an1Ji ...Jfnnk guns
of the move. This weak force constituted the only Americans
in Prummern that night. The AT guns engaged six German
tanks morving into Prummern in a column. The. third of the
six was knocked ou't, hlod{!ing the road. The lead tank r1a n
over one gun, burt; was knocked out by another, and the second
tank broke through the defense but waG wrecked by a mine
:Dield on the west edge of town.
The Second Battalion was att tempting to readh its, n ew
area, but was halted by intense mo-rtar and art:ililery fire. A
concerted ef:Dort was made at 2400, and the Battalion adVIanced perhaps one hundred yards, but it made no sizeable
dent in the German defense. It Wlas time to use our rese-rves.
The Third BaJttatlion WaJS in an assembly area near Breil.
Orde!'ls were issued sending it to Prummern in a column of
companies. The Third was to deploy on the near side of the
town, and pass aTound the right flank of the city. The First
Batta'lion was to move through Prummern, and with the help
of the Third Battalion take the ground between Beeck and
Prummern. The attack was to move forward at 1200, 19 November. We had hit the enemy a strong body blow 1Jhe day
before; we were trying for a knockout an tlhe 19th. "Morve
forWia:rd if poosibie" WaJS also· a part of the orders passed down
to Regtiment, whicih meant that if we took the low ground
between Prummern and Beeck, we were to continue to the
hill beyond Beeck.
At 1145 the Third Ba't talion executed its flanking movement and dosed with the .enemy. The First Battalion had
started its move through the town, and in the face otf heavy
machine gun fire moved through Prummern and into the
'fields beyond. The Germans were on ground above them
watChing thelir mo,vements. When they were approximait ely
200 yards north of the town, the Germans th-rew in tremendous concentrations and forced 1Jhe Battalion to dig in. The
Third Batt·a lion carried the attack, alone. At 1550 the British
XXX Corps ArtHlery sheUed the area and rolled the barrage
toward Beeck. Following closely behind the artillery, the
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Thi rd Battalion Aid Men help German shot in stomach at Lindern.

Third Battalion moved into the assigned area between Prummern and Beeck. The ·F irst Battalion continued to consolidate
the ground it had taken the day before.
To comply 1with the order ,move forward if possible,'' and
to ex1ploit the po1tency of the barrage, I and K Oomnmies
triEid to move from the }ow ground. They m'o ved only a short
distance, but were under perfect German observation, and
were halted. L Company was commi·t ted from batJtal.i on
rese'r'Ve and swung around the right orf the batta<li:on. The
mO'Ve helped very little. The German positions on the high
ground WEre so strong that continuatton Wias impossible. "We
were looking into their throats•," s•ailld Pf:c P!aiUl Leger of K
Company, "and their tonJsils were on fire." 'Dhe Third Battalion moved into def:iJlade and dug in for the night.
We attacked again on 21, 22, 2'3 November, but the story
was a .carbon copy. We would kill, capture and wound many
Germans, take a few pillboxes, and meet the same frustrating fire from above. On the 23d the Third Battalion attacked
with the 405th Infantry on our right. Physically led by 'Major
Charles R. Murrah, the Third BatJtalion advanced 1000 yards,
200 yards short of Be€ck, but could not gain the town. The
Third BattaLion h'a d heavy casualties. We jabbed at the left
side, right sidE, and cen:t er of the town wiJth combinati-ons of
battalions. Aifter se'Ven continuoUJs days of combat and attack,
we were re1lieved by fresh batta'li1ons of other regiments. W e
moved to Pa:lenberg for reorganization. The re,s:t of ilhe month,
26-30 November, was spent in division reserve.
What had happened in this firs:t attack? The £irSit day we
h!ad mo.ve.d_ like a Rose BoiWl football team unti-11600. At 1600
we hJad losrt; our drive and from 19-26 November our alttacks
were consistently frustrated in terms of geographic gain.
Were we jusrt a poor uni·t, as many m E'In had been say~ng? The
enemy didn't think so. Or had we hit s ::Jmething too large
for a regim ent?
There is a cL:~ar answer. Lindern Wias taken before Beeck.
La•ter we took Leiffarth befo.r e Wtirm and Mtillendlod. There
is a ridge r.u nn;ing werslt of Gereonsweiler through Beeck.
Wtir:m and MtiUenJdorf. Thi•s ridge was the s'trongest section
of the Siegfried Line from the Dutch border at Rimburg to
the Roer River. In our sector this was the stronges1t part orf
the s1tnongest bne in the world. In no other engagemEnt did
the Germans resist as they did our first week in combat, and
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never again did we have to pay the price per foot thart we
paid before the evi!l smEJlling debris of Beeck.
Our next assignment was tJo the east, between Linnich,
Lindern, and B:uachelen. The area enclosed by this tri,a ngle
was tihe objective of our Corps, the XIII. It Wlas the higih
ground overlooking the Roer River, necessary :Bor any large
scale crossing of the river. The key to the area was .control
of a hlar'd surf;a.ce road between Linnich anid Lindern. To
protect the attack, to flank Wiirm, Mullendonf, and Lindern,
the First Battalion was ordered tJo take Leiffarrt;h, no.rtlh of
Beeck and WEl3't of Lindern. The Se.cond BatbalioiD. was to take
the southwest poi'tion of the Linnioh-Lindern___;Brachelen
tl'liang.le, and the Third Battalion was to seize tihe balance.
This attia•ck was airpost as difficult as our last mission.
It started far less successfully, and met the same German
units. The Germans were not surprised, and not unprepared.
The att/ack was to sta·rt at 0730, 30 November. The Second
Battalion moved from Pa,lenberg to Ap'Weiler where it was
shelled. From Apweiler it continued to Gereonsweiler. W·e
were taking over another unit's area, and this unit, the 405th
Regiment of the 102dDivision, had just finished an exhausting
attack. Somewhere in the switch, pi'oper liaison and reconnaissance between the two units was n:o't maid:e. Major (then
Captain) J·a mes Johnston reported that the Second BaUa1lion
melt resistance 1500 yards farther back than expected. The
Third B:a.ttalion was engaged in· hea1vy fighting two hours
before it was due at the line of departure. Heavy fire was
pouring from en:emy posi1tions in Linnich tO n our right fronJt.
By H hour we had sustained h eavy casualties a:nt.:l some disorganization. The First BattalioiD. jumped off at 0730 for
Leiffarth. It fought i1Js. way from Prummern into an incomplete tank-tr:ap east-northeast O·f Beeck. The enemy artillery had the trap pinpointed and threw an intensive con:centmtion at the First Battalion, forcing it to dig in.
·'I1he First was stopped'; the Second and Third we:re in a
state of diso-rganizJation w hich negated a cont'intuance of the
aHack until later in the afternoon. We htad fought orur way
to the line of departure, but had :tost contact with the Regimenit on our right, the 405th, further delaying the attack.
Liaison wa·s finally effected, and another attack went forward
at 1500. W e moved to within 200 yards o:f the LinniohLindern road, but were unable to cross even with an attempt

29

This German is attached to a tellermine . Pfc William Farmer, B Companl',
cuts the wire leading to the booby trap.

a1t inf'Htration. The fire, principally small arms and mortar,
w.as coming from the northeast, outside the regimental
boundary. 'l'he Germans were throwing heavy interdidory
fire over the mad. This attack Wlas a1lso discontinued.
Our toughness brought us •a few reluobant gains on 1 December. Our Second and Thitd Ba1ttaNons CO[ltinued the
attack with tJhe roughes't sort of reorganJziation. Men were
oounted of1f, assigned to platoons, squads and companies
without regard for previous assignments. The Germans were
counter-attacking on our left flank at Lindern, and to ease
the pressure against the 335th, which had placed two battalions in the town, we tried again to seize the high ground
over the Linn'i ch-Lin:dern road. We jumped off a't 1500 and
came within 300 yards of the road before we were halted.
Both battalions dug in.
To provide flank protection f01r the Firs<t Battalion as.s ault
on Leiffarth, the Third Battalilon was moved to an area 1000
yards diue south of Lindern. The Th~rd was to su:ppor.t the
335th in its defense agains't the German counter-attack. The
Second Battalion had to take the Corps' objective. The Firsrt
Battalion, held under orders afte~y its halt in the tank trap
near Beeck, had yet to take Lei':flfarth.
We did i't. The Third Ba,t tahon moved into the west edge
of Lindern at 1300, 7 December. The First Battalion moved
from its area into LeiffurtJh. At 0400, in a ni!ght advance, the
Second Battalion move across the Linnich-Lindern road and
into the hi.gh ground beyond. The Second',s a!divance was s:o
swi:flt and quiet that the Germans were surprised. H Company
madhine gunners were amazed to see a German dhow li.ne
opem:ting in the early morning hours. As the Germans lined
up for food, the machine guns opened up.
The FiTst Battalion's advance was equally as rapid. The
326th Field Artillery, our blnaking back, provided interference into Le'iffarth with a heavy barmge. The doughboys
dio:nbed from their holes and sprinted for the objectives. FirSit
Battalion followed the shells so closely thart it looked as if the
barrage were falling into the forward elements. The Germ·a n
attempt to defend Leiffarth with small arms fire was quickly ·
overtcome. The town was ours half an hoUtr atfter we had
asiSiaulted it. We had mopp£d up our sector of Lindern with
the Third Battalion.
After the attack phase whiJch las,ted mom 30 November
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to 3 December the 334th Infantry went into a h()lding phase
and Colonel (then Lt Col) ChaT'les E. Hoy asSIUmeld command.
Although it oould not be seen at the time, the Ninlth Army
drive had put an enormous amorunt of pressure on the Germans, so much tihat the Ger:mra:ns must !have been rorced to
pJan their future Ardennes attack to relieve the threat to the
Roer. The 84th Division had era.s1ed the Geilenkirrc hen salient
in our fines and had sturck a raw finger into the German
derfell!Se along the Roer. We were not far from the Roer which
meant we were not far from the end of t'he Siegfried Line.
If 1Jhe Germans chose to defen~d stDongly the wes't bank of the
RC)er, there was danger that they would be pushed back
agains't the river in the Linnirch-Lindern area. In turn, there
were two things the Germans courld do. The first wa's a counter-offensli'Ve of such magnitude as to rslieve the pressure
a'long the Rner. The other w:a;s to contain our salient and
others whiclh had probed close to the Roer. In our sector they
were to attempt to retake Leiffarth and regain oontrol of the
high ground, Lei:ffairth-Wiirm-Miillendorf, while sheUing
any roads, cws6road or to!Wn!S available to us as supply instruments for the crossing of the river.
There was !l ittle ra~~tivity until 16 December 1944. The
units were rotated between the lines anid Palenberg. Pa·l enberg was a safe place to be, but in the damp, unlit cellars or
in the settled dust of a three-month old shelling there was
little connection with the things the men had ledlt in September. Mail call mated a man's eyes and throa~t. Reinforcements were so numerous it seemed a,s if the Regiment had a
new :flace. Trench foot was common. Yet from the sufferings
the men hiad undergone in the field, from the danger and
mu~h they had shared, there began a comradesihip and a
pride in the units, fr,orrn squad to Divisi,on, whi<ch wa·s later
to be one of the prime factol's in the hi:stork Ardennes stand.
Oarll trhe 334th a "replacement outfit," or say "we coruldn't
fight our way through a pa1per bag," the catoh words of the
Howze-Olaiborne days, and there was an immedi,a te reaction
and a hundred tales to illustr'ate how good a unit the 3:~4th
was. In the P.alre nberg celLars where the exhaus!te:d men lay,
so quiet that the candleHght was frozen and the dgarette
smoke hung in punctuating tiers through the room, the men
talked of the soldiers who didn't make it: Fred Fluty,
Mercer Yeagar, Ben Goodman, David Powell, Don Smith,
3
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The supporting chemical mortars swing into action at Prummer n.
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The Germans knew the exact coordinates of this street corner in Geilenkirchen.
There was no speed limit for Service Company drivers.

Edward Acuna and so many others that the names were a
poetic rollcaH. The Siegfrried Line seemed interminable. It
was no longer "if I get it" it was "when I get it." Everyone
knew the Unilted Natilons were going to win the war, but if
the Siegfried Line stretched to the Rhine it wo;u ld cost us a
genemtion. Althouglh the Russians were advancing, that was
a symbol and not a fact. A fa:at w:a's the destruction of a
Pcmther tank near Lindern, a fact to .b e seen, towched, and
cheered. Wha:t 1Jhe flannel-suited commentators sraid about
sitx millton Russians wa!S to be heard: attentive'ly, but what
W 1ats real was the throttled Banther west otf Lindern.
The Germans counter-attacked in the Leiffarth sector on
the morning of 16 December 1944. A heavy aTitillery barrage
wrus laid on our line~ and the German infantry followed none
too closely to retake our salient in their high ground. The
First BattaJ.i1on was struck by a Germ:an battalion attempting
envelopment f~om the no'I1iheast and no'r:thwest. Our artilliery
was effective in dispersing the enemy's reserve company. The
atta,cking oompaniels penetrated our lines but were eliminated
in a sharp fire fiJght. Those that infiltrated were either killied
or captured. We stood fast . In total 80 Germans were
klilled, 200 Wlounded, and 73 pri's oners taken, inc:luding those
casualties inflicted WJh,en they continued their attla ck at 1800.
The evening a~ttruck came from Wiirm, with the strengtih of
one company. Our artiillery fired eleven batt'a:liilo ns, and the
First Battallion 'had been reinforced with a Tank Ass1a ult
Team. The attacking forces we~e unable to tak~e any ground.
There was plenty of time to plan the next attack. To protect our Leirffarth salient and to roll up the high g:rtound to
the west, the next targets were Wiirm and MU]lendorf. The
CO made exhaustive plans for 1Jhe attack. There were many
pillboxes in the area, and many choices had to be made in the
attack. Every poss~ble eventuaHty was considered, and alternate plans were made should the primary plans be frustrated.
Men wer.e briefed, from battall·i on commanders to squad
leaders. The houses were numbered, groups were informed
otf particular targets and shown their line of attack on sand
tables. 125 guns were to support our attack. The First
Battalion was to seize Wiirm; the Second, Miillendorf. "D"
was 18 December 1944. "H" for the 'Second was contingent
upon the First Battalion's success.
The 125 guns blew Wiirm arud Mullendorf into history
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shortly before 0900. At 0900 a red smoke shell was fired and
the doughs climbed from their foxholes, fol:liow.ing 1Jhe artillery barrage within fifty yards, running at top speed for
their objectives, disregarding weak fire sent by the Germans.
Our prisoners were so dazed by the speed and f.erocity of our
Infantry and Artillery that they were weeping when captured. Five minutes after the attack began we were in Wiirm,
silencing the scattered fire earning from a few strong p[aces.
The in:iiantry broke through to the fieLds beyoTIJd the 001wn
and dug in, awaiting :flurtlher orders. We had very light oasualties: tw,o men slightly burned.
After Wiirm was attacked, the Second Battalion assaulted
Miillendorf. Jumping off from the direction of Beeck, the
Second folllowed ~ts supporting artillery as closely as had the
First. Thirty minutes after the attack started, the town was
secure. In the attack phase we taok 114 PW's and had only
four wounded. The operation was wen planned and weLl executed. The tmops advanced with marching fire. The Germans
were caught off-.b alance. No counter-attack was met e~cept
a mortar barr~age thTown into the newly captured towns.
The firS't and la:st days olf our first month in combat were
our most spectacular. Between them we become a combat
outfit. We had learned how to kill Germans most efficiently
withoUJt being killed ourselves. We had carved througih the
Siegfried Line untill we sltood a few thousand yards from the
R!oer River, which was to be the last natural boundary in the
west. We had bled and won. It is f.or other\S to say hiow significant our actions were, but it is true that we had ripped a
holle in Germany's strongest defense. Now it was time to
bLock her last offensive.
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The draw is under observation and fire from Wtirm. The doughboys sprint
for safety, one at a time.

Coming from foxholes K Company assaults Beeck. A few moments later
enemy artillery halted the advance.

WINTER IN BELGIUM
DEFENSE
It is only in retrospect, or at a safe distance from the front,
that ruction seems dramattc. Engaged in an ~actilon, tJhere is
only roOJm for fear and planning; drama comes li n re-telling
or remembering. :If !the soldier comes out safe!ly, the experience of dianger achieves lustre and hue. The action in Belgium which threatened at four times to disorganize the
Regiiment, became the most talked-of crumpa1ign rumong the
veterans of the Regiment. As Major James Johl1Siton said, "I
wouid never go 't lhrough the fighting again, but I IWiould not
give up my experiences for 't he staff's payroll."
Marsha1l Gerd von Rundstedt had thrown siXity dii'visions
agailrust ten Armerican divi:sions in an attack whicfu commenced
16 December. 1Rundstedt's intention \\nas to drive ,t hr!ough the
hiilly Ardennes •to the Meuse and cut our main supply r1oute
between Liege and Namur. W:hat the further objectiv.es were
would depend upon the success of ·t h'e attack. Another prime
reason for the drive Wia:s the intense pr esSu'!"e being putt on the
Siegfried Line by 't he 'concerted British an·d American drive
in the North. He did not cut the Liege-Namur road nor
reach the Meuse, pa.rttally because 'o ur Marche-Hotlton sltand
blocked his northward movement, but he did achieve time £or
his defense od' the Siegfried Line.
There was li·t tle warning of our m:i ssion in the defense of
the Marohe-Hotton sector. After the Wiirm-Miillendorf
a1ttack we shifted battalions in the lines. Everyone ta.lked of
40
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Artillery killed this German at Hatton, Belgium.

two ·w eek's rest in 'Hoilland. The Stars ,a,nd Stmpes we received
were three days old ~and gave no hint of the Gerrnan drive.
SHAEF had put a dlamp on radio news, and all that was
he:ard was ·a report of smalll 's.cale counter-attacks li n the F!irst
Arttny sector.
r,t WCliS in this atmosphere of speculation that the Regiment
received its orders. The fi:rst orders were simple. " Go to Verviers, Belgium," At Verviers an Army representative met
Oolonel Hoy and told hJiJm to proceed to Marche, Begium.
"Ciheck at some poinJt near there before entering to see if the
town is clear 'Of Germans. You may hiave <to filght your way in."
On 20 December we moved a:s 1a combat team to Marche,
v:iJa Aachen and Verviers. "You may have to fight your way
into the town." Colonel Hoy led the convoy in the Jead jeep.
Darkness oame early bUit speed was essential. The v~h1icles
turned on their head!ligh:ts after half the fifty-mDe trip was
accomplished. As far as we knew, the only safe grorund was
that before our headlights.
The Regiment moved int:o MaTche and set up a perimeter
defense, a circle of riflemen 360 degrees 'around the city. M0!3:t
of the R egiment was billeted in and around a central s'choollhouse while the sta:fif opened the n ew maps to see what tt hey
were up against.
It was a bewildering picture. Where were the Germans?
No one knew. A report came in that the Germans weTe in
Hatton, a town abou!t six miles northeast, and through which
our convoy, lights blazing, had passed an hour before. Service
Company heard burp guns iaJS they passed through ~the town.
What was the ter11ain? Unlike the Siegfried Uine: h eavily
wood~d half-mountains, deep cuts and wooded gor1
g es thr.ough
wlhich an enemy force coUJld \infirtrate withollllt observation.
The weather was cold, the ground frozen. The men around the
periphery of Marche reported, "45 minutes to dig a foxhol e
near Prummern. Fi!Ve hours here." Where were ·our forces?
Simply, there were none, excluding a company of combat
engineers who had built few road blocks between Marcihe
and La Ro_che. Some cooks and bakers of the 3d Armored
Divison had belied their rear-echelon status and with a platoon ofF Company under Lt. Cliifton L. Ma1c La1c hlan fought
off an armored attack 'a cross the Ourthe in Hatton after we
passed. As far as we knew, we had no unit on the flanks . The
only thing certain was that we would defend Marche.
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Third Armored Division's rear echelon knocked out this tank at Hatton, Belgium.

The first pmblem was to estimate the direction from which
the Germans would attack. We could assume :the 'locail. attack
would come in the same direction as the major attack, east
to west. It was equany probable that the Regiment was on
one ft~ank of the German salient which meant the line should
be established against a drive from the south. The latter
was chosen as tihe most probable directton of attack. Our line
was set on a ridge a mile and a half southeast of the MarcheHotton road. The line was six miles long, more than three
times the length of the line we bJad left in Germany. The left
anchor was the Ourtihe River. The right anchor was established the next day when another regiment of the Division
moved into the west end of Mar,che. A series of small villages
were between Pidges: Verdenne, Marenne, Menil, Ha·m pteau,
Ho:tton. Oniginally, the 'Dhird Battalion held the line from
the right anchor to Meni,l and the Second from Meni'l to
Hampteau and along tfu.e Ourthe River to Hotton. When
the fight began, it wa's necessary to shift units 1into these
areas and to oommit the First Battalion, which was the Regiment's reS'erve.
A glance :at the map wi11 show that the principal problem
in the defense of Marche was t'he control 01f the MarcheBourdon~Hotton road. Should the Germans cut the road at
Bourdon the Second Battalion would have no route of withdmwal, other than ·o ver the Ourthe or tlhmugh bad secondary
roads to the N or,t h. While Marohe was our primary point
of defense, the Marche-Hotton rood was Hs k ey.
We took up the line in the morning hours of 21 December
1944. The Second Battalinn sent a platoon ofF Co:m1pany to
this area, in 'light of previous reports telling of German
s~trength in Hotton and Hampteau.
In Hotton, Company F
met seven Mark V tanks, a half-track, and 20 infantrymen.
In a sharp fight two tanks w ere knocked out and the Germans
withdrew. A patrol from E Company found Hampteau swarming with Germans. E Company drove the Germans from
the town and took up defensive positions. The Third Battarl.ion
went 'i nto line with less diffi.Jculty. C Company h ad been
posted in an Outpo,s t Line, 2000 yards ~ahead 'Of our main
line of resistance.
The r egiment 'was far understrength. Foxholes were
150 yards apart over a six mile line. As 1!he men Wlai1:ed for
the inevitable ·a ttack there was an understandable loneliness,
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accentuated by the overpower·ing silence of tall hills and
thick pine forests. The tirst snows o[ winter bung in some
crevices, a beautifUl treachery revealing marks of patrols
an:d foretelling 1:Jhe gigantic drifts s·oon to fall.
On the 22d there was a trickle orf information. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Plat·o on was sent out to make
contact with the enemy. It found him at Hamoulrand enga·g ed
in a fire fight. A large enemy patrol engaged F Company
at Hotton but withdrew aifter suffering casualties. We captured a German o.f ficer motoncycling to Verdenne as an advance billeting detail. A·t 1Jh[s time it was revealed we were
in the sector of the 116th P 1anzergrenadier Divis~on, a tough
outfit composed principally of young men. AT Company laid
hundreds of mines throughout the area, .constructed roadblocks, and !helped prepare demo'lilli:on charges in the br·i dge
at Hotton. There w1as not as yet any indication of the enemy's
strength, nor the area hom which his attack would come.
The 23d was also spent on the razor's edge. The repor•t s
from other sections of the ·A·r dennes front showed that the
German's drive to the east had been halted at the tip. The
stand of the lOlst Airborne at Bastogne slowed the southern
expansion of the df;i ve. The Germans were to force northward and we stood in their way. By the 23d, enemy reconnaissance had increased in our sector: a stgn of attack.
On the night 23-24 December the Germans shelled Bourdon on the Marche-Hotton road. Simultaneouslly, 120 German infantry infiltr-ated throu•gh an uncovered dmw into a
small woods between Mar;che and Bourdon. Although they
were lbehind our lines, for a few hours there was no indication of their presence. At 0630 the Germans captured a
platoon lea:der, 'and a pl·a'toon S'e rgeant of I Company. An
I Company patrol followed the footprints from th:e foxholes
occupied by the men. Strangely, the tracks led to the rear,
into the woods where the Germans had infiltrated. The patrol
was fired on. At the same time, a PW reported the position
to the Int'errog·ation Team. Li·ttle 'time was lost. K Company,
which had been in Third Battalion reserve, was brought to
the northeast edge of the woods, while A Company and a
platoon of tanks moved up from Marche to the southwest
portion. The enemy waJS to attack at the same time we
attacked him, according to a captured document. He wa.s late
organizing, and our companies were attacking the woods in
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Verdenne, left; Marenne, right; Bourdon, top. The clump of trees in the center is the location of the pocket,

a bayonet ·a nd small arms a<ction. Whlile the woods were
being flushed, the Germans complicated matters by attacking
V erdenne, in the center of our ML'R and in the area covered
by K Company before it had been pulled out to flush the
pocket. It is thought that both German forces, the one in
the woods and the one which attacked Verdenne, were coordinated in a si.ng1le drive to out the Marche-Hotton road
at Bourdon and between Bourdon and Marche. Our attack. in
the woods was successful and the Germans plans were upset.
,A t 1550 the other tine ofGermans attackedVerdenne. The
First and Second Platoons of I Company, vastly outnumbered
.and without support from K Company which had been moved
to the right, were overrun. The remainder of I Company withdrew to the vkinity of Bourdon for reorganization. K Oompany, back from the attack, was put on a ridlge behind Verdenne to limit the enemy's penetration.
The situation was tense. There were no reserves between
our lines and Bourdon. Contra[ 1of Verdenne, the •c enter of
our lines, meant the enemy had improved his chances to cut
the Marche-Hotton road. Marenne could be easily flanked,
and our ridge along the Marenne-Menil-Hampteau line
coulld be mad:e untenable, if the enemy had enough force.
It was either retake Verd:enne or retreat. The decisi'o n w1as
to attack.
From the shallow trenches outside Verdenne where our
Third BattaLion lay, the doughboys could hear the Germans
•Ceil,ebrating Christmas Eve. The Nazis had ·a merry Christmas
Eve. Hitler had promised them that N~w Year's Day would
find them standing at the English Channel. All that lay
before them were a few Americans, a few inf,a ntrymen from
the 334th Regiment. S·ome of the Germans we11e happi[y
drunk. A few doughboys from I Comp.a ny's Second Platoon,
hidden in a chickencoop in Verdenne, heard the laughter.
The Americans outside the town were co'ld and apprehensive.
German tanks were prob'ing the woods around Verdenne.
L Company, 333d, and K Company, 334th, were designated
to retake Verdenne. L Company, 333d, part of division
reserve, was brought up through Bourdon, but the guide took
an incorrect turning and brought the support too far to the
left. They engaged in a fire fight with an enemy group
moving through the woods toward Bourdon.
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In the meantime, the A.rtillery had promised us all possible support. All available .artillery, including 't he chemical
mortars, were mustered for the bauage.
K Company jumped at 0100 Christmas Day 1944. ':Dhe
artillery preparation had been so heavy and so thorough that
the Germans were stunned. K Company's first wave, 13 men,
overran the town, and its second wave mopped up Verdenne.
305 PW's were taken Christmas Day, all from the 116th
Panzergrenadier. Many Germans were wearing American
equipment taken when Rundstedt's divisions had captured
American supply dumps.
In the slow J.ight of Christmas day it was discovered that
another threat to the Marche-Hotton road remained. Sometime before the artillery preparation on Verdenne, another
large force o:f Germans had moved behind our lines into the
same wooded area between Bourdon, Verdenne, and Marche.
The size of this pocket was not known. Parts of A and B
Companies were sent to engage the enemy forces and report
their strength. These small groups ran into heavy fire from
armo.,r and infantry. Reinforcements were needed.
Again, part .of the Division reserve was committed. A and
B Companies, 333d, were to move on the pocket at 0300
26 December in a night attack. These compani•es were
repulsed and the pocket was further strengthened by German
tanks which engaged our A Company the next morning and
joined the pocket.
This pocktet behind our lines was now a greater threat
than the attack at Verdenne had been. German strength in
this area totaled ove:c thirty armored vehicles and more than
two hundred infantry. This group, had it wished, aould have
seized MaDche 'l ying a few thousand yards heilow, defended
by parts of AT Company and ·Headquarters Company. It
couM have taken Bourdon, severing the all-important
Manche~Hotton road.
For some reason, never explained,
the Germans sat in the woods. This error killed the ma,j ority.
From a bare farmhouse on a treeless ridge across the road,
the Third Battalion Headquarters was able to observe the
exact position of the enemy.
That day, 26 December 1944, was the wHdest day in ou1
action in the European T1reatre. We beat off German attacks
all day and an night. In the morning of the 26th ala troops
were cleared from the area above Bourdon and an emergency
48
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concentration was fired into the pocket. A ten millJUte barrage
was fired in our support by 4.2 mortars, the 326th F'A Battalion and our Cannon Company, a battalion of 155 mm
howitzers, and a battalion of 240 howitzers. Tree !bursts,
time fire, high explosive and armor piercing sheHs left
wreckage never since equalled in .t he regimental areas. The
few Germans still alive tried frantically to regain their !lines.
When our patrols went into the area at midnight, 200 Germans were dead, and 25 armored vehicles . were destroyed.
The artillery was shi!fted to the threat on the left flank
of the Third Battalion where Germans were engaging L Company, 333d. The art1llery dispersed this attack. When the
artiHery stopped firing, the 3216th had only six rounds of
ammunition left.
'I'he defeat at Verdenne and the fiasco in the Bourdon
pocket •Cost the Germans mor·e vehicles and men than they
cou]d afford. Twke they had been within 2000 yards of
their 'objectives, and twice numerically in!ferior American
forces had stopped them. The German cry "Too much quantity beat us" was not supported by faclls. The Regiment had
met them understrength and had thrown them baJck. This
was not all. Our third victory in four days took p!l ace a few
hours after the Bourdon pocket had been cleared.
During the afternoon hours of the 26th the Germans
struck at G Company in Hampteau, using a full battalion.
Hampteau was in a valley. The Germans seized control oif
one slope and a road leading into the town along the river.
G Company fought back, driving the Germans off the ridge
and to the r~ght. In the meanwhile F Company was brought
from its reserve position in Hotton to iblotck a road leading
from the hills to Hotton. The Germans s;lid off to the right
and engaged F Company. Ste cond Battalion Headquarters
Company was the only reser·v e left to the Batta'lion. ll t threw
up a horseshoe defense at the juncbon of the road from the
hills and the Marche-Hotton road. The Germans struck
E Company shortly after hitting F Company. The Second
Battalion was completely engaged along its ·MLR. The Germans penetrated the lines far enough to cut the MenilHamptearu road.
Meanwhiie another large force o'f German armor and
infantry sudde:nily swung from the hills to the road between
Verdenne and Marenne. This force swung into Marenne,
4*
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defended by a few L ComiJany men. It was useless to fight.
The men hid 1in the houses when it became apparent the
Germans were not going to stop in the town. These two
forces had radio ,communication and were aiming to strike
at Menil simultaneously from the right and front. Our
forces in Menil ~were radioed to be prepared. E Company,
a platoon of Anti-Tank Company, and I Company, 333d,
were in town.
In the tim:e it took for the German armor to trav·erse
the distance to Menil "daisy chains" were set out, and a few
riflemen moved to foxholes along the road. AiT Company had
sown the area a·round Menil with mines, but the firmness of
the frozen earth had made it imposs~ble to bury the charges.
'Dhe only communication open wan a sma'll SCR 300 set
manned by P:flc Raymond Beauchamp, and after the initial
warning every set in the regiment and many in the division
tried to pikk him up. A real fight was coming.
Our meager plan was to allow the first tank to come into
town where a bazooka team headed by Pfc William Ivler
would knock it out. The second tank was to be "daisy
chained" by a crew h idden in a cellar. From then on it was
anybody's fight. In the mearrwhile, the artillery had fired
an emergency concentration of the Menil---<Hampteau road,
forcing the Germans to come into Menil frontarlly.
Beauchamp reported that the head of the cdlutmn was in
sight. A motorcycle led the rco1umn, blinking a green
headlight. When the column closed near the town the motorcycle allowed the first tank to pass. The first tank, earmarked
for a bazooka sheH, tri·ed to make a small turn in the stveet
and slammed against eleven anti-tank mines piled against
the building. Sixty-six pounds of TNT went off. r:I'he tank
was destroyed.
,T he German column began to depaoy. The few American
rifleman opened up. Beauchamp went off the air "to catch
himself a couple of Krauts." Led by the German ·i nfantry,
the deployed ~tanks came to a mine field on the south edge
of town. Their 1infantry did not warn them or did not see
the mines. The first tank hit a mine and was knocked out.
The second vehicle, a half-track, echeloned slightly to the
rear, struck a mine a moment later and was knocked out.
In qui·ck succession the rest of the column found mines on
which to destroy themselves. Panic stricken, three halftracks
1

1
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swung beyond the minefield only to destroy themselves
in a secondary field in the southwest corner of town. As the
balance fled, our artillery continued destroying more vehicles'.
EXJcept for the mopping up, the battle was over. We had
knocked out four Panther tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight
motorcycles and had captured over 100 prisoners. Argain
Cannon Company and the 326th FA supported us so fully
that only forty rounds were left when the battle was over.
'I'hat was the last defensive action in the sector. We held
Marche, ,e ven though the war map at SHAEF and in the
Stars and Stripes had given it to the Germans on 22 December 1944. We were now ready to attack.
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WINTER IN BELGIUM ATTACK
The Germans had failed to reach the Meuse, out the
Liege-Namur road, or take Marche. A slo·w withdrawal from
the tip of the Bulge had begun by 1 January 1945 when the
334th was moved from the Marche-Hotton sector aicross the
Ourthe River. In the attack to i£oll01W, a coordinated drive by
the 84th Division and the 2d iA.rmored Division, the 334th
was initially in division reserve.
The fight to drive the Germans from our sector in Belgium
was a puzzling, difficult job. The fight was more often up and
down than in a cOiffipass direction. Steep mountains were
wooded so heavily ·t hat a fighter could not see ten ·f eet ahead
of his path. Fields o'f fire were correspondingly short and
frustrated. Roads were icy and almost impossible to use. In
many cases supplies were carried by hand. As the Germans
retreated they had time to strew many anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines. The weather was the climax of hardship:
thick snow lay over the countryside, masking the ground and
freezing any unwary soldier who slept. From the infantryman's point of view it ·w as an unsolvable problem. The fighting called for a clear head and continuous use of intelligence,
but ther·e was little chance for sleep. The tactiiCian had to
think constantly in terms of ground ~levation and in a series
of interlocking actions which would dislodge the enemy from
positions of advantage. There is a popular saying that war is
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Devantave, right.

The single house in the center is Consy, behind which runs Consy Ridge.

J

A Mark V tank mounting an 88 is searcheu near Marcouray.
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like chess. If it is, we were playing three dimensional chess
in the Ardennes.
Our first objective was Consy Ridge overlooking Marcourt,
a village due west of Marcouray. The second objective was
Marcouray. If these two objectives were taken, the Germans
would be tforced to cross the Ourthe at Marcourt under direct
observation. There was also a chance to seal enemy forces
against the Ourthe, north of Marcourt. The Second Battalion
moved for Consy Ridge at daylight 7 January.
Great amount of mortar, nebelwerfer, and sman arms fire
from the objective and the ridge before it caused the attack
to be delayed. It was here the Second Battalion lost several
of its medical personnel, who, although plainly marked and
in open ground, were shot do.w n by German mach1ine gunners.
Consy Ridge was a key point in the German defense
between the Aisne and the Ourthe, and the enemy was not
disposed to withdraw without a fight. The ridge had held up
the 84th's attack for several days. In an open field one ridge
short CifConsytheSecondBattalion was met byfirefrom twelve
machine guns on three sides. A ·c ourageous atta.c k was made
across the open field into the woods from which the fire was
coming, and the Batta!Jion overran the machine gun positions.
Consy ridge was attacked the next day from the south, over
an "1impossiblle" rear slope. On the 7th the Second was unable
to secure the ridge because of tough opposition, exhausting
terrain, and early darkness. The fire fight had lelft the Battalion short of ammunition.
At 1500 the same day the First Battalion moved from
Daventave to Marcouray through 1a tick forest, assauLting
Marcour·ay from the northeast at 1500. Captains Sam Adams
and ·E arl Jackson led A and C Companies which came into
the town against scattered and surprised resistance. The
two companies used marching fire and entered the town
a short time after the artillery 'lifted, capturing 36 vehicles
and kUling 40 Germans.
The road [eading into Marcouray was a driver's nightmare.
The final vehicles of the First Battalion's convoy, ·t wo antitank guns, slid off the road blocking traff.ic until morning.
There was a sliver of an intermittent moon, otherwise the
night was completely unlit. Sand on the road was partially
helpful but two prime mov·e rs and two tanks went over the
side. Enemy artiilery was interd~ctory.

60

Top ; Marcouray.

Bot: om right, Cielle.

C rations and a stove look good to these Second Battalion men at Biron, Belgium.

But the capture of Marco.u ray eased the Second Battalion's
prol)lem, for Marcouray flanked the fire which the Second
was Deceiving. A continuation of the attack was succes•s fuL
We had perfect observation into Marcourt and the bridge over
the Ourthe. Occupation ·of Marcourt was not necessary but
the Second Battalion sent a patrol into the town the next
morning.
The next objective was Cielle, a First Battalion target.
Lt Ool Roland L Ko1b led the First Battalion from Marcouray
to Cielle, and the Second Battalion moved into Marcouray.
B and C Companies went ~nto the assault on Cieltl e, with A
Company in reserve. The men came through the 'WOods northwest of Cielle, scrambling through the snow. SmaU arms fire
was met, but the town fell witholtlt too mUlch trooble. A Company, in reserve, followed close1y behind to secure billets for
the night. ,Immediately after Cieme was captured, the Second
moved down the Marcouray-cielle road. The road was
m·ined. Eleven vehicles passed over the miilles, one returned
and was destroyed. Later the 309th Engineers removed fifteen mines from the road; several had the paint scratched by
the tire chains on our vehicles. During the a>fternoon we lost
the Regimental Commander, Colonel Chades E. Hoy, the
Second Battalion Commander, Lt Col Joseph E. Williams, and
the S-2, Major John J. Will'iams; all wounded.
In spite of tremendous difficulties, plans were lbeing carried out with continuous success. The attack was going forward i.n a column of battalions; the First at Marcouray, the
Second at Marcourt. The F•i rst at Cielile, the Second at Hez
de IHarze. We were like a fighter with two right hands. The
enemy's retreat was constantly oU balance. We were pressing
him faster than he liked: our efficiency in the attack was
evidenced by the disproportionate amounts of mater•i al we
were capturing. In the rear, our reserve battalion, the Third,
was ready to take over after Hez de Harze.
Hez de Harze was a mountain overlooking LaRoche. High
ground is valuable because it allows observaticn into objectives and because it decreases defilade for the enemy. Hez
de Harze, three hundred feet albove LaRoche and 150 feet
above CieUe had to be ·taken. '11he enemy knew we had to
take it, and they knew the way we had to come. !They dug iri
one hundred infantry on a carefully chosen position and
waited for theSecondBattalion to swing around the road from
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Cielle, left top.

The directional arrow is over Hez de Harze.
Bottom right, La Roche.

Christmas is a month late for Cpl Bob Reilly, Pfc Raymond Collarini and
Cpl William C. Arnold of Cannon Company.

Samree.
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Cielle. We called for artillery. H Company mortars and
machine guns went to work. The doughboys belHed down ,i n
the snow and moved against the mountain, leaving grey-white
trails where they slid in the snow. Meanwhile, the watercooled heavy ma·c hine guns from CieHe went to work on the
dug- in German .i nfantry and the supporting tanks. It was
like a · fight between two skyscrapers: on one level, G Company crawLed up the mountain; above them in overhead fire
went the bullets of the supporting machine guns. The Germans, even though on a higher l evel, could not stand the
attack and pulled out. The Second occupied Hez de Harze
which was so heavily wooded that LaRoche could not be seen.
The men watched their sweat generated by the climb turn to
ice, but at 1600 we he1d the mountain.
The I and R platoon of Headquarters Company plus a
squad from F Company reconnoitered LaRoche on the lOth
of January.
·
By taking this high ground we had pinched ourselves
against the Ourthe. The First Battalion remained 'i n Cielle,
the Second went to !Biron, and the Third relieved two battalions of another regiment near Samree. Our positions were
taken over by a Cavalry Group.
It was felt that the Germans were holding a hard periphery over a vacuum, ·consequently the next attack !Was aimed
at breaking this crust. We wanted to take as much ground as
possible in an attempt to meet the Third United States Army ·
driving from the south. Our two~battalion team was the First
and Third. On our left, however, the "Hel!l on Wheels" 2d
Armored Division was heM up at Wibrin and our attack was
extended to two small towns on the south flank orf Wilbrin,
Petite-Mormont and Grande-Mormont.
We were not sure of what resistance lay before us. Division Reconnarssance troops were assigned Berismenil, but
could not get near the town. A patrol from the First Battalion was sent forward to reduce a roadblock !but was caught
in an anti--personnel minefield. The ·T hird Battalion was
ordered to take the roadblock the next morning and found it
undefended. The Third Battalion moved through the woods
while the First Battalion took high ground overlooking Berismenil. When the Third emerged from the woods., it was hit
by a heavy concentration of artillery. The 'First was ordered
1

1
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M Company mortarmen, Pfc Huiell C. Harkins and Cpl Carl Johnson, dig in near Samree, B e lgium.
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to take another high area closer to Berismenil while the Thir d
attacked N adrin.
The First Battalion took its objective on schedule, but
enemy fire was heavier in the woods where the Third Battalion was moving toward Nadrin. Naclrin was therefore assigned to the First Battalion which took it the next day [ rom the
northeast, while the Third bypassed through a creek bed to
F-illy. The First drove through Nadrin to Ollomont and
secured both towns while taking 150 PW's. Meanwhile, the
Third was wading through snow waist high, forming a salient
pointed at Filly . The 2d Armored again failed to take Wibrin,
and had the First Battalion failed at Nadrin, the Third would
have been in danger of encirclement. To make matters m ore
complicated, hi:gher headquarters issued an order for the
Third to split up and take Petite--Mormont and Grande-Marmont in the 2d Armored's sector. L Company took Filly arlone
while the rest O!f the Battalion veered for the Mormonts.
It was dusk and the Third Battalion made a lucky error.
It captured a small collection of houses north of the Mormonts
and was forced to strike due south to capture its ·o bjective.
The Germans had been expecting an attack from direction of
Filly, west of the Mormonts. They were caught with their
machine guns down the wrong road. The towns were s111bdued
shortly before midnight. It was a record haul, five towns in
a single day: Nadrin, Ol'lomont, Filly, Petite-Mormont and
Grande:-Mormont, taken in bitter cold and deep snow.
A 33-man volunteer patrol Ieft Filly in the morning of
15 January 1945 to make contact with the Third Army. The
Ourthe was crossed in rubber boats dragged over the snow
covered approa·ches. Originally intending to meet the Third
Army's patrol in an old barn near Grinvet, the patrol changed
its plans because of the severely cold night. There w.as no
reason not to investigate Engreux to see about the possibility
of warm billets. When the town was found clear oif Germans
(indicating that the Regiment could have pushed farther
south had it been ordered), Lt Byron Blankenship bedded
his patrol down for the night. Contact was finally made
17 January 1945 while press correspondents and photographers, fully as numerous as the patrol members, spent the
afternoon recording the meeting.
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WINTER IN BELGIUM
BEHO
Armor was not too effective in the First Army counterattack on the north rflank of the Bulge. We had come to the
aid of the 2d Armored in the previous campaign, and in our
final action in Belgium, at Beho, we aided the 3d Armored.
Roads were too s'lick, temperatUires too low, and forests too
thick for tanks. ·A Sherman tank at a standstill is at best a
dubious pillbox, and at worst draws enemy fire. The 3d Armored needed assistance in its drive agains,t the southern
flank of St.Vith, the last German strongpoint in the Ardennes.
We passed through the 83d Division.
The 334th was moved irito position on 21 January. Beho
was to be taken by a fairly complicated maneuver in which
the Second Battalion was to swing .from Halconreux through
the woods southwest of Beho, while the Third Battalion
moved parallel to the Bovigny-~Beho road. The 333d Infantry
also had Beho as an o:bjective in a drive starting farther north.
The southern flank was cleared by the 335th Infantry, nucleus
of Task For·ce Church.
The weather was as bad as it had been in the previous
phase of the campaign. It was an impossible problem for the
intfantryman. Even with the best of care he stood a good
chance 01f frostbite. Too much clothing would restrict him in
an attack; too little would freeze him in the preparation.
Physical exertion would make him sweat; rest would freeze
the perspiration. Dry socks were passed out in chow lines and
men wore a pair around the neck to keep them dry with body
heat. Overcoats were discarded for many layers of clothing.
T ypically, a man wore two ·Or three wool undershirts, a wool
sweater, two shirts, and a combat jacket. Some men precferred
two combat jackets, one to wear normally, the other to be
wrapped around the feet in stationary positions. Men let their
hair grow long and slept with helmets on to gain the last
possible heat.
Both battalions moved out at dawn, 22 January. The
Second ran through Halconreux with little difificulty, but in
the woods between Halconreux and Beho the enemy had set
73

Two anti-tank guns have slipped off the road near Cielle. The resulting traffic jam took t en hours to clear.

a defensive line of tanks and infantry which delayed the
attack. This resistance seemed to be the right flank of a defensive line established against the 335th Infantry. Although the
Second was halted in its attack, it flanked this line by moving
to the left, thus opening the defense and relieving pressure
on the 335th. The Third Battalion had less trouble. By 1600
it was prepared to attack Beho. It had moved along a road
parallel to the Bovigny~Beho road and had found the enemy
prepared to defend the primary road, but .flanked by the
Battalion's line of march. The Battalion reduced the opposition and waited lfor the Second Battalion. The Second was
late and the Third was ordered to take Beho alone. The Third
BattaHon attacked at 1715 after a heavy artillery preparation.
The town was captured and clear by 2000. The Second Battalion moved into the southern portion of the town.
The next mornin:g found the Second Battalion moving out
to the high ground east of Beho. E Company had occupied a
stone farmhouse when an enemy counter-attack moved
against it. Tanks, 200 SS infantry, and artiller:v menaced the
position. It seemed as if the company would be overrun. An
artillery barrage was called when the German tanks were
only seventy--'five yards away. E Company was totally committed; F and K Companies were on the way to assist when
fire power turned the Germans back. This was the last action
in Belgium, except for a holding action in the 75th Division's
sector by our Second Battalion. We were the first to enter and
the last to leave, an indication of our fighting ability.
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OVER THE ROER
After the Ardennes campaign the 84th Division turned
north, back to the Ninth Army Sector. There was an old
score to settle near Lind ern and Linnich. We had paid a ter·rible price for the six miles between Palenberg and the Rocr;
now it was time the Germans reached for the check. Beyond
the Roer lay the Cologne plain; fiat ground with a road net
which invited tank action. This plain was the initial objective
of the Ninth Army's XIII Corps. It stretched for thirty miles
1between the Roer and the Rhine, transversed by small
streams.
To protect the Roer, the Germans had blown several
upstream dams which inundated the valley and forced us to
put our plans aside for a few weeks. The dams were blown
12 hours b efore our assault was to begin. During this time
the Regiment established an assembly area in the vicinity o,f
Waubach-Eygelshoven, Holland. It was the first rest the
men had received since combat began on November 18th. Two
theatres were maintained in Eygelshoven and one in Waubach. Beer and Coca-Cola were trucked from Belgium.
Although the move was m ade under secrecy-all shoulder
p atches and unit insignia removed-we w ere in the same area
as that occupied by our r ear echelon t roops during the first
month of combat. Old .friends billeted the men in neat Dutch
houses. Many men felt as if they had acquired a second
family, so friendly were the civilians. Ho'lland was starving
and only half-liberated. Many straight-faced soldiers went
through the mess lin~s two or three times each m eal, feeding
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the family with whom they were billeted. The Dutch were
friendly because we were Americans, infantry, and had been
through their towns before. They ·w ere " Mama" and "Papa",
and we were the "Vier und Achtsig Diviz."
Thi:s friendliness had the effect of unveiling the secrecy
with which the move had been made. "Berlin !S ally", the
adenoidal traitor broadcasting from Radio Arnhem, welcomed
us back to the Ninth Army front the day after our arrival
and gave us the night's password. She had also ascertained
our code name and joked about it. When the attack came,
however, the Germans were surprised at its time, strength,
and position.
The 333d Infantry maintained the river line and we kept
one battalion in reserve. Cannon Company took position and
rotated its crews.
Plans were laid carefully. Again, as in the Wiirm-MUllendorf attack, the openin:g phases o>
f the Prummern attack,
and the offensive in the Ardennes, every possibility was analyzed and every precaution taken. Boat drills were held on
the Wiirm and Meuse rivers.
The First Battalion crossed the R01er at 0330, 23 February
with the 335th Infantry secure the Corps front, after which
the 333d would pass thi'ough our positions. The artillery feinted each night for two nights preceding the attack. Smoke
was generated to mask the work of our combat engineers who
prepared the bank for crossing. The enemy responded with
nebelwerfer fire.
The First Battalion crosse d the Roer at 0330 23 F ebruary
1945 after the most intensive barrage of the war. C Company
was on the left, A on the right, and Bin reserve. The artillery
barrage was so violent that the enemy was unable to respond
against the leading elements of the First Battalion. The
crossing was smooth. Behind the leading elements TOW
on row of weapons fired overhead support, from AA 5081 !nm mortars pounding the beach to knock out mines,
through the 'l05's, 155 howitzers and rifles, and our largest
field pieces, the 240's. The artillery numbered 27 battalions
in support of the Regiment. By 1400 the AA guns had fired
three hundred thousand rounds from their positions.
A and C Companies scrambled ashore and regrouped along
a railroad parallel to the river. B Company, in reserve, met
6
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Caught by machine gun fire, these five so!d;ers from Company C were dead before the boat crossed the Roer.

stronger fire when it came across, but the leading companies
were moving from the track by this time. The combat engineers were unable to build footbridges for the Third Battalion.
The right boundary of the First Battalion was Glimbach,
an objective of the 102d Division. Glimbach was a risk. To
assault Korrenzig from the south meant a chance that the
First would !he flanked if the 102d did not reach Glimbach in
time. As soon as B Company was across it was deployed
around the town to protect the flank. At 0720 Korrenzig was
taken against moderate resistance. By this time the enemy
had discovered our crossing site and was shelling it heavily.
The ·T hird Battalion was crossing, to 'be followed 'by the
Second, but there was no bridge as yet.
Rurich was next. The attack went odif without artillery
preparation. The First Battalion met small arms fire in the
town, ibut secured it by 1415, a few minutes before the final
elements of the Third Battalion were across the river. A footbridge had been secured and a bridge for heavier equipment
was under construction. The attack continued in inverse
order of Battalions.: ·Third, Second, and First in reserve. We
had secured the Corps bridgehead and were to widen the
base by seizing Baal.
The expected counter-attack was started by the Germans
about 1500 in the 102d Division's area. We caught bits of
a·ction, particularly stratfing from enemy air·craft who were
after the heavy bridge near our area. The Third moved into
Baall against light resistance 'but was met by three or four
strong counter-attacks. The Rurich-Baal road was made
untenable by German artillery and sniper fire, causing the
Second to swing off into a wooded area on the right where
they encountered and dispersed small forces orf infantry
and tanks.
The Third Battalion was heavily counter-attacked again,
shortly before midnight. Baal crackled with small arms fire,
as the Third Battalion's outposts were driven in. The Germans
drove into the city, forcing the Third to fall back behind railroad tracks which bisected the town. There were a few b~ocks
of disputed territory in which the Germans held one house
and the Americans the next. In other instances, the Germans
held the bottom floor and the Americans the top floors. They
shot through the ceiling and we fired down. The Second Bat84

The Roer at Linnich from the East and West.
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talion supported the Third. The fight continued into morning.
Resistance was overcome.
Throughout the first four days of combat we moved
against spotty resistance to Granterath, Hetzerath and Matzerath. Hetzerath was taken by the First Battalion. A command post twas established in a schoolhouse near the town.
Suddenly six German TD's appeared, supported by infantry.
Communications were poor but the radio attempted to reach
the supporting artillery. 'T he Battalion headquarters was
reduced to Ml fire until artillery support arrived. The Third
iBattalion again had its outposts in Granterath driven in, but
the Germans were blocked.
These counterattacks could not disguise the effectiveness
of our position. All German resistance was uncoordinated
and their attacks became weaker. Resistance to the front
had ceased. We had :broken through.
To exploit the breakthrough, Task Force Church, led by
Brigadier General John H. Church, was formed. The Task
Force which spearheaded the drive into the Cologne plain
consisted of the 334th Infantry, the 771st Tank Battalion, the
84th Reconnaissance Troops, with Anti-Aircraft and Service
units attached. As Captain Charles Willson, S-3 of the Second
Battalion, put it, "It was a new kind of front, twenty miles
deep and one tank wide."
ilt was hard for the doughboys of A Company to understand their part in the action. Previously tanks hald been
helpful, but it was an unwritten axiom to stay a respectful
distance from them because they drew enemy fire. "My heart
was in my mouth," said Pfc Royce MacDougal of A Company,
"when they told us to get on the tanks. I reckoned we would
go about three hundred yards before we dismounted. I felt
like a movable day duck in a shooting gallery."
A Company went ten miles the first day of the breakthrough. Behind the tanks stretched twenty miles of trucks
carrying equipment and personnel. This was strange warfare.
!'t hatd taken us d'our days to move 1100 yards across the
Linnich-Lindern road; we were now covering the same
distance in four minutes. It was a comfortable war, towns
were taken which had electric light and dry rooms. One German major was interrupted at breakfast by doughboys who
took him and his staff just as they were sitting down. The
hungry infantrymen finished the German breakfast. Com1
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This railroad station was a hotspot at Korrenzig, but L Company took over.

These Germans are glad to quit at Hetzerath.

309th Engineers move through Erkelenz.

The twigs on the ground and the torn up trees are the result of the
artillery preparation.

munications were in with the German rear, and a few men
were calling Berlin to inform the German General Staff that
the 334th was on its way.
Our prisoners were of all classes: Air Force, Service, even
a ifew sailors of the German Navy. They were searched and
sent on foot to the rear of the convoy in a continuous stream.
There was varying resistance to the front. The column was
cut in half at one point when a bridge was blown. At Waldneil
stronger resistance was met, necessitating the deployment of
the First Battalion.
The area around Waldneil was a refitting place for a German paratroop army. We bypassed Waldneil a,gainst resistance and took a few towns to form a perimeter defense for
the night 27-28 February. The Germans were attempting to
make a stand in this area for we found continually stronger
resistance and a Nazi artillery unit moving up. We were not
equipped to fight a night action, and this delay allowed the
Germans to build strong defenses east of Waldneil. IT'he key
to this defense was the position Eicken-Berg, two small
towns straddling our route of advance. In the most brutal
small arms fight oif the campaign, G Company kiHed 49 otf 50
Germans in an assault which developed into a bayonet and
hand to hand fight.
All three battalions were committed in the perimeter
defence near Waldneil, but after the Berg-Eicken fight there
Wias little TesiS'tance. We had been advancing continually
for six days without rest under the unduplicated tension of
infantry attack. Nerves were raw, tempers immediately apparent, but the combat efficiency built of previous battles did
not depart.
After the Waldneil fight the Third Battalion, led by K
Company, moved to the f:pont of the column. iAt one po:int
near BoiS'heim, when it was import&nt the enemy knew
nothing of our approach, the Third Battalion used silent
"commando" .tactics. Here 197 PW's were disarmed 1with<out
a shot being fired . Communications to Boisheim were cut so
the ala-rm would not be sp:r<ead.
The Third Battalion raced in to Boishei'rn, completely surprising the garrison. Resistance was haphazard and an artillery unit was captured moving into position. We were so far
front that it was necessary to halt and wait for the rest of
the Division to catch up. Also, Task Force Church was dis-
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solved and the change of command required a shift in organization. We kept one company of our tanks.
At 1400 2 March 1945 the First Battalion again mounted
tanks, drove east, and took St Tonis. Strong antitank resistance in the town kept our tanks buttoned up and the
infantry hugging the ground. The tanks pulled into defilade
but could not move. German infantrv went after our vehicles.
T~e infantry riding the tanks fought off the Germans. C
Company walked from St Tonis to Rolz. In the meantime,
higher headquarters ordered a 90 degree turn to the north.
We swung around the outskirts of Krefeld and made for
Romberg, opposite Duisburg on the Rhine. From Krefeld to
Moers was a slow task.
The Germans were attempting to hold an area on the west
bank of the Rhine at Wesel and our advance struck the flank
of this "bridgehead". At daylight the Third Battalion passed
through the First. The enemy defense around Moers took
time for us to solve.
On the southern outskirts of Moers the Second Battalion
passed through the Third. Parts of both Battalions were
resting in a large chateau near the town when the Germans
counter-attacked strongly with artillery. It was a dark night
and little could (be seen. The attack was principally mortar
fire, but enough small arms was intermingled to signify a
large force. Artillery support was called and fire dispersed
over the area from which the attack was thought to be
coming. The enemy pulled out in the direction of Moers. Our
attack moved forward agarn.
!The enemy made a strong fight near the outskirts: of
Moers, holding up the Third Battalion. 'T he Second Battalion
was sent around the left of the force, but it was held. The
First Battalion moved between the other two, artillery was
used, and the enemy fell back from the southwest ·corner of
Moers. In the southeast portion of Moers the Firs,t Battalion
was halted by emplaced riflemen and machine guns in a
skirmish line along the crest of a railroad. The \battalion
flanked the opposition and continued. It was completely dark
and the individual riflemen of the attacking battalions were
in danger of losing flank contact. Every noise had become an
enemy, and sleepless doughboys identified the shuttling black
shadows of 1Moers and Romberg as hostile strangers. Moving
across a deserted railroad net in darkness was a difficult job-
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The reserves close up to the Rhine. The Germans had a stiff
defense along this railroad embankment.

Resistance to the front has slowed up Task Force Church.

and when the report came down that the First Battalion had
encountered mines, even the earth seemed unfriendly.
The infantrymen did not worry much about who would
have the credit for reaching the Rhine. We had spearheaded
the XHI Corps for 42 miles, collected 8500 prisoners and had
fought continuously since 23 February. K and I Companies
reached the Rhine 'a breast at 0100, 5 March 1945. F and G
Companies, with a First Battalion patrol, came to the Rhine
at 0420. The important thing was that we had reached our
objective. The bridge was out, discontinuing our attack.
The 334th had done all it had been asked.
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The Germans don't trust us, and we don't trust them. Rurich, Germany.
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Pfc Cecil F. Kerlney, Pfc James Lovette, Cpl Theodore Darden,
Pfc Martin Arroyo, Pvt John De Boer and Pfc Archie Doll
clean A 57mm AT gun near Marcouray.

Brigadier Gene ral J ohn H. Church.
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THE RHINE TO THE ELBE
Romberg was our first taste 01f military occupation. A
.strict non-fraternization policy was in force, but the stay was
r.elatively pleasant, for we had clean sheets, warm water, and
long sleeping hours. We maintained 50% of two battalions
on the Rhine River line, but there was only scattered action;
a few shells, and scattered patrols. It was a difficult job
Dccupying and holding the line. It was, as one soldier put it,
"Get in ·t he foxhole, but keep your shoes shined." The Germans were attempting to find out about us and they stared
as often as we stared back. One thing was. obvious : ther·e
were no Nazis in Germany. Every German told us he had
hated Hitler for years, was glad the war was over, and had
.several relatives in the States. There was no reason why the
Germans and Americans could not get along, the war was
going to be over soon, and i'f the Americans would only
understand how baribaric Russia was, it would be easier for
the Germans and Yanks to be friends. Their talk 'had little
oeffect.
A movie theatre was put into op eration 400 yards from
the Rhine but the friendly Germans found a way to communicate the position to their artillery across the river, and
the theatre was bracketed. There were no casualties. Some
friendly young German males were caught signaling a
.s trafing plane, pointing out the location of the Regimental
Command Post. The Germans were terribly glad we were
there instead of the barbaric Russians, but they lodged
hundreds of complaints against the American soldiers at the
local Military Government office. They fawned: be friendly ,
oean we do your washing, will you have a beer? 'But the men
in F and G Companies remembered the plainly marked
medics whom the Germans had kil1ed at Devantave. If a man
wanted to remember, there were plenty of reasons to keep
.away from the Germans. We carried out the non-fraternization program.
The training also seemed incongruous to the men. They
were taken from the front lines to class1es in familiarization
with new weapons, hikes, :ballfields, showers, and critiques
tOf past actions. Road mar·ches, calisthentics and organized
] 01

Liberated Italians, Russians, Poles and French start home from Lohne, Germany

T fSgt Henry S. Yarborough, M3 under arm, rides herd on PW's in Moers.

athletics were also conducted. We fired at targets of opportunity, generated smoke as a feint and sent patrols across
the Rhine.
German civilians were stopped and their papers examined.
We took erght hundred prisoners in March, many of whom
were soldiers hiding in civilian clothes. Everybody was willing to talk about German positions and arms, but it all added
to the same thing: Germany "kaput," there are no detf.enses
in Duisburg. One day the troops could see white tflags waving
from the houses in Duisib urg, across the river. The next day
the flags were gone. They appeared and disappeared throughout the month. On the day three armies, the Ninth, British
Second, and Allied Airborne, seized a bridgehead near Wesel
the flags reappeared again and a daylight patrol 1from F Company was told by citizens of Duisburg that they would be
happy to surrender. Within a short ti:me the 75th Division
reported friendly troops across the Rhine, and Ruh:rort was
taken by troops of the XVI Corps, pinching out the Second
Battalion.
In the last week of our stay, the Ninth Army crossed the
Rhine at a point ·f arther north in a movement which was later
to envelop the Ruhr by meeting the First Army. Our Corps
was. in reserve, to be committed when the XVI Corps swung
south for the encirclement. ll'he British were across north of
the Ninth Army bridgehead, and the 17th Airborne Division
had been committed near Wesel to secure the bridgehead.
The play was around another end. We could see only the
interference: artillery and constant swarms of fighters and
bombers.
We were to move on 1 April, twenty-five days after
arriving in Moers. The 335th was on the north, the 333d on
the south, and we were the middle, behind the 5th Armored
Division, the latter engaged in a slashing tank mov·e which
prepared the way for the Infantry. Our job was to mop up
scattered pockets otf resistance behind the leading elements
and to preVJent the Germans from reforming after the tanks had
moved through their positions. We crossed the Rhine 1 April
and reached the Elbe 14 April, an advance of 250 miles in a
fortnight. The Roer-Rhine advance had been a preparation
for this move.
The 334th Infantry became Regimental Combat Team 334
when the 326th !FA., D Battery 557 AA1A, lst Platoon Co. B
103

H Company machine gunners walk
unconcernedly through Hannover.

The Jerries had this road zeroed in.
A TD is knocked out, and a recon car
of the 638th TD's moves ahead.

309th Engineers, Co. B 638th TD Battalion, and Co. B 309th
Medics were attached.
We waited for one day in the vicinity of Erle, Germany,
for the leading elements to clear Munster. Local security twas
sent out and a captured hospital was guarded. On 3 April we
made a move to another as1sem'bly area near Appelhausen,
waiting for clear roads ahead. In the previous day's move we
passed wreckage of the gliders which had 'C arried the 17th
Airborne, part of the Allied Airborne Army. Gliders were
strewn in every position and at every angle among the trees
and fields of the assembly area. This was a spectacular sight.
As we moved, the shiny 'b rass lid over the German cesspool was taken away. Lining the streets in our path !were
thousands of liberated Allies, prisoners of war and slave
laJborers. This was the day for which they had been waiting.
Many, including the 'Russians and the Poles, were headed
west. Some stood on a street corner saluting every vehicle
in a thirty mile ·convoy. They had saved their uniforms for
this day, and although the weather was in a slow tu:rn to;
German spring, they stood in full uniform including overcoat.
When we halted they came to our trucks, telling us unbelievable stories of suffering, of thousands killed and millions
starved, of unm'e ntiona'ble cruelties. A !British soldier captured at El Alemein in Africa asked how we had ever built
as much might as he had seen passing through. Sniffing the
warm "C" rations and noting the frightened Germans around
him, he begged us to take him along. "I'm still a fighter."
·M unster was completely destroyed as we passed through,
so puiverized that a mist o~f rubtble hung in the air. On the
walls, punctured by shrapnel and small arms fire were the
impo't ent German mottoes: "Our Victory is Adolf Hitler,"
"Germany Saves Europe from Bolshevism,' and later the
explanatory "Germany is all Europe." The Germans stood in
the streets or peered from windows from which a white rag
was displayed. The white rags and the smell oif battle were
good indications of how far away the front was. When we
were dose the streets were deserted, a window would fly
open allowing a white flag to be thrust out, and then be
slammed. The smell of battle which we had learned so wc:ll
at Prummern hung over the towns where there had been
resistance. The usual procedure was to roll up to the town,
announce over the loudspeaker that resistance was hopeless
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The Rhine separates Romberg and Duisburg.

L Company deploys at Buckburg.
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and talk to the burgomeister. If the town resisted, it was
flattened. If a sniper shot from a house, the house was
burned down.
We moved to Bad Oeynhausen 4 tA pril1945 and found the
bridges over the Weser blown. We were to cross at a :bridge
in the 335th sector and take the north flank, which would
put us on the north flank of the AEF.
The Third Battalion 'led. The river crossing took all night
5-6 April because of the steep approach on the opposite side
of the river. The 'Germans had dug in on a wooded ridge
and constructed a familiar type of road block near
Buckburg. The Third Battalion flanked the block and the
Combat Engineers removed the obstacle. ,F arther up the line
of advance the Third Battalion ran into a strong enemy force,
dug in and supported by self-propelled guns. L Company,
leading the convoy, deployed. The resistance was very sti.if'f
frontally, there were a few casualties, and the rest of the
Battalion was thrown into the fight. This was the first action
since we 'had crossed the Rhine.
As the fight continued, it was apparent that the Germans
had about 800-1000 men in prepared positions around the
town. If we were to force Buckburg it meant that we would
have to commit the major portion of the Regiment. Our
mission at the time was to secure the bridges across the Leine
River. The Regimental Commander decided to bypass Buckburg. 'Reconnaissance elements and tanks were sent around
the left flank to discover resistance. There was little to be
found. The First Battalion moved to the north with the rest
of the Regiment following. Deinsen held up the tanks and th e
:F irst Battalion for a short while, but the town was cleared.
The Third Battalion was ordered to disengage and follow the
Second Battalion. This move prevented a delay of our forward
movem ent, which meant the Germans would not have time
for a stand elsewhere, and flanked Buckburg for the 335th
which cleared it the following day.
So completely disorganiz ed were the Germans, and so
dark was the night that enemy units attached vehicles to our
,c onvoy. We did not see them nor they us , but a few were
recognized when they attempted to pass through the convoy.
Six or eight of them were riddled by pointblank fir e .as they
m oved through l()ur line. In the Tear of the convoy Cannon
Company had converted an empty two and a half ton truck
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into a PW cage. As we flushed Germans and motioned them
to the rear, the men of Cannon Company put the Nazis in
the truck. When the truck became too full it was unloaded
at the nearest MP post.
Th'e First Bat>tahon cleared Stadthagen by 0215, 8 April
1945. We had been moving eontinuously all nig.h!t, 1a n'd' the
armor leading the column was manned by quiet soldiers. As
the Germans slept behind blackout shutters they hea_rd the
sound of our armor and did not hear any noises of battle. It
was natural for them to believe the sounds they heard were
their Panzer divisions moving about to meet the American
offensive. The next mo.rning the civilians opened their
shutters amazed1y .to find American soldiers building fires
along the road and cooking emergency rations. A few
soldiers knocked on the door and asked for warm water for
coffee and shaving. Wehrmacht rear echelon troops wer·e
awakened with varying gentleness from their lb eds, told to
dress, and sent to PW cages at the rear of the convoy. Every
house held a few soldiers, some of whom displayed discharges
issued the day before.
The Regiment was approaching Hannover. Originally the
Germans had intended to defend Hannover strongly. The
oute.r defense was to be conducted in the circle of small
villages which surrounded the town.
The defensive preparations were in varying depths, but
our sector started twenty miles from the center of town. The
enemy used every poss~ble weapon in the outer defenses including batteries of flak guns. At one point A and C Companies deployed over flat terrain against four batteries of flak
guns. Cannon Company and the 326th FA were used in
counterbattery fire. Although men were dropping, A and C
Companies did not hesitate in the advance. The guns, manned
by Italians commanded by German officers, were finally
abandoned. At this time the Second Battalion was fighting
slowly through Meyenfeld, BerenbostEll, and Stalingen.
'At 2300 the Second Battalion was ordered to secure the
bridges into Hannover. The German O!PiL had Engelbostel as
one anchor, and it was through this town that F Company
moved to take the bridges over the Weser-Elbe Canal. The
tankswe.resent to the rear of the column becausetheyweretoo
noisy for a night movement. The First and Second followed
F Company at an hour's interval. The move was quiet. A

111

Duisburg, foreground. Romberg, background.

771st Tankers found some resistance in Bielefield.

German soldier approached the column and asked "Was ist
das Companie?" "I'll be a crock .. .. !" shouted an E Company
man. The German ran away. F Company bypassed several
tanks and took the objectives.
Hanno.v er was taken by all combat units of the Division,
but our night work and drive the next morning made the
jab easier than was expected. 'Second and Third •Battalions
mounted tanks and trucks after the 309th Engineers had
removed demolition charges. We tore into Hannover in the
early morning hours of 10 ·April 1945. The Second Battalion
trucks zig-zagged through the streets searching for resistance.
The speed O'f our 'move flanked many German positions in
the town.
The streets were lined with refugees and Germans
cheering our troops. The SS had organized the Volkssturm
resistance, and then pulled out otf town, realizing the position
was hopeless. The departure of the SS and the speedy drive
of our 'Second and Third Battalions were signals to burn the
Volkssturm armband, get rid of the panzerfaust, and hang
the white flag from the window. We drove through the streets
between five story tenement houses, alternately watching the
civilians and the top story windows .w hich were excellent
places for snipers. The First Battalion moved through the
city and secured bridges for the next day's advance. RCT 334
billeted in Hannover for one night.
On 11 April 1945 we moved forward to Burgdorf a.lfter a
short fight at :A ltwarmbuchen.
The fall of Burgdorf was a signal to change our tactics.
The separate Battalions were sent on roughly parallel routes
through the entire area oJ our advance. There was no danger
in spreading the Regiment more thinly because resistance to
the front had become little more than roadblocks, destroyed
bridges and small bands of infantry. The terrain had !become
wooded and hilly, offering more chance of concealment for
the enemy.
All the to.wns we passed through looked alike to the men
on the trucks. Our casualties after Hannover did not exceed
two figures. Near Flettmar the Third Battalion met a strong
force of infantry, haltf-tracks, and self-propelled guns which
veered off to the area where Service Company was billeted.
This was part of Division von Clausewitz which operated in
our rear for several days. Its attack was headed off by our
8
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Total war. The man on the left was not too old to fire a machine gun from a pill box. The young boy
was outside Waldneil and ran screaming to our lines from no man' s land .

Third Battalion and the Third Battalion, 333d Infantry. The
First Battalion had been ordered to the Elbe, attached to the
5th Armored Division, to secure a bridgehead. When the Battalion arrived at the Elbe, reeonnaissance sihow.ed that the
Germans we had been chasing for 250 miles were across the
river, prepared to fight. It would take more than a battalion
of infantry to establish a bridgehead. At 2100 14 April, two
weeks after crossing the Rhine, the Regiment was deployed
near the banks of the Elbe River. We had made our last
advance in the European Theatre.
Generally, the Elbe front was quiet. The Germans attempted one counter-attack in the Third Battalion area but it was
stamped down with artillery fire. We were dug in on the
west side of the river. Our patrols showed that the Germans
were along the levee on the east side of the river. We maintained outposts, laid trip 'flares and conducted all defensive
measures. Behind us were few Allied troops. Our supply
columns were attacked by a few German units which were
later bottled in the Harz Mountains. A fully loaded mail
truck was lost.
The >Russian offensive near Berlin, ·only 50 miles away,
sent a backwash of refugees to the German side of the Elbe.
A few civilians and soldiers came across the river to us,
seared, they said, by the hot breath of the Russians. We knew
it would not be long before we met the Soviet forces.
The prisoners came across in increasing numbers. A
hospital on barges floated ,f rom Berlin by canal and tied
at a wharf in the Third Battalion area. At first we took
all who wanted to come across, but soon the far bank of the
river was filled with frightened Germans. We could not
permit civilians to cross, nor had we facilities for the wounded.
Thousands of able-bodied German soldiers wanted to surrender. Whole German divisions marched to the river bank
and obediently waited for boats to transport them. At times
the Regimental PW cages held prisoners numbering three
times the strength of the Regiment. When we ran short of
diesel fuel .f or the barges, the Germans drained the vehicles
with which they had driven to the bank. Hysterical men and
women stripped to swim the Elbe. Nazi propaganda had
invented a ridiculous rumor that the British and Americans
had declared war on Russia. Many asked if they would have
to continue fighting the Soviets.
8*
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Several patrols were sent across the River to make contact
with the Reds, but all returned unsuccesfully. First contact
was made by the 69th Division farther south. At 1810 21VIay
1945 contact was made in the Third Battalion sector when a
Russian captain rowed across to make liaison with American
Headquarters. Later in the day the Russians closed up along
the Elbe, ending our campaign in the European Theatre of
Operations.
VE day was announced five days later, an ·o fficial end to
the fight. We had gone seven thousand miles lf rom Claiborne
and Howze, and had changed a mindful of ideas in seven
months of com!bat. It was over, and many of our friends were
dead. That was the principal feeling when VE was announced.
The men had gone into battle as tutored civilians, and had
come out as succesful veterans in a crack regimer..t. ·W e had
done a good job. We were glad it was over.
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Twentq separate units make up a regimen.f.
Consequently twenty separate histories make
up a regiment's history. In the process of
selection and compilation many episodes
were regretfully put aside because of technical limitations. To compensate, each compang has submitted one story it believes
should be told, taken from the mass of
incidents which make its history.

WALDNIEL
Our second day of the spearhead from the .Roer to the
Rhine was almost as eventful as the first. Company A men
won't forget W aldniel.
After our first day on tanks we stopped at what we called
the "Model Village." We spent the night under shelling from
Jerry. We were all pretty fagged out after the day we had
just gone through, but Jerry didn't want us to get any rest at
all. We stuck it out okay.
The ,f ollowing day we were to push off again through
W aldniel and towards the Rhine. The town of W aldniel was
supposedly in friendly hands.
·W e approached the town through a low cut in the road .
Hell cut loose. The heavy boom of a panzerfaust soundEd and
the Jerries scored a direct hit on the lead tank ridden by
S /Sgt Charles 'Slifco, Sgt Paul M. Vasington and P'fc Rober t
L. Curtis.
Another tank had tried to break through and was knocked
out farther down the road. Three tankers w ere wounded and
had takEn cover beneath the tank. Between us and the tankers
was approximately 150 yards of open road covered by deadly
machine gun fire. The tankers needed help badly and A Company had to get to Waldniel and knock out the opposition.
T /Sgt James W. Kuykendall, acting first platoon leader,
Lt Myron Henitzman and T/Sgt James A. Strodel, platoon
leader and platoon sergeant of the second platoon, quickly
deployed their men on each side of the road. The third
platoon, led by Lt Richard K. Hawkins, was rushed forward
to give help.
A dugout just at the edge of the clearing was manned by
several Krauts with bazookas and ri'fles. Sgt Kuykendall and
Sgt Mack L. Morris went after it with guns blazing and
grenades flying. Six Germans surrendered; three died.
Sgt Kuykendall and Sgt Morris advanced to the burning
tank for temporary co.v er. Sgt Kuykendall called for iS gt
Morris to take up a firing position to relieve some of the
pressure on the tankers. Sgt Vasington and Pfc Otha G. Smith
rea·ched the wounded tankers and dragged them to the
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comparative safety of a nearby ditch where ,they gave
them first aid.
The attack on the buildings and trenches was launched.
Pfc Curtis slammed a bazooka shell into the building from
which the most fire was coming. Some Germans retreated to
the trenches in the rear, some chose to stay and hold out. Pfcs
Thomas Fabiano; Elrey Phaup, and Fred R. Pritchard assaulted thos,e remaining in the house with grenades and rifle fire,
capturing several Germans. Sgt Strodel brought his platoon
around to the right. A machine gun burst wounded him.
Sgt James H. iFoster took his squad around to the side of a
building and ran into another machine gun. Before the gunner
could collect his wits, one of the boys in Foster's squad shot
him. The other gunner surrendered.
By now we had all the houses, but most of the J erries had
retreated to the trenches behind and were pouring it on us.
Sgt Morris after an effective banage of grenades and small
arms fire from the house led an attack against the trenches.
When he reached the head of the trench he lobbed a grenade,
killed sev,e ral Krauts, and everyone cut loose. It was then
that Jerry started to get wise. 125 Germans were in the
trench when we started. When we finished about half came
out with their hands up screaming "Kamerad". The rest were
in the trench to stay.
We then dug in and secured the town. Jerry loihbed
in a lot of shells and pulled a counter-attack, but it failed
and our lines held. We were ready to push on again for
our next objective.
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S/Sgt Manuel De Ferreire -

Cpl Jack Ecroyd -

Lt Richard K. Hawkins -

Sgt Raymond L . Gould

Lt Myron H. Heintzman

THE BATTLE FOR LEIFFARTH
Every campaign can be broken down into many stories.
Stories of regiment, battalions, companies, platoons and
individual soldiers. The story that stands out prominently
in the minds of the men of B Company is the battle f.or the
town of Leiffarth. In pre-war Germany the small town was a
whistle stop but during the Siegfried battle it was a link that
the enemy gave up only after a fanatical defense.
The original plan was for B Company to assault, take,
and hold ,t he high ground in fmnt of Leiffarth. This accomplished, A and C Companies were to move .through and
take the town. Capt AlC!ee L. Peters, Jr led the company
out of the tank trap IP at 0700 the morning of 1 December
with the fi'rS't platoon on the right, the third on the left
and the second in reserve. Adv,a neing only four or five
hundred yards after a five minute artillery preparation, the
entire company was checked by murderous machine gun and
88 fire from six dug-in German tanks and two pillboxes.
Supporting the enemy tanks were mortars and artillery.
Casualties were very heavy in this encounter and the
attack was momentarily halted. The light machine guns
manned by Sgt Raymond S. Stahler, Pfc Charles W. Black,
Sgt James G. Watson and Pfc Charles W. Chambers returned
fire effectively until a direct hit k:illed Pfc Stahler and
wrecked the gun. Mortarmen Sgt Delbert A. Sloan and Pfcs
Harold A. M. Shock and Enoch J. Sellars badly damaged one
of t he enemy tanks.
The men rapidly dug in and by noon the sector was pretty
quiet until it was decided to advance again to take the high
ground. Under the leadership o.f T/Sgt Clyde W. Montgomery,
the first platoon set out at the appointed time to accomplish
the mission but the fire was so intense that Capt Peters
called them back.
In v:iew of the heavy casualties and the apparent strength
of the enemy, the attack was delayed until 3 December after
two nights and one day in the foxholes. On 1300 of D-Day
the first and second platoon assaulted while the third was in
reserve. A five minute preparation preceded our advance into
the town, and we followed the artillery barrage by seventy-
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five yards. We so surprised the enemy that our entrance into
the town did not prove too difficult.
The mopping up was accomplished quickly under the
platoon leaders., S/iSgt Ira D. Munday, Lt H oward Buchanan,
Lt Tomlinson C. Ulbricht, and T/Sgt John Simco. T /Sgt
Addison Me Clung led a small group into the neighbming
village of Wiirm, captured fifteen prisoners and a mortar,
but withdrew.
As soon as Leiffarth was taken, a defensive line was dug
at the edge of the town and buildings were selected for the
Company CP and aid station. S /Sgt Robert O'Horo was killed
at this time as he was preparing the defenses. By the time
the reorganization was complete, the enemy was shelling the
town heavily and any movement was extremely hazardous.
It was not until after dark that communications could be
established and contact maintained between all units of the
company. Runners Pfcs Leslie 0. ·F ulton, Delbert A. Gwi.nnup,
Walter H. Mitton and Arthur W. Jacob, Jr were kept busy
throughout ,t he operation. In the meantime, C Company
moved into the town and helped to strengthen the defens.e
by filling in the gaps in the line.
During the night it was impossible to bring in ra·t ions or
water and at 0400 the enemy launched the first of several
counter-attacks. Throughout the night tanks were hear d
rumbling in the distance and as the sound grew closer. the
men grew more alert. ·A ided by the "artificial moonlight"
provided by mammoth searchlights, we finally spotted the
tanks some hundred yards away. Backing up the tanks were
about one hundred riflemen. Our men fired at the attackers
but the direct fire from the tanks' guns proved to b·2 too much
for the doughs and the majority of the third platoon with
several men from the first and fourth platoons were taken
prisoner. This left open our entire left flank. The enemy was
stopped, however, by very effective artillery and mortar fir e.
Pfcs Walter R. Davis and Howard Rasmussen, the two radio
operators, played a most important part in stopping this
attack by staying at their radio throughout the night. Davis
had received a face wound during the attack but refused
treatment until saf·ety was assured for the company.
The next morning TfSgt Addison McClung and Sgt Lewis
F. Newsom took th e remnants of the third platoon and, with
a machine gun section from D Company, filled in the gap
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T /5 Terrell Teuts ch

Sgt Charles Chambers -

S jSgt Hughart Stump Pfc Walter Mitton

Sgt Cecil Brown -

Pfc Walter Davis -

Sgt George Johnson -

Pfc Edwin Rosenthaler - S gt Joseph Vierra T jS gt Addison McClung

Pfc Arthur Jacob

Pfc Charles Carter

created by the capture of the men. Th:at night Sgt George N.
Johnson, Jr made two perilous journeys back into our lines
to obtain reinforcements; ·a n armored infantry company from
the 7th Armored Division.
Except for enemy patrols, the next few days were relatively quiet. Lt Buchanan led one our own patrols ·into
Wiirm but heavy machine gun fire forced them to return.
Fortunately, the supplies of foodstuff were sufficient and
they supplemented the C :and K rations brought by Htter
bearers and mortarmen. Pfc Joseph P. Vierra, utilizing
available supplies of food in the town, kept the men from
hunger with at least one hot meal a day. Pfcs William L. Desmarais, Ford 0. 'R oan, Samuel C. Carone and CleonA. Nelson
came up from the kitchen and supply area to act as litter
bearers.
The following night under mortar fire, we withdrew from
Leiffarth to return to Geilenkirchen for a much needed rest.
We all thought that the Leiffarth incident was closed, but
after three days in Geilenikirchen, we again headed for the
dreaded town. The heavy losses inflicted on us were reflected
by the handfull of men who embarked on our second trip to
Leiffarth. We started back with visions of a terrible stay in
the town, and we were right. The next night the enemy
launched the most vicious counter-attack we had eve.r seen.
At 0400 S/Sgt Munday and Pfc Richard C. YoungbLood
were standing guard at a listening post on the edge of the
town when a movement was heard coming from WiiTm. It
proved to be a company of Germans, and the two guards
immediately woke an ·A T crew in the basement. The enemy
stopped near the listening post after setting off a trip flare.
Pfc Youngblood threw a grenad€ in their midst causing many
casualties. Using all the weapons available, the two men
completely confused the attacking force. Only after the
enemy had damaged the house, were they finally repulsed.
In another part of town the attackers gained entrance into
CharLey Company's CP but they were also frorced to withdraw after having caused many casualties.
All this time Capt Peters was directing artillery on the
German force. The results of the attack were disastrous to
the Germans who lost 70 percent of their force. After daylight
Pfc Gerald E. Rosenfeld and Pvt Fred A. Lesser, under a
white flag, went into a mine field to remove enemy wounded.
9
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Medics T /5 Terrell Teutsch, Pfc Samuel Gionourakos, and
Pvt Virgil L. Parker worked tirelessly troughout the entire
action, oa·r ing for their wounded comrades. Several ·times they
ventured to the dug-in posHions through merciless artillery
poundings to carry litter patients to safety.
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T/0 strength for a ri'fie company is 193 men, including
officers. When Charley Company counted off after the nqnstop ride to Belgium, there were only 67 men to answer
"here" to roll call.
No one knew anything about the disposition of the enemy
or the direction from which his attack would come. Tactically,
we were blind. To give the Regiment eyes and to warn of the
German's approach, Charley Company, one third strength,
was chosen to be the outpost company. We were sent 2000
yards ahead of our main line of resistance to build and man
on outpost line on the f,orward slope of a ridge running parallel to , the lines. There were five outposts, commanded by
Lt Henry C. deGrummond, Jr. Each observation post was
placed before a town. Communications were installed on
22 December and we waited for Jerry to show up.
We didn't have to, wait long. At Outpost Two on the 23d
appeared a German lieutenant on a motorcycle. S/Sgt Ambrose Cerrito's crew covered him with rifles and forced him
to surrender. The documents we secured from him gave us
our first information as to the units and direction of the
German attack. Shortly after we had taken the German, we
were warned of the approach of an enemy armored column
and Outposts One and Two withdrew to Verdenne.
On the 24th we were at Outpost Two when the Germans
shelled us heavily. Again, an armored column, part of the
force which took Verdenne, swung up to the outpost. S/Sgt
Al.'bert F. Goetze reported the enemy to higher headquarters
and moved the personnel back. We were cut off from Verdenne
and somewhat confused. A truck from Anti-Tank Company
was taking off like a big, fast bird, but the driver stopped
long enough for us to crawl on. About a mile farther we were
stopped by an officer whlQ. told us to dig in. We helped K Company seal off the German penetration.
So far •the attacks had lbeen at the right flank. On the 25th
the Jerries hit our other flank, guarded by Outposts Three,
Four and Five. Seven Kraut tanks and supporting infantry
overran Three, capturing S!Sgt Maxie Horner and Burt L.
Giese. OP 'T hree was in touch with Regiment by radio. We
g•
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could hear him: ''' There are German vehicles approaching,
blinking lights. They are supported by infantry, but I can't
tell how many. They are past me on the left. They have
flanked me on the right and are opening fire. We are surrounded and their fire is getting heavier. Shutting down."
Outpost Three was captured.
Outpost Four spoUed a heavy reconnaissance patrol,
complete with vehides. Our elements in Hampteau were
notified :a nd the patrol •w ithdrew.
On the 26th T /Sgt Walter C. Erickson and his crew at
Outpost Four again spotted a heavy German attack. Simultaneously Outpost Five, commanded by Sgt George H. HalL
was !hit by heavy forces. Lt deGrummond was heading
a patrol to regain contact with Outpost Three. Later we were
told that we had sent back warning of an attack of battalion
strength. Outpost Four knocked out a Jerry jeep and armored
recon car. It was too hot to handle and we again withdrew,
to Hotton and later to Bourdon. The Regiment had been
prepared for every German attack by the work of Charley
Company, the eyes of the 334th.
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T /4 Elro-y Homuth

Pfc William H. Corwin - T j Sgt Curtis C. Robirds Sgt Norbert C. Burlinsky

RED-LETTER DAY
OBJECTIVE: Hetzerath
D Company, under command of Capt Theo E . Kerhulas,
red-lettered 26 •F ebr uary 1945 for the battalion ass au1t on that
German town.
With the first platoon attached to A Company, the second
platoon to C Company and the mortar platoon in battalion
support, Capt Kerhulas moved into. the attack with the forward command group. From this position they directed the
deplo.y ment of the company and effectively established the
perimeter defense later set up by the weapons.
lfhe first platoon moved with A Company north along
the main road to the town. <Receiving small arms fire from
the right flank, the platoon cut across a gully toward the
town cemetery. •P fc James F . Maloney was killed by small
arms fire in this action. From a position to the right of the
cemetery, •t he platoon emplaced its ·t hree guns and offered
direct fire on Germans and on two strong points.
Lt Varnum scouted the approach and located a strong
point on the right. The platoon then moved forward to the
center of the town, one squad at a time. SgtRobertW.Staples
took the first squad through an open field to the left flank.
S /Sgt Joseph J. Barron led the remaining section while being
covered by S/Sgt Clifford •D. Leguin and Pfc newey L. Crisp.
Leguin, while giving this covering ·f ire, received a burst of
enemy fire and was wounded.
In the town Pfc Loren V. Richardson was wounded in
attempting to fire on ·t he German strong point on the right.
The platoon set up northeast of Hetzerath in perimeter
defense after the complete capture of the town.
Under T/Sg·t Vints E. Shumate, the second platoon moved·
to thigh ground before Hetzerath in support of C 'Company.
From this position, under the direction of S/Sgt Joseph L.
McCarthy, two guns opened fire on entrenched Germans.
Overhead fire was laid until the progress of C Company
masked the support.
In the evening Pfc Roger R. Yeatter was wounded by
concussion during a shelling prior to a German counteraHack. Pfc Samuel M. Brandli led ·t he opening of fire on the
1
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attacking German infantry and the machine guns were effective in the stopping of the attack in this sector.
'T he 8lmm mortar platoon was in position in Baal.
Until the final phase of the assault on the objective they
had done very little firing. As the line companies prepared
to jump off, S/Sgt Michael L . Kordeleski, forward observer,
called a barrage from all six guns on the near side of Hetzerath. The weapons were being used at extreme range. The
quota of ammunition to be used was to have been thirty
rounds per gun. However, the second section, under S/Sgt
Ernest A. Trowbridge, was limitlessly supplied by H Company and continued to fire until the cease fire order which
was given fifteen minutes ad'ter the barrage started.
<Lt Williams S. Miller, Jr, Lt Lester C. Kendig, and Cpl
James H. Schaub had moved forward before the barrage
started to investigate a route of approach to Hetzerath.
A route was found which necessitated hand-carrying the
weapons. Cpl Schaub was sent to the Baal position 1to guide
the platoon forward.
The mortar platoon moved into positions on the southeast
side of Hetzerath while under small arms fire from a German
strongpoint on the right. In this position they were rejoined
by forward observer team of iS/Sgt Kondeleski and Pfc William R. Huber. The weapons were then set up for a perimeter
defense of the town. Our fight was over.
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F j Sgt Arthur J . Harpold -

Cpl James H. Schaub -

S /Sgt Arthur B. Roberts -

Lt Edward F. Sinclair

Pfc Loren v. Richardson

"'ROER CROSSING
At the time of the crossing of the Roer River, ·Headquarters Company, First Battalion, played a large role in the
initial waves. Close coordinaHon with the rifle companies
was essential, and each man was throughly rehearsed on the
part he was to play in. the op·eration. Sand tables prepared
by the Ba'ttaliton S-2 Section under the guidance of 1st Lt
Robert H. King, assisted by S/Sgt Arthur Bouret and Pvt
Kenneth Rowan, clearly showed the terrain and. enemy installations of the east bank of the Roer. From 'the Battalion
OP on the west bank of the river, S-2 personnel noted· each
detail and movement of the enemy forces and installations.
No details were le:H to chance. Each building in both
Korrenzig and Rurich, the initial towns to be assaulted,
were numbered to aid in hasty identification and to faC'ilitate
movement.
Just after dark on 22 February, a detail from the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon under ' the command of 2nd
Lt Clarence F. Rhea and consisting of T /Sgt Woodrow W .
Arceneau, Sgt J:..ewie A. Burner, T /5 Thomas B. Weaver, Pvt
Roy C. Call and several men from the AT platoon set out
for Linnich to sandbag the second floor o.f the old slaughterhouS'e on the bank of the river. They piled 317 sandbags
during four enemy mortar barrages, which on one occasion
came so close as to dislodge the piled :bags and cause a
temporary halt in the operation. But the crew completed
the task in just under three ;and a half hours.
The rest of the company, which was billeted in Leiffarth,
made last minute checks of equipment and tried to snatch
a few hours .sleep. At 2300 S/Sgt Miguel R. Nieves and his
kitchen crew put aut hot coffee, doughnuts and hot cakes
as the last hot meal that the boys would get for a long time.
Shortly after ch01w each man made the final check of his
equipment and prepared t'O move up to the river. .
At 0245 the artillery shattered the night with a 45 minute
barrage which plastered the river bank and swept over the
surrounding area and into the towns of Korrenzig and Rurich.
The first wave of the "Fightin First" piled into the assault
boats promptly at 0330 and started through the smokey dark139

ness to the other shore. Headquarters Company had its boats
mixed with the boats of the rifle companies. AT had two
bazooka teams in the first wave commanded by Lt Richard
M. 'Deasy, consisting of S/Sgt Baldwin T. Cecchini, and Elra
L. Faulkner, Pfcs John J. Flynn, Ralph A. Gaeta, James B.
Smith, Douglas J. Harvey, Norman T. Haskins, Fidele
Marinone and Robert N. Gessner. Each of the ammunition
bearers carried four rounds of ammunition to make 12 rounds
for each bazooka. The second Headquarters boat carried
the wire teams whose task was to pick up the lines at the
rivers edge and string them from the boats to the other side.
Two wire teams were made up of S/Sgt Clinton R. Caudill,
Sgts Byron McAllister and Charles H. Spencer, T/4 John P.
Dzuray, T/5 George P. Morley, Pfcs Robert J. Herman, Lawrence H. Carter, Henry A. Darrah, and Charles F. Rockford.
The wire crews quickly spliced the line and successfully laid
it across the river from the assault boat while under enemy
fire. Upon reaching the other bank, Sgt Spencer's crew
remained nea:r the water's edge to repair severances.
The second wave brought two more bazooka teams from
the ·A1T platoon led by TfSgt Joseph Cosari, Jr., and consisting
of S/Sgt Larren B. Davis, Cpl Sid L. Conrad, Pfcs Elmer G.
Webb, William H. Rogers, Robert E. Anderson, Edward R.
Mello, Robert M. Newbill, Alejandro Zamora, William G.
Williams and Billy A. Ford. The second crew carried
antitank mines in ·a ddition to their ammunition. On the
other side, both teams united and followed along behind
Baker Company, skirmishing along the way and blasting
enemy dugouts. Once in the town of Korrenzig, they set up
the anti-tank defense of the town in conjunction with the
rifle companies.
The radio section of the company was posted in the
slaughterhouse by the river and as soon as the assault troops
were aaross and the foot bridge in, the men carried their
300 radios to join the assault of the t!'oops dr:iving on
}(iorrenzig. T/4 Glen 0. Odman crossed over and set up a
relay with the CP in Linnich ·and later went on into
Korrenzig after the town was taken. ·T / 4 William A. Keller,
Pfcs Thomas H. Stone, Jr., and Edward T. Ledd hand-carried
the command 284 to the other side of the river over the foot
bridge and set up operations along with the command group.
S/Sgt B. F. Lancaster handled the radio jeep with the other
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284, and _set out across the treadway with the first vehicles to
race up the road through Rurich and join the attack.
The remainder of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon
handcarried mortar ammunition across with the second wave
and followed closely over the shell swept terrain to turn the
ammunition over to Dog Company in Korrenzig. rThe group
consisted of Sgts George S. Hutchison, Marvin C. Halloway,
Pfcs Clarence Breaux, Guadelupe V. Arredo.rido, Tillman W.
Dean, Howard Allgeier, Jr., Lawrence H. Finley, Nelson B.
Marcy, Leroy E. 'Barnette, Roy IT. Dunn, Elo A. Mueller,
R. A. Alvin Camp, Emerson J. Haug, JosephS. Polinsky, Jr.,
and Lloyd Straub. Eeach man was burdened with six
rounds of 81mm Mortar HE light and any fragment could
have touched off these rounds. 'A ll the men reached Korrenzig
saifely, turned o.ver their ammunition, and set up an ammunitton dump in the .t own while waiting for T /Sgt A:rceneau
to come across the treadway with the ammunition trucks.
Thus Headquarters Company and their specialized' platoons played a large part in the operation and aided materially in assaulting the Nazi river stronghold. The '"Fightin
First" with a highly coordinated attack had secured initial
objectives and was on the move again.
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BATTLE OF BEHO
From a wooded assembly area deep within the h eart of
the Ardennes on 22 January, Easy Company moved out in a
night attack. Although the men were veterans of many battles
and knew well the enemy they were about to engage, they
were g.l ad to be moving after spending cold, miserable hours
in foxholes.
We had gone only a short distance when our supporting
tanks were forced to fall back because of icy roads and deep
snow drifts. Easy Company men then realized that this next
battle would 1b e typical of the Belgian battles: thick woods
with the Jerries holding inme favorable positions. It was
snowing much harder now and the infantry continued· the
attack down each side of a iheavily mined road.
rF rom distant high ground we drew artillery fire, and the
battalion commander decided on an alternate route. This
route afforded us excellent concealment but carried us
through heavy woods and deep snow. Sixteen hours after
our jump-off we found our way into Beho, arriving at 0100
on 23 January.
We barely had time to eat a "K" ration and get partially
thawed out before we pushed off again at 0500. Weary, cold,
and hungry doughs were ordered to continue •t he attack
after spending over 20 hours exposed to the elements of
an Ardennes winter.
Our orders were to dig in on the high ground about a
1000 yards outside of Beho but before we re~ched this ridge,
we were fired upo.n by German outposts. Lt James V. Morgia,
th~ executive officer and acting company commander, ordered
an immed.i ate attack. The Germans were completely surprised and were unable to man their previously dug positions.
The second platoon actually bypassed some Germans who
were s.leeping in ·t he buildings of the Mansion Neuve Monastery. These were easy prey for our riflemen, although in the
darkness it was difficult to distinguish them from our own
men. Everyone was shouting and orders could be heard in
Doth English and German.
We ran into machine gun fire from tanks and infantry
forcing us to withdraw into a barn. About twenty Germans
10
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in the barn fired at us, but our surprise and superior po.w er
forced them to retreat via the near door toward some tanks.
Even though these Jerries were armed with automatic
weapons, in the confusion that followed they were afraid to
fire, and chose to follow their tanks. Meanwhile S/Sgt Walt·2r
E. Wright crawled into the barn after neatly disposing olf a
well concealed machine gun nest firing only thirty feet from
were he was lying. He scored a tree burst directly over
this enemy position 'w ith a rifle grenade. Small arms fire
came into the barn from three sides. S/Sgt William H. Lumpkin Jr. had his steel h elmet shot fr;om his head while placing
his BAR man at an upstair window. We won the first phase of
the battle by occupying the enemy's positions; however, our
company was disorganized. The second and •t hird platoons
had lost their platoon leaders, Lt Marvin W . Jamison and
Lt Clyde S. Laurant Jr.
Sergeants resumed command and we reorganized, treated
our wounded, and set up a defense for an expected counterattack. The Germans counter-attacked twice, firs•t with infantry and then with tanks. The first attack was repulsed
with rifle and BAR fire. As BAR's barked from the second
story windo,ws, enemy tanks begain using their 20mm high
explosive shells in the second att ack on the stone buildingS\.
The intense small arms fire proved ineffective, and we received a terrific shelling. Three enemy tanks were f.orced to
retreat because of our accurately observed 105mm fire.
· The situation was so precarious .a t one time that the fmward observer destroyed his radio. Pfc Robert E. Epley ran
back to Beho to get the badly needed artillery support which
. came just in time to 'f orce the r etreat of the battered German
units. Thes e numbered between 200 and 400 infantry troops
and three tanks before the retreat.
We dug in on the ridge and manned outposts until dark.
1
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A PERFECT OPERATION
During the long and bitter history O·f World War II the
t erm "perfect operation" has been applied to a few important
battles, but to th e men of F Company only one action can
ever bear the term "perfect": the capture of Mullendorf, Germany on 18 December 1944. In the words of a crack officer,
"That was the day this outfit came into its own as an
attacking force. That day we really dem onstrated the' u se
. of marching fire."
Two days before the jump off th e Second Battalion had
been reliev ed at Leiffarth, and was sent to Geilenkirchen •t o
prEpare for the Mullendorf battle. On 16 December each
platoon leader in Fox Company was informed of the coming
operation. We were to coordinate with the First Battalion's
attack on Wurm. The platoon leaders received many maps
and aerial photographs delineating the terrain features, pillboxes and communication trenches. The men were told, "This
wiH be a tough and speedy operation." Due to the closeness
of th0 fighting, mm 1were equipped with M3 machine pistols,
additional bazookas, grenade launchers, and BAR's.
With all preparations completed, the company moved to
an assembly area in Beeck early in the morning of 18 December. Each man was given rations and additional ammunition.
Bazooka teams carried from nine to twelve rounds. As Pfc
Edward Rosol said, "If the Jerries had hit me, I would have
gone off like an ammunition dump." Rifle grenadiers carried
six grenades. M3 men and "ordinary" rifleman were armed
with extra magazines (as were BA:R teams) and additional
bandoliers, plus six grenades per man. It was obvious that
this attacking force meant business.
The company was scheduled to leave the assembly area
at 1000 and move into a draw outside of Mullendorf which
was fr·ee from ;observation. Here they wait ed for the terrific
artillery barrage to lift before opening th eir attack. Two
assault engineers were assigned to the second platoon, designated by Lt Edward Gedrich, company commander, as the
leading attack element. Each of the engineers carried a
"satchel" charge, in case it became necessary to blast the pillboxes. Before the attack one of the engineers told T/Sgt Harry
C. Kelly, "I just want your boys to keep the embrasures
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buttoned up wHh rifle fire, while we move in toward the
pillbox." As it later turned out, the engineers never had to use
their charges, but did some · fancy firing ,w ith their Ml's
instead.
A red flare suddenly shot up indicating the last round of
the barrage had been 'f ired. Kelly moved his platoon forward
on the double and across a .r ailroad track. The third, led by
Lt George M. Hardy, and the first , led by T/Sgt Clarence E.
Stephens, followed close behind. As the company poured
through the gap, they encountered small arms and sniper fire
from nearby shattered houses and pilliboxes. Sgt Kelly, firing .
his Ml with on e hand and carrying a 536 radio in the other,
ordered his men to return the fire and they immediately cut
loose with terrific bursts from all weapons. Sgt Kelly and
S/Sgt John Greslick Jr., s econd squad leader, ·each attacked
enemy pillboxes, tossing smoke bombs down the ventilators.
When enemy fire was discovered coming from a pillbox on
the left flanks, Pfcs Raymond Fusselman Jr. and. Charles
Danajovits ·f ired two W:P ·r ounds into the position and continued moving forward with their platoon. StlSgt Irvin K.
Pierce followed behind th first wave and captured 16 J ·erries
in a shattered pillbox.
By keeping up a continuous fire the company reached the
last objective, a well-covered pillbox, listed on aerial photographs as a "doubtful hays tack." The J erries poured out of
the pillbox and .attempted t o set up a defense in a n earby
trench. One Kraut came out with a MG 42 and beltfull of
ammunition, but was immediately cut down by a long burst
fr.om Pvt Steve W·ozenski's BAR. A Jerry captain d r ew a bead
on Pfc Frederick Nock with a Schmeisser, but a burst fr·om
Pfc Fusselman's M3 caused the "Hauptmann" to toss away
his weapon and give up. A steel bayonet, ably handled by
Pfc Marion J. Fuchs aid ed in this C?pture.
Suddenly the men discovered " it was all over " as Maj or
James V. Johnston, Ba ttalion CO, rushed to the last trench ·
and told the men, "You did a great job. We've got Mullendorf. Set up for a counter-attack."
The rest was anti-climatic. Everyone felt "great", especially aft er learning that their company had cleared out 16 pillboxes had taken 84 prisoners, and b est of all, suffered NO
casualties in the entire operation.
The "post-mortem " lectures gave deserved credit to the
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brilliant planning and coordination, the devastating artillery
fire, which drove the Jerries out o'f the trenches and into the
pillbocxes, and the able way many dangerous mines were
cleaned out. But greatest praise was given to the men, who
double timed through mine-laden orchards and fired like
hell to teach the vaunted W ehrmacht what "perfect operation"
means.
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DEATH IN TWO CITIES
This is the story of Company G and its title is "Death in
'Dwo Cities."
It is also the story ·o f the 334th's Roer River breakthrough.
Company G learned at a terrific price that the dash to the
Rhine was a costly thing.
The night of the first day of the Task Force Church drive
found the regiment fanned out in de'£ ense positions north of
the ~traffic hub of W egberg. While the men dug in for the
night and waited for a counter-attack, word came do:wn that
the attack would be resumed the following day. The Second
Battalion would lead off. Immediate objectives were the
towns of ,B erg and Eicken, later termed by Company G
infantrymen the "Cities of Death."
Company G jumped off hom a WPA-like German settlement, known as the "model village," which lay near a road
junction not far from the town of Waldniel. The company,
operating with the reduced strength of 125 men, led the Second Battalion's drive. To reach the road leading to the two
towns it was nec essary to cross an open field for 300 yards.
Wh en the company reached the toad, the doughboys pushed
f·orward, the third platoon swinging up the left side of the
highway, the first on the right, and the second in support.
The ·l ight machine gun section moved with the third platoon,
and the mortars stayed behind in the village to provide
suppo'I"t ·f or the advancing troops.
Company G had gone about 300 yards toward the to;wn
of Berg when they ran into th e first of their troubles. They
were trapped in :the cross-fire of four machine guns. One lay
off to the right and nor.th of the highway. The other three
were firing from b ehind a slope t o the immediate front. A
rifleman pump ed lead into the machine gun on the right. He
crawled for a while, got up on his knees to fire, crawled
some more, raised himself up again to fiTe. A machine gun
bullet killed him.
A recent Company G battlefiel'd commission, Lt Harold L.
Howdieshell, was about 25 yardS' ahead of the company. Both
of his scouts were with him. The lieutenant spotted the
machine gun that was hitting the first platoon. H 'Was the
1
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one off to the right of the main road. He pushed his scouts
down into the ditch by the road and then pegged about four
hand grenades into the gun position. Just as he was starting
to pull the pin from ·the fifth grenade, •the machine gun cut
loose and killed him outright.
The two scouts were saved :b y Lt Howdieshell's quick
thinking. (Later in the day, when there were only two German prisoners taken fr·om th~ pitched battle that followed
down ·t he road, one of the scouts, Pfc Lemon ·R. Burrows,
rushed toward the two Germans in an attempt to compensate
for the death of his lieutenant. He was restained by the other
scout, Pfc Lonnie J. Davis, who grabbed him and quietly
declared: "No., 1we've got to take them prisoners to stop this
bloodshed.")
The dead •l ieutenant's bravery removed one obstacle from
the direct path of the first platoon. A second machine gun
w,as spotted. It was firing from a building at the front otnd
to the left of the r.oad. The continuous spatter of bullets
kept the first platoon hugging the road. But about half the
platoon managed to crawl up to a sugar beet mound. The
mound atbsorbed some of the machine gun fire and afforded
tempoTary p.rotection. The platoon leader, Lt JackF.Schaper,
and his platoon sergeant both made their way to the shelter.
Lt Schaper snaked his 'way to one of the mounds to observe
the position of the gun.
The lieutenant was hit just as soon as his head was far
enough around the end of the mound to observe. Fortunately
he was only wounded. Then one of Company H's lieutenants
- Lt Daniel Fochesato - ran to aid the wounded lieutenant. He was killed outright by the same machine gun. Then
the platoon sergeant took o.v er. Just as he raised his head
the machine gunner hit him between the eyes.
It was the most accurate shooting that Company G had
ever run into. The accuracy of the German machine gunners
was unoanny. They couldn't miss. Almost all of the dead and
wounded suffered direct head hits.
Lt Milton Rabinowitz, in charge of the company's light
machine guns, ran back to report to the company commande.r,
Capt Charles E. ·Hiatt. He told 'the captain of the "slaughter"
that was taking place. Capt Hi.att went up to the road,
pressed himself against the embankment, and crawled up to
the bend of the highway. He then sent his second platoon
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on a flanking movement to the far left. They were to go
through a patch of woods, circle around, and knock out -the
deadly gun from the flank. Lt Rabinowitz was to reorganize
the third platoon.
The second platoon picked up 15 prisoners in the woods
- every one an NCO or officer - and continued on to knock
out the gun. Advancing cautiously, the sec'Ond finally reached
the house where the machine gun was firing. It was a low,
one-story affair. The gun was rattling fr·o m the windo.w .
The second platoon assaulted with marching fire and charged
right into the "house of death." Their catch amazed them:
a full Nazi colonel at the trigger .o f a doublebarreled
machine gun.
The colonel had hit some of Company G's best men. Some
one wanted to murder him.
But the catch was too important to kill. Company G's
idea was to take as many prisoners as possible, get the
Germans out of their holes, thereby reducing the company's
casualties. Still full of arrogance and hatred for his Yankee
captors, the colonel 'Was sent off to the rear.
The platoon looked out of the building and in a minute
they understo·od the German plan. The colonel's doublebarreled gun had covered the crest of the slop,e behind which
the Germans were dug in.
It was a perfect reverse slope defens e. The Germans had
every avenue of approach thoroughly covered by machine
gun fire. With the colonel's gun immobilized, the third
platoon could vault the crest of the slope and stab at the
Jerries dug in behind it." H was decided to rush them. Company G didn't make much dis1ance on the first effort. The
German£ replied with a barrage of lead. Another machine
gun cut aU around the soldiers. Burp guns and small arms
fire increased the German counter-attack.
George Company hugged their side of the slope after a
few yards and waited for the fire to quiet down. The Germans
had to be uprooted from their trenches. It w.as a risky
business. Every ·on e took a turn at the enemy, raising himself
up, letting go with a slug, and then ducking back to the
ground. The Germans replied again and again. They w eren 't
the ordinary run-off-the-mill soldiers the company had encountered in previous action. Company G later f ound out
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that they were special paratroopers that were flown in to
stop the Yanks at any price.
The Germans were determined fanatics. The wouldn't
come out of their holes to surrender. ;rhey wanted to fight
to the last man and hold the slope until kingdom come. Some
one said: '" To hell with this j.ack-in-the-box game. Let's
rush them."
Company G rushed the Germans and charged the crest o·f
the slope with fixed bayonets. They dived into the trenches
and pushed their bayonets into the stomachs of the Germans.
When they couldn't get at the Krauts with bayonets they
used hand grenades. The Germans fought back with hull's
eye small a·r ms fire, dying one by one as' they hit back. They
were no match for the infuriated soldiers ·of Company G,
who bayoneted and grenaded every German in sight until
finally only two remained. They were the only prisoners taken.
The company felt physically whipped after the wild fight.
But they had to continue on to take the town of Berg. The
first platoon reached the road. There was no opposition now.
Going from house to house in Berg they rounded up 75 Germans. Most of them had changed into civilian clothes, but the
battle-wise soldiers were not fooled.
The •company reported by radio to battalion: "Objective
taken. We're moving on to our next objective."
The morta•rs laid down a small barrage in preparation.
The plan w.as for the second platoon to lead off to the left
of the road, with the third moving abreast on the right of the
h:i ghway. The second platoon was within 150 yards of Eicken
when it had to stop. It was the bitter Berg experience again.
The Germans had the route of approach perfectly covered
with the cr'O·ss fire of three machine guns, For good measure
the Jerries had an 88 dug in with the two machine guns Ito
the front.
·T he German fire was murderous. The second platoon
assaulted with 25 men and soon was hit hard. One by one
the men were cut down by the rapid fire of the machine guns.
The 88 was firing flat trajectory point-blank fire. The shells
were exploding a few inches from the ground. There wasn't
a sliver of pi'd·tection.
When the Ge.r rrian fire eased up, six men remained in the
second platoon. Two of the company's medics were casualties.
Pfc Victor W. King braved heavy machine gun fire to .ad159

minister first aid to the rwounded. He tried to reach more,
but it was suicide. S/Sgt Artis C. Britton realized to remain
in ;the open ground was certain death. He jumped up from
his prone position and dashed toward the 88 and machine
gun, side by side.
When the sergeant was in range he hurled two hand
grenades at the weapons. The Germans threw back two
potato mashers. Britton threw two more grenades. The
Germans didn't throw anything back. He had scored direct
hits. Both weapons were knocked out. Their crews were
dead. But the heroic sergeant was wounded.
The guns knocked out, the surviving six exhausted men
of the second platoon stayed to guard the positions. One of
the six, Pfc Cleatus W. Ewton, ·r eturned across the field
under withering machine gun fire to report the success. When
he reached the CO, he was i:?·O exhausted that he fell down
right where he stopped. He managed to utter: "We got them.
The road is open,"' before losing consciousness.
Capt Hiatt then sent the third platoon up the right side
of •t he road toward Eicken. The platoon traveled about
200 yards ' when a machine gun, snuggled in a haystack,
opened up on the advancing column. The platoon took cover
in a drainage ditch along side of the road. All along the ditch
were culverts. The pla:toon slowly made its way through the
ditch, but the cmlv.e rts, spaced .25 yards apart, barred progress. It was impossible to get through. Some jumped . up
on the road, ran across the culverts, and hopped back into
the ditch. But the machine gun caught them every time they
put their heads above the ditch.
The column halted. The CO wo·rked his way up to the
ditch. He asked the lead man what was holding them up.
":Sir," he said, "we can't move. That machine gun has
our number."
'
"Well, we can't stay here," the captain replied, "We've
got to get into that town. Follow. me."
Capt Hiatt jumped up and made a dive for the next
opening. The platoon followed at his heels. The machine gun
sniper never let up far a minute. He was perfectly zeroed in.
The platoon lost nine men. The wounded lay sprawling in
the ditch. There wasn't an aid man available.
The last ·culvert led to the first house in Eicken. By
constantly leap-frogging and "hoping the bastard wasn't
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looking when
he jumped,"
the platoon
finally made
it into t01wn.
Company G
had made the
second "City
ofDeath."The
day's
work
was finishedalmost. The
men wanted
that last machine gun out
of the way.
The CO sent
Lt Char les C.
Baker and a
patrol of four
men to wipe
out the m achine gun under the haystack.
Th e patrol
worked
its
way back to
the haystack.
Major Charles E. Hiatt
They reached
a position in front o-f the gun. While the remainder of
the patro1 kEpt the gunner busy with small arms fire, Pfc
Max L. Slater worked around to the left of the haystack and
approached it from the rea-r. Slater moved a little and removed a match from his pocket. Then, as calmly as though
he· were lighting a cigarette, he struck the match and set
the hay afire. The gun w.as wiped out. The battalion could
pass through safely.
In Eicken 't he weary soldiers of Oompany G tried to get
some rest. The breakthr10ugh 'would go on.
For this action G Company was later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
11
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HOW HIGHLIGHTS
H Company's combat diary reveals the active part that
unit played in the story of the 334th. Here are some dayby-day highlights:
18 November 1944. Unit jumps off against the Siegfried
Line at Breil, Germany. Members of H Company take the
first enemy prisoners from a dugout by the railroad just
outs1ide Breil. The 81mm mortar platoon learns to use battery
fire and the 300 radio in preference to dispersed gun positions
and sound-power telephones.
28 November 1944. Gereonsweiler Germany. Moving up
to Gereonsweiler, unit nearly walks through enemy lines at
one point because of faulty information. T/4 Robert E. Ward,
company aid man, establishes his name throughout the Regiment as "Doc" Ward. The tireless, efficient work that he is
performing in combat has given him Associated Press recognition and his name is becoming a legend in this battalion.
20 December 1944. Regiment pulls out of Siegfried Line
and moves to Marche, Belgium, to meet the German counterattack. Afiter assuring the Marche civilians that the enemy
was "beaucoup" miles away, members of the company move
out with other companies of the battalion to establish positions of contact with the enemy in Hotton and Hampteau.
The night of 23 December the battalion is alerted for an enemy
attack of an approximate strength o;f a corps. When Lt Daniel ·
L. Fochesato goes ~to one of the gun positions of his machine
gun platnon to inform his men of the situation and asks if
they can hold the line, the immediate reply is, "Hell, yes!"
24 December 1944. Fi<rst section of the mortar platoon
under 6 /Sgt James E. Bush is exposed and attacked by the
enemy at Hampteau, Belgium. At one time, firing at a range
of less than 400 yards, they drove the enemy back to a range
of 1800 yards by their efficient concentrations. On this same
day a section of machine guns under S/Sgt Thomas R. Clutter
breaks up an enemy combat patrol firing almost point-blank
into the enemy.
7 January 1945. Having moved fTom their positions around
Marche, the regiment prepares to attack Marcouray, Belgium,
with the Second Battalion jumping off at Devantave. Belgium.
During this attack Cpl Ralph M. Rogers, radio operator for the
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morta'r observer, voluntarily charges and - knocks out an
enemy machine gun position with his M3 while carrying the
300 radio.
9 January 1945. On high ground above LaRoche, Belgium,
machine gunners have a "field day." One machine gun under
Sgt Edward G. Martinez drives an enemy force directly into
tih e line of fire of another machine gun of Sgt Cecil Hayes.
The ·enemy force was completely annihilated.
At Cielle, Belgium, the entire H Company organic transportation paS!ses over a mine field of approximately 50 mines
in the road without mishap. When the mine field is uncovered
a few hours later, some of the mines are found to have the
paint w01rn on them and some of them have even been turned
up on an angle by the weight of the vehicles passing over.
16 January 1945. 'A regimental patrol led by .L t Byron
Blankenship of H Company meets General Patton's Army.
22 January 1945. In the battalion attack on Beho, Belgium,
Cpl Jerome P. Wohlstadter pieces together one workable
radio out of his own radio and that of the Company F
radio operator, both sets having been knocked out. Having
accomplished this under heavy enemy fire, he then continues to observe, direct fire, and maintain comrpunications
for both companies.
On this same day a section ·o·f machine guns under the
command of T/Sgt Clifton R Dasson enters a courtyard on
th e 'O utskirts of Beho, Belgium, and his m en become mixed
with a group of SS Germans who are wearing the same type
of snowsuits as the H Company men. AHer Sgt Dasson has
succeeded in separating his men and taking cover, the SS
men counter-attack. As the H Company men are outnumbered, their only means of breaking up the attack is to
call their own artillery on their position. They are forced to
break up two such attacks in this manner.
23 February 1945. In the crossing of the Roer River, H
Company's weapons fire in support of the First Battalion. In this 'One operation the mortar platoon fires 312'00
rounds, and the two machine gun platoons fire approximately 50,000 rounds, burning out an average of two barrels
per machine gun.
27 February 1945. Having broken through the main
enEmy resistance on the east side of the Roer, the H Company
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forces become a part of the motorized column of the 334th
that breaks through to the Rhine.
2 April 1945. The unit becomes part of the motorized
operatiop to continue the drive into the heart of Germany.
9 ,April1945. Because of the darkness and fog which prevent tank operations, the Second Battalion spearheads on foot
part of the coordinated regimental drive on Hannover. Under
the cover of darkness, H Company, preceded only by part of
one rifle ~ompany, walks through the enemy's lines and
esta"Qlishes positions on the outskirts of Hannover. At one time
during this move we are. within a few yards of .an enemy
tank covering an underpas\S. At daylight the men are suddenly
startled by a loudspeaker announcing to the Germans that
it is the best for them to surrender. Immediately Germans
begin ·to come from several directions with their hands over
their heads. With the inf•a ntry holding its strategic positions,
the tanks are able to move through and the motorized column
is 'resumed.
_, During a temporary halt of the column in the heart of
Hahno~e'r, a party from H Company is sent out to clear houses
of enemy personnel. Pfc Homer R. Boissonneault, along with
Pfc George W. Gross and others, gets ahead of the party,
stops an enemy command car, and is in the prncess of taking
its occupants prisoners when a German armored column pulls
up and fires upon them. Gross and the others are able to elude
the' enemy and make it back to the company, but Bois~
sonneault is cut off and is forced to take cover in a nearby
church. Though the enemy searches for him, he later escapes
and rejoins his outfit.
14 April 1945. After taking Hannover on April 9, the
regiment resumes its motorized advance into Germany and
continues without serious res.i stance until it reaches the Elbe
River. The 'Second Battalion is pulled back from its position
a few miles from the river to occupy Salzwedel, and to take
over several displaced persons camps and local ·t argets.
H Company's mission consists of guarding targets and conducting motor patrols.
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HEADQUARTERS SECOND REMEMBERS
We remember the tim e we were shelled at Gereonsweiler
and the Krauts hit an ammunition dump in the front yard.
The dump went off, sounding like hell's b elches. Somebody
y elled, "Let's get out! " but the front door was just a few
feet away from the exploding ammunition. We piled up th e
steps leading from th e cella·r and out the back doo.r . There was
a convenient trench nearby. We sweated out the aummunition pile and the target it made for the Kraut artillery.
We remember 28 February 1945 when the call came
down that the Krauts were dug in around Waldneil, suppo;r ted by tanks. 2nd Lt Winthrop P. Murray invented
"Murray's scurry" .as he whipped the third squad of his
Anti-Tank platoon into action. S/Sgt Novbert H.Bockerstette
and Cpl William R. Haskin swung into the fight. The gun
was brought up to a position outside Eiken and set up.
Meanwhile the tank had spotted the crew and was firing at
them, attempting to knock the gun out before it could
get into action. It was no time to be orthodox. The book
says to bracket the target, but if the crew followed the book,
tthe medics would have followed them. They fired one shot
and knocked out the, tank setting it on fire.
While this was going on, up ah e,a d G Company was
engaging in a horrible small arms and hand-to-hand fight
with Germans paratroopers. Casualties were so. heavy that
the medics could not handle all the wounded properly. The
Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon went forward 'to assist
the medics. Lt Sheldon L. Palmer led litter parties to the
culverts and ·o pen fields wlhere the G Company wounded lay.
Under intense enemy fire the litter bearers moved thei·r
comrades to safety. Pfcs Claud Bark, Fred Nance and
Robert E.Russell made trip after trip to the evacuationareas.
We remember Capt Seymour B. Stone, Pfcs Edmund J.
Brown and Douglas N. Jennings in a billeting team which
took on more than twice their strength in Engelbostel during
the drive for Hannover. Capt Stone, our company commander, moved into Engelbostel directly behind the front
lines to secure billets for the Battalion CP, thus insuring an
efficient position from which to work. As the jeep containing
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Stone, his diriver, Jennings, and his interpreter, Hr:own,
moved down the street they noticed a house filled with
Germans. Capt Stone immediately dismounted, slung his
carbine f.rom the shoulder and· pumped lead into the house
which later we discovered held seven Nazis.
The Nazis were preparing a machine gun nest to ambush
the next troops moving down the streets. They were not
quite prepared when the three men moved in on them. The
Germans in the f.ront yard ducked into the house and our
men moved in on them.
The three Amerioans cleared the ground floor of· the
house. Jennings went to the cellar door and jerked it open.
In the cellar below, traversing a machine gun to meet him,
was a German soldier. Jennings reacted instantly. He drove
down the stairs, kicked the machine gun to one side and
fired a burst that killed the German.
During the encounter Capt Stone was killed from a German automatic weapon's 'burst.
All in all, the three men of Headquarters Second killed,
captured, or wounded the seven Germans, and averted a
posssible ambush for the troops following behind.
'Dhese are some things that Headquarters Second remembers . . . .

168

Cpl William R . Haskin -

Cpl Sidney L. Freeman -

S (Sgt Nobert H. Bockerstette

Cpl Hyder A. Neely -

Sgt Morris Davis

S(Sgt Joe Green -

Pfc Charles s. Speeice - F(Sgt Paul R. McFall Sgt William F. King

CHRISTMAS PATROL
Lines were thin and foxholes were pretty far apart in the
Item company sector o·f the line before Verdenne, Belgium.
It was little wonder that on the morning before Christmas,
men of the second platoon discovered two foxholes empty.
Jerries had been infiltrating through the lines all night, and
there was little our men could do about it but shoot at anything they heard, or at shadowy figures they might chance
to see. ·S econd plato·o n's leader, Lt Norman Seidensticker,
T/Sgt Ray Owen, and Pfcs Edward Prince and Os,car Delgado
were gone, and their empty foxholes meant a wide breach in
the single front line of the company.
It wasn't hard to guess what had happened to them. The
Jerries were up to all their tricks to pierce the MarchcHotton line, and footprints ·on the frosty ground showed that
the I Company men had been overpowered and captured.
Strangely, however, all the footprints leading away from the
emptied foxholes led to the rear of the I Company lines.
As soon as it was light enough to be able to follow the
trail in the snow, two of Lt Seidensticker's men, Sgt William
Emmons and Pfc William Neil started on their own private
recJnnaissance. They were soon joined by Sgt Unah G.
Lucas and Pfc Glenn Whitfield. The tracks led on and
on, down the road, across an open field. The men knew
the risk involved in becoming separated ·f rom their outfit in
the Battle of the Bulge. They went back for a little more
support.
By 0900 a volunteer patrol of thirteen men was ready to
look for the missing men. They were Lucas, Emmons, Whitfield and Neil, and T /Sgt Frank Telesz, S /Sgt Carl Wilson,
S 'Sgt Albie Jarvis, S/Sgt John Heath, Sgt Ralph Zindel,
and Pfcs Jose Bonney, John Alejo, Benjamin River.a and
Michael Balash.
Again following the footprints in the snow, the patrol
took off. When they reached the open field they formed a
skirmish line and proceeded toward the woods. Several of
the men got fleeting glimpses of Jerries sneaking through the
underbrush. They opened fire . However, instead of being
greeted by the return fire of a few rifles, which they fully
expected, machine guns and burp guns opened up on them.
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German troops, they discovered, had set themselves up
for the winter in the woods. 'They had prepared defences,
cut fields of fire, and channelized the approaches to the woods.
The patrol had only one recourse. Covering each other as
best they could, they beat a hasty r etreat across the open
field. Expecting t'O be mowed down at any moment by Jerry
fire, they were relieved when they made it back without the
enemy opening up on them. They returned quickly to the
Company CP to report their experience.
At the Company CP, it was obvious that something would
hav·e to be done immediately to relieve ·the threat to the
rear of the I Company lines. Already over-extended, and
expecting an attack at any moment, the company's situation
was perilous. Calling back to battalion for some support, I
Company prepared to defend both front and rear from attack.
Fifteen hundred was the jumping-off time for K company
to clean up the pocket discovered by the I Company patrol.
At the same time, Jerry made a frontal attack on I Company,
expecting the two companies of German troops which had
infiltrated behind the I Company lines to attack from the
rear. But they were otherwise occupied with K Company
and three attached tanks. The attack stalemated, the line
held, and after a see-saw battle on Christmas Eve, the line
was thoroughly secured.
'
'T he patrol, which had been sent behind their own lines
to find four of their own men, discovered instead the wellconcealed Jerry plans to effect a breakthrough, and made
possible the timely liquidation of the attack. It might be
added, too, that K company found Lt Seidenstioker and his
men who had been taken prisoner. They had been treated
well, they were lightly gua·r ded, and were none the worse
for their experience, but glad to be out of the hands of
their captors.
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VERDENNE
K Company's "toughest battle" began on 21 December
1944. On that date, K Company moved into a defensive
position around the grand chateau north .of Verdenne, Belgium. There were no reports as to enemy position or strength;
just the information that the Germans might and probably
would attack somewhere on this Verdenne-Marenne~
Bourdon triangle.
The digging was tough, the cold ate Tight through one's
bones, and the tension mounted. For greatly needed information, on 24 December a four man patrol, S/Sgt Jose
S. Correa, Pfc Thomas A. Weiss, Sgt Joseph E. Beaudin, and
Pvt Jack A. Reynolds, was sent out to reconnoiter and make
contact with the enemy in the woods to the east of Verdenne.
'T hen the expectancy and tension was shattered like glass
when word came that the German had infiltrated two recon
·companies behind our lines into the woods to the west of the
town. At approximately 1500, 24 December, the company,
with all excess equipment left behind, attacked and cleaned
out this, area with a loss to the enemy of 67 prisoners and a
large amount of German and American equipment.
The patrol of four men returned to the chateau after
compl'e ting their mission to find 1/Sgt Paul Z. Long 1a nd four
men there. Around 1600 the German attack started with a
concentrated shelling of the chateau. As the nine men
prepared to defend the position, the order was given to withdr:aw from the building. The four man patrol, with Pfc
Anthony F. Guerra, moved to the Wo·ods to the northwest
and dug in to defend the strategic crosS'r·o ads. Just as they
were settled, they were forced to withdraw with :t he 84th
Recon Troop when warned by the approach of firing enemy
tanks.
In the meantime, one platoon, led by Lt BruceC.Chapman
and Sgt Anton T. Milosevich, moved out to lay barbed wiTe
in front of the town. When the enemy attack started, Lt
Chapman led a patrol back into the town, and returned
with sixteen prisoners and the information that the town
was full of the enemy. With no other route open, they made
their way back t·o Marche with the information and prisoners.
!Back in the woods, the company was foTced to dig in
12
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along the ridge to the west of the town and await further
orders. The enemy had overrun the chateau and captured
all equipment. Due to the rapid action of 1/Sgt Long, the
company records and all important papers were saved!.
Now came the ChriS'tmas present that everyone expected;
attack the town, take it, and hold it at all costs. With half
a K ration per man, and freezing from the persistent cold,
the men tried to adjust themselves, and prepare for the
attack. A little later the order \Was cancelled, and with frozen
sighs of relief, the men walked back to their holes. But then
it came again, this time for keeps take Verdenne.
Fo:r almost twenty minutes-supporting mtillery laid the
most concentrated, and if possible to say, the most beautiful
barrage ever seen; the sky was continuously lit up almost
like daylight. At 0100, K Company, composed of approximately forty men with Lt Richard S. Bullens in command,
and L Company of 335th moved ahead to carry out the difficult mission given them.
In the attack across the open field on the approach to
town, Lt Kenneth D. Macinnis•, platoon leader, was lost to
the company when a shell hit near him. Just as we entered
the town, both Lt Bullens and Lt William C. Himburg were
shot down by enemy rifle fire. The company was now !Without
an officer, and left with only a handful of men.
While the company fought through the rest of the town,
thirteen men, under TJ1Sgt Cha·r les Termine and Sgt John
M. Siegel, moved through the place to dig in on the east and
prepare a defense. They steeled themselves for the strong
enemycounter-attackthatwas inevitable. Thirteen men dug in.
Pfc Raymond Guiducci was standing in a doorway
with Pfc Oharles :L. Stepanick when he noticed someone
walking down the stveet into town. It looked li ke a GI so h e
let him go by. But when another, followed by fifteen more
came, he explaimed, "Damn it, those guys aren't GI's," and
they both opened fire.
For three hours they fought off the enemy counter-attack,
which grew in force as reinforcements were thrown in.
Finally, after a bitter battle, this small vanguard of defenders
beat the enemy back, and the first phase ·of "hold at all
costs" was completed.
The next day, 25 December, the company, commanded by
Sgt Sieg·el, sta·r ted out to flush the town. •I n this operation

178

SjSgt Thomas Weiss -

Sgt Charles Stepanick -

12*

Sgt Joseph Beaudin

Pfc Thomas Farmer -

SjSgt John Siegel

S jSgt Anton Milosewich

Pfc Alexander Intrator -

F j Sgt Paul Long -

Pfc Anthony Guerra

a large number of prisoners was taken. Then at 1000 that day
iLt Chapman arrived with seven tanks of the 771st Tank
Battalion. Pfcs Alexander M. Intrator and Dudley T. Briggs
had gone to lead them up. With this group as reinforcements,
the small gr•oup of men commenced to flush out the town
again, this time with more ease. For two days, twice a day,
it became necessary to flush every house and cellar for the
enemy, who had infiltrated into the town during the night.
The grand ·t otal after two day's of cleaning up was 472 prisoners for K Company alone.
All during the attack and defense, for five consecutive
days, Sgt Warren N. Pedersen, assisted by S/Sgt Carol L.
Nutter and Pfcs Guerra, Intrator, and Thomas L. (Farmer,
were forced to walk the wire lines continuously to keep .communications intact. Without thes;e communications, this small
vanguard of fighters, still classed as a T AO Company, would
never have been able to ·" hold at all costs."
Finally, as the backbone of the last effort in the German
counter-offensive was broken, events took place with more
calm and ease, and the company settled down to reorganiZ'ation. During this time, a number of less effective counterattacks were launched by the enemy, but supporting artillery
Was the greatest aid in stopping them. On one occasion Lt
Wood, attached FO, directed fire of Cannon Company,
M Company's 81mm m'ortars, Division and Corps artillery
all at one time by sound alone. Through his effective fire
direction, a large number of enemy tanks and half tracks
were effectively destroyed and chalked up as a .loss to the
weakening enemy.
On 1 January 1945, the exhausted men of K Company
were relieved by the British, after a job well done. Final
score was 472 prisoners, countless dead, and a large number
of enemy tanks and half tracks and other equipment captured, including large stores of American equipment being
used by the enemy.
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COUNTER-ATTACK
Korrenzig and Rurich had been taken in the swift rush of
the initial attack over the Roer, and L Company, was poised
on the edge of Rurich to smash forward to Baal.
Held in reserve in the initial stages of this action, L Company had moved up through heavy artillery fire following
the First Battalion's river crossing. Since the footbridges
could not be maintained during the enemy barrage, · the
company had crossed the Roer in assault boats. !Moving
swiftly into defensive positions on the edge of Korrenzig,
they discovered a strong enemy defense line along the railroad to Rurich.
Between Rurich and Baal was a large chateau surr.o unded
by pillboxes and tanks. Rocket-firing Typhoons hammered
and slammed the chateau as the doughs ran into fire ,f rom
tanks and a pillbox concealed beneath a haystack. Fighting
hard, the third platoon, aided by the mortar section, managed
tQ set the hay camouflage ablaze.
Silhouetted in the glare of the burning pillbox, the second
platoon, with a machine gun squad attached, moved through
the lowering darkness toward the objective. They had gone
only a few hundred yards when they were flattened by bursts
from an enemy machine gun. Quickly grasping the situation,
Lt Frederick M. McConnell swung his third platoon to the
left, found concealment for his men in an anti~tank ditch, and
moved to the flank ·of the enemy. This action forced the Germans from their bunkers and freed the second platoon under
Lt William L. Nelson to strike foward again. Moving u'p as
close as possible, they awaited the artillery preparation iWhich
enabled them to strike a dazed and confused enemy.
Initially, opposition was light. However, when L Company
moved toward the main street of the town where coordination
was to be eUected with I and K Companies, Jerry burp guns
opened up. Despite this interruption, two p1a.t oons kept
moving, the second platoon continuing to the juncture point,
while the third platoon set up a defensive position near the
center. More than 30 prisoners were taken ;b y the leading
platoon as they moved toward the railroad underpass which
marked the limits of their advance. In the meantime, the
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first platoon had swung right to clear its sector. The town,
we thought, was ours.
But the Germans thought otherwise, and in the hours
which followed, the enemy challenged every yesource of the
fighting men of L Company. Striking 'without warning from
the rear, three enemy tanks came rumbling .out of their hiding
place in the nearby woods. They blasted the Company CP
with point-'blank fire, and moved on to the center of town,
surprising and confusing our elements on every hand. With
guns blazing at the slightest evidence of opposition, the three
t·anks mo.v ed on up the street over the same path recently
cleared by the L Company platoons.
At the far end of the town these disquieting sounds were
heard by the second platoon, which was beginning to have
plenty of trouble of its own. German machine guns had
opened fire along the Tailroad embankment cutting off those
men who were deployed beyond the underpass. Then, just
before the tanks came roaring along the street with headlights blazing, someone reported that they were friendly.
Waving and shouting, several men attempted to waTn the
tankers of the machine gun fire. For their trouble, the GI's
received a guttural challenge and a sudden burst of lead from
the tanks. Raking the buildings as they went, the tanks continued through the underpass and out of town. With them
went Pfc Harry Kuchmanich Jr, taken as prisoner.
Lt Nelson hastened to reorganize his scattered platoon,
but before he could do so, the enemy began a counter-attack
in strength. From the 30-foot railroad embankment and concrete recesses in the underpass itself, machine guns and riifles
opened up on the battered building in which the defense of
the vital underpass and road junction had been set up. Two
breathless men from the first platoon dashed in to report that
their platoon had been completely surrounded and only a
small group had been able to escape.
The ;enemy bullets began pounding the rear of the building. Germans seemed to be everywhere, but in the darkness
they could not be spotted. Concentrated rapid fire from the
attached heavy machine gun and from the BAR's held the
attackers back, but the ammunition was running very low.
The situa·tion became so critical that the only solution was
to call down artillery fi:re on the spot.
The decision made, runners were dispatched on the
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hazardous mission. Though these men never reached the CP,
Captain Garland did receive a report that the position had
been broken through and called for artillery at the underpass.
While the artillery crashed and pounded around them
intermittently for an hour, the men of the second platoon
stuck to their position-only 25 yards from the underpass
target. Only a minimum number of men could be kept
above the ground, but these had to be there, for the Germans resumed sniping during any brief cessation of the
artillery's shelling.
Sgt John R. Murillo, who continued to fire a BAR from
the rear entranoe of the 'building, was hit by our own shell
fragments as was T)Sgt Wilmer D. Haley, who was firing at
the enemy on the railroad and in the underpass.
Finally beaten and dazed, the Germans called' out,
pleading to surrender and 1begging fo·r the shelling to be
lifted. Fearing ·a ruse, Pfc 'Charles M. Stine told the Germans
that they would have to surrender under fire. In .small groups
they charged across the road to surrender, some of them
dragging or carrying wounded comrades with them. Soon 23
were jammed in the already packed cellar.
These troops claimed to be all that remained of more
than 200 men who had begun the attack. Two runners,
Pfcs 1R oy B. Turner and Daniel G. Smith, attempted then
to get back to the OP to have the artillery fire lifted.
They stepped out a nd were cut down by sh eH fragments . Two
more men, ·P fc >Russell N. H amner and S/Sgt Harry L.
Sweeney Jr tried again. Both twere wounded but managed to
make the long trip back to the CP. In the meantime, T/4
Joseph T. Stark worked feverishly in the crowded basement
to treat the wounds of the injured Americans and Germans.
The second platoon did not have all the fight that
night. The Germans introduced themselves to the second
squad of ·t he first platoon with a hand grenade and surrender
demand. Pfc John L. Purdy J r 's answer was a withering
burst of BAR fire, while the rest of the squad pulled out and
barely missed being surrounded.
The third squad of the first platoon was not so fortunate.
Togeth er with Pfc Jesse L. Hailey and Pfc Robert A. Tilton
of the second platoon, they were surrounded in a house. When
the Germans told them to surrender, their answer ·Was a
well-placed hand gr.enade. Bazooka fire opened up and
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forced them to the second and third floors. They couldn't
see what was going on outside, but shouting and thr.owing
grenades was their solution. The Germans couldn't get in
and they couldn't get out. Finally, the artillery began
removing the top floor so the men again returned to the
ground floor.
To top the night in which the company had already
·r epulsed •three enemy companies, three German tanks accompanied ·b y some infantry appeared just before the dawn,
heading :toward the underpass. Taking stock, L t Nelson found
that he had no machine gun ammunition, only one bazooka
round, and no grenades. There was nothing to do but sweat
it out. After the platoon waited t ensely for an hour, the
tanks moved away.
The long night was over. Casualties were heavy. Of the
38 second platoon men who had crossed the Roer the morning
before, only 16 remained. But Baal was ours and a major
threat to the Roer crossing had been decisively beaten back
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THROUGH GRANTERATH
The time was set at 22130 hours, 22 February 1945.
Company M, commanded by Capt Edward Latta, assembled
in .the battered town of Wurm, Germany. ·A t 0040 hours,
23 February, we were underway with two platoons of
heavy weapons, leaving the third· platoon, consisting of
81mm mortars, in the rear. 'They were to follow the company
a few hours later.
After a march of three miles to the outskirts of Linnich,
Company M dug in and awaited the "go" signal to make
the crossing.
Our artillery barrage began at 0245 hours and continued
for 45 minutes while A and C Companies made a night
crossing.
Daylight appeared, and Company M, under observation
of the enemy at all times and ,r eceiving heavy artillery fire
and long range machine gun fire, approached the banks of
the Roer River. There they were driven back by the most
intense enemy artillery barrage since the days otf the Siegfried Line.
A·t this point, Lt Richard W. Lindquist took charge of the
operation and brought order out of the confusion. He gave the
command to secure equipment and move forward. Double
timing under heavy loads and through heavy fire, the doughs
reached the bank of the river and found only 11 riddled boats
remaning from the original fifty.
Due to the rapid cur.r ent of the river and the excitement
of the task before them, doughs of Mike Company landed on
the opposite shore in many different ways. Squad leader Sgt
Fr.ank Wallar,· Pfcs John M. Koniowski, James B. Reyno.l ds,
Richard M. Donnelly, Pvts James Ryan and Gyles H. Walker
were caught in an entanglement of barbed· wire placed by the
enemy to slow the crossing. After a futile effort to free the
boat, they were forced to go overboard and swim to shore
with all equipment.
After finding shell holes for protection, they awaited the
crossing of the third platoon. This turned out to be only a
short break before going on into the attack on Korrenzig,
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their first objective before Granterath. All platoons were
quickly -reorganized and set off to the attack. They found
little resistance in Korrenzig, except for small arms and some
artillery fire.
After the capture of Korrenzig, headquarters platoon
established its CP with the mortar platoon and defended
the town.
The machine gun platoons were ordered to advance on
their next objective. As they neared the town, they met
srtrong fire and were ordered to dig in once more. After establishing positions, the machine gunners immediately went
into action. Sighting a small force of Ge-rmans two hundred
yards distant, S/Sgt Harvey R. Stewart, Pvts Cherry K.
Whisenhunt, Donald L. Shinskey, Irvin H. Schaber and Pfc
Ray 0. Lindsey opened fire, inflicting 100 per cent casualties
on the g['oup. The town was captured in one hour and at 1430
was cleared of all enemy tr.oops.
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COMBAT STORY
On 4 March 1945, the Third Battalion was approaching
Moers and Romberg. They had started early in the morning
in trucks, but had been forced to detruck and fight, and then
continue on fo·o t. The Nazis apparently had had a little
time to set up some kind of defense on the west bank of
the Rhine.
·In the afternoon the battalion traveled north, parallel to
the German lines, then suddenly turned and headed directly
into the German positions. For a brief time there was a sharp
fire fight, which ended with the coming of darkness. The
Battalion pulled into a chateau just outside of Moers to spend
the night. At 2300Headquarters Company set u!p the Battalion
CP. Part of the Battalion, about one-fourth of it, dug in
around the chateau while the remainder found some plaee to
sleep, either in the cellar or the barns. Most of Headquarters
Company was in the main building.
It was thought that the enemy forces which we attacked
in the evening were a covering force for twops retreating
across the Rhine, and that we had dispersed them. We were
wrong. At 0330 a curtain of enemy fire was laid upon the
chateau from every kind of weapon that the Germans had
on hand. Under its cover, infantry attacked simultaneously
from the left rear and the right front. They made their way
easily through the foxhole outposts and .approached the walls
of the buildings. Everyone, groggy from the lack of rest,
-we had attacked practically without sleep for nine daysstaggered to his feet once again and manned the defense.
Dog-tired, the men found it hard to reg·ain their senses, even
with t1he sounds of battle about them and streams of tracers
flying in the windows.
Capt John W. Busby, Battalion :S-3, hastily .organized
the defense of the chateau. Our tanks were outside and
the crews could not get out through the fir·e. Two were
severely damaged by mortar fire. Men were being hastily
assembled in the courtyard ·w hen the Germans began a mortar
barrage. ·M any casualties were sustained. Room after room
was taken .f or an aid station as casualties multiplied.
The men took up firing positions at the windows, firing
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into the fire-spitting darkness 'OUtside, although every window
was intermittently covered with German small arms fire.
Communication was completely out. All radio jeeps were
almost immediately destroyed. The telephone which connected to units of the battalion worked for a time, but no Dne
could get near it because of a stream of 50 caliber slugs that
were whizzing in ·t he window and over the table on which it
was placed. A barn caught fire and in its glare our men were
firing at the roofs of the buildings to keep the Germans from
climbing up. Cooks, bakers, clerks, and drivers, took up
weapons and joined in the fray that night.
Many riflemen had been asleep in the cellar. ·T hey s·eized
their weapons and dashed up the cellar stairs, frequently to
be blo.wn back by the concussion of shells landing near
the stairs. The stairs to the upper part of the house, from
which we were doing the defending, were mos1ly uncovered
by shell fire which b1ew down part of the outer wall. To
reach the upper floors it was necessary to jump and dodge
over the shattered, debris-piled stairs in dire.c t exposure to
enemy fi're.
The night was punctuated by hundreds of stabs of flames
as the enemy was gradually driven back from the walls of the
chateau. At 0400 the tempo of the counter-attack had s1owed.
At 0500 the battle had ceased and by 0630 the Third Battalion
was ready to resume its attack on :Moers and Romberg.
Particular credit is due to 'First Sergeant Joseph B. Eis€nhauer. In the midst of the confusion, he dashed about, S1etting
up firing positions and outposts, and organizing the men into
an effective core of resistance. It was while he was engaged
in this task ·t hat he was killed.
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HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
COWHIDE OPERATOR
The soldier grabbed the field phone and .spun the crank.
He waited a full five seconds and then turned to h1s buddy,
"Those operators! Probably asleep in a chair with a magazine,
a drink ... " Meanwhile the operator was pulling cord after
cord, arguing wi·t h the GI who wasn't sure where his Platoon
Leader was, but would he mind putting in a circuit call to
all units immediately?
If Operations is a regiment's brain, Communications is its
nervous system. Esp ecially under fire , Communications is
essential. F·or instance, the crossing of the Roer ....
We had laid fifty miles of wire in preparation for the
crossing. A good deal of it was laid under fire and by hand.
We had improvised a communications system over the Jerry
connections in pillboxes we had captured. Many lines were
dragged by hand through tunnels from basement to bas1ement.
Two wiremen, 'T /5 CarlS. Leonard and Pfc Lester S. 'R egillo,
were fired on so vigorously by enemy machine guns while
laying wire that it took the combined efforts of the 326th iFA
and H Company, 333d to extricate them.
'
While the Third Battalion was crossing, the wiTemen were
forced to work standing upright in the middle of a barrage.
It was at this point that S!Bgt Howard V. Isbell was killed.
He had brought the wire to the water's edge and was awaiting
a boat when a mortar exploded near him. The wire was finally
taken by hand across a footbridge by T/5 ·Afredo G. Contreras
and Pfc Rice Ratliff, Pfcs Milford B. Davis and Lawrence G.
Swanguarim, switchboard operators who v•o lunteered for the
d etail. On the night 22-23 February Pfc Jim Leverett constructed twelve new lines from the switchboard to the radio
s·ection, a distance of only 250 yards. Several times Leverett
would start up the street with the end of the wire, only to
find when he arrived at the destination that the line had been
cut by shell fire bhind him. During the next night a 170mm
shell crashed into m essage center, severely wounding stix of
eight men in the room , and blowing ·t he Communications
Officer through the wall into the next room. But messages
and communications were kept in by wire, radio, or messenger. That is our job and our story.
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HOT SPOT
A patrol mission near Marche was 't he ·a ssignment of the
Intelli'gence and Reconnaissance Platoon rm 22 December
1944. This mission consisted of a series of small patrols,
connecting several towns and keeping a motorized eye on the
surrounding country and adjacent roads. This seemed to be,
from all outward appearances, the simplest of mis·s'ions, for on
that morning the whole route was travelled by two jeeps and
eight men without the slightest mishap.
On the afternoon of that day three jeeps and nine men
took off at about 1300 on the 's ame route. One jeep, which was
led by Sgt ·E dward C. Podzinski, mounted a 50 caliber flexible
machine gun. The patrol proceeded according to plan until it
reached the village of Hamoui, where the jeeps continued
do1wn the main street and s·t opped a short way from the
Ourthe River. At the end of this street was a blind spot
around which, several moments later, came two German
moturcycles and an American jeep. Upon s·eeing the parked
·r econnaissance v.e hicles the Germans opened up with a
30 caliber machine gun. The street being straight as a die,
it was impossible to escape the fire except by taking refuge
in the surrounding houses. An attempt was made by Cpl
Robert R. Willett to fire back with the 50 caliber machine
gun, but the gun failed to fire after two rounds. Willett was
forced to give in and take refuge with the rest of the men.
At ·t his point the patrol was split up, and no more than
two or three men were together at a time. These small groups
managed, with the help df the Belgian civilians, to make their
way from house to house and barn to barn until ·t hey had
extricated themselvt!!> from the town. During the scramble,
Pvt Leon Eisenberg, who had never driven a car before,
realized the necessity for transportation and rushed into the
street amid the flying lead, turned a jeep around, and drove
it to the edge of town, where one of the other jeeps had been
left originally. It was there that the men met and took to the
road again. One jeep had been captured by the Germans,
who had forced the civilians to roll it to them at the point
of a gun.
One jeep managed to escape some time before the other,
as the second had been hit three times. The second jeep had
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was almost back to the American lines when the occupants
dis:covered that a bridge had been blown in their path. Artillery was falling in the area. The men took to the r·oad on foot
and 'w aded across the stream on the ruins of the !bridge.
Once on the opposite bank the men saw one of their jeeps
unoccupied and shot to pieces by small arms fire. Upon
approaching it, they heard a call for help in a neighboring
field and upon investigation found their friends, all badly
wounded and Willett dead.
The wounded men, Sgt :Podzinski, :Pfc Oliver :P. Wimmer,
and :Pvt Jimmie L. Smith, told how they had, been ambushed
by a German tank and raked with fire from its machine guns·.
They asked for a man to remain with them, while the rest
ventured to get medical aid. :Pfc Broda H. Webb, Jr volunteered to stay. The remaining men, Lt Charles W. Jermy,
:Pfc George C. Armstrong, T/5 Edgar B. Adams and :Pvt Eisenberg than sought out our own lines, and after two hours of
infiltr·ating through enemy positions, Tan into a .335th Infantry outpost. It was four hours later that a group of 309th
aid men and a small group od' guards found the wounded men
under the guidance of Lt Jermy. They found that Webb, in
a vain effo.rt to comfOTt ·t he wounded, had all but stripped
himself ·o f his clothing to keep them .w arm and was himself
on the verge of pass•i ng out from the sub-zero cold.
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COWHIDE COPS REPORT
The many duties of the MP platoon make it impossible to
remember any one incident in which all men participated at
once. But all the men had their share of thrills and excitement, oiften alone or with two or three of their buddies. Even
a routine job like posting a road f.or a convoy often became
an exciting adventure. There were snipers at night or artillery
barrages on CI"ossroads, and more than once the MP's have
waved on the trucks from foxholes at the side of the road.
They remember the night they posted the wad to Marche,
and didn't get back for three days. Jerry cut the road after
the troops got through and it was necessary to make a huge
circle tour to get to them. 'S/Sgt Bruce R. Burton had his
troubles in Marche keeping the CP properly guarded. The
men s'tood seven hour shifts and that was .a long time to
stand in the cold. ·A lerts every night kept the men from
enjoying comforts of theiT billets very often. We lived in a
fine jail. It w.as very handy too. We just put the prisoners
in tile cells and locked the doors.
Sgt Willard :M eadows, Pfcs Harold Mono~s on, Horace
Humphries, Richard ·D eLeo and Richard Crumpley rememlber
trying to evacuate a cellar full of civilians from a house 400
yards from the enemy in Hotton one night. They had gotten
five out of the house when a Jerry patrol was discovered
outside. That ended the evacuation.
Yes, all the towns bring back exciting memories. Each
man has his own ideas of the worst and best experiences. !But
all will agree ·that Linnich was a hot little town. No one
walked or strolled the streets. When they went anywhere it
was on the double, and V·i a the shortest route. The Cowhide
Cops did not have to break up gT>oups of soldiers hanging
around corners. Those rockets broke up everything. Still the
CP had to be guarded and the men stood against the building,
behind a semicircular sand bag wall, 24 hours a day.
T /5 John Robas, Pfcs Ian Turner and Richard Turner
spent more time in Linnich than most men. 'l'hey moved into
town some 10 days ahead of the C'P to secuTe and hold the
buildings. They worked by d.ay when the town was quiet .
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By night they sat locked in the cellar, listening to bursts of
mortar shells and rockets.
The climax of the MP's woTk came in Lichterfe1d when
they handled 8,000 PW's in the period of 24 hours. It took a
lot of hard work by all 34 men to search, count and evacuate
that many prisoners.
Now some have gone home but most of the platoon still
remains. They continue the more routine duties of patroling
and guarding the CP, checking civilian passes and listening
to V'arious complaints and troubles Occasionally ;t hey talk of
the past, but mostly they speculate on the future and wonder
how Jap prisoners will act or whether there :w ill be any.
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SLUGGING IT OUT
The stakes were high, and the seasoned fighters were
punching out victory in round after r ound. Now 334th's hard
hitting •c ombat team faced a stiffer t est in the Roer-Rhine
area. A wary foe was parrying after rocking back on his
heels at Korrenzig, Baal, and Waldniel.
Going had been rough at Waldniel, and b eyond Boisiheim
there was work for the heavy sluggers on Task Force Church's
team. Heavy slugging is the role of the 334th Cannon Company's M3 105mm howitzers.
The doughs had Boisheim well in hand that March morning but there was trouble ahead at Lobberich when Capt
Theodme L. B easley's cannoneers pulled in. Parallel fo1rces
smashing toward the Rhine had been outdistanced.
L•t John iA. Burns, Lt Peter Relac, and rP fc Donald B.
Boylan reconno.i tering, carried the fight to the foe, 2 miles
beyond the front. Drawing enemy fir,e , the two officers
directed their battery successfully to destroy an 88 and its
vehicle while Pfc Boylan's Ml kept ·approaching attackers
away. Then concentrated Jerry fire made the obervation
point untenable.
"A short distance in front of our lines.," related Lt Burns,
"we met a reconnaissance unit of an armored division, which
captured us."
'" After 1We proved our identity , an officer ·asked us if we
could give artillery support to armored infantry attacking
Lobberich. Since their own division artillery wasn't in position to fire this field, we went with the leading elements
making the attack and laid a concentration on the town, and
fired by request at targets they observed."
First !Sergeant Henry D. Young aided the armored artillerymen in locating good gun positions, some few hundred
yiards to the right of his own •c ompany's battery. In the
meantime, accurate firing data was being compu~ed inCannon
Company's fire direction center by Cpls William Weeden,
Eric Vero, and Leonard Seikmeier.
From data supplied by these men, and without the benefit
of the usual surveys, the armored division's self-propeUed
mounts, 105mm, threw in their first round only 50 yards off
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target. It was then an easy matter for the foward observers
to direct the two batteries in a scorching barrage 'w hich raked
the objective from end to' end.
'T /Sgts William Bowers, Thomas Senier, and Clifford
Reese, platoon sergeants, all reported excellent work by their
gun crews and pointed to the next day's reconnaissanee reports as evidence. Four Panther tanks, three anti-tank guns,
th~ee 88 field pieces, seven vehicles, and ammunition dump
were destroyed in 'that a'c tion which helped to make Germ:an •
opposition ineffective in Lobberich.
"We were really on the ibeam that night and the next day
too," said Sgt Donald Swanberg, typical section chief. "Then
we knocked out a ba'ttery of 170mm field guns, a Panther
tank, two scout cars, two heavy trucks, two anti-tank guns,
a mortar position, and numerous personnel. That was at
St. Tonis."
Cannoneers will always remember the s'ticky mud of the
Geilenkirchen beet fields where they learned the lessons of
self-preservation and teamwork in attack. Whether firing as
platoons in battalion support or tied in as a battery with
division artillery, the men grew wise and seasoned in the lore
of battle. They learned the power of their weapons and the
skill of their leaders. !They became a successful unit of a
successful team. Prummern, Lindern, Beeck, Wurm, and
all the rest, became blasted symbols of what they, and others,
had learned.
"Our toughest test came in the Ardennes," declared Cpl
William Niedermuller, who was one of the eight men whose
Purple Heart tells something of the hardships in that sector.
A persistent f.oe , aided by the vagar:i!es of the winter weather,
called forth a full measure of resourcefulness as Cannon
Company contributed to the saga of Verdenne, Hampteau,
Marcouray. Icy roads, sharp cold, waist deep snow, and rock
hard soil double d: the toil o.f all while •t he 334th s•ought, ·a nd
gained, successful complehon of its mission.
'T he Siegfried line and the Ardennes campaigns were
seasoning experiences which made effective Cannon Company's contributions to the Roer and Rhine drives. Cannoneers had learned to throw a heavy punch quickly ; they
had become 334th's "heavy sluggers".
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Lt John A. Burns- Pfc John Wayne- T (Sgt William D. Bowers

Pfc Louis Emproto -

T ( Sgt Thomas X. Senier -

Cpl Alfred T. Humphreys

SKETCHES FROM SERVICE
The men w ho k ept th e 334th fed and clothed , and passed
the ammunition have their record to speak for itself. Moments
to remem'b er are noted h ere.
PalenbeJl'g, December 1944
1

The Jerry pl·a nes are back making nuisances of themselves
this morning. Everyone seems to know just what to d o now.
T/5 Joseph E. Blankenship takes off to man the AA mounted.
50 cal machine gun in the back yard, assisted by t he CO and
Sgt Leonard Guiher, mess sergeant. So far we haven't sihot
down a single one. Either we're poor shots or the planes• are
out of effective range. The Luftwaffe is furnishing us our
Christmas tree decorations this year. It seems that the Jerry
pilots drop tinfoil strips to throw our radar devices off their
trail. Anyway, the tinfoil makes for a beautiful tree. Under
some protest Capt Steinhausen had a large tree brought into
our crowded CP and mounted on the talble. Capt Willi'am G.
Willard, Jr, Regimental MotorOfficer, remarked that the tree
was taking up valuable "eating spa'c e", meaning that he puts
his mess kit on that particular table while eating his chow.
"Anyway, the tree stays," said Capt Hichard A. Steinhausen,
CO, and so it did. Now, all are beginning to tolerate and even
to appreciate it. Lt F•r ank A. Pinto came in about noon
bringing some decorations for our tree. He even had little
figures comprising ·a manger scene.
The favorite breakfast with our troops is hotcakes and
bacon. Most mornings the fellows are willing to fmego breakfast in order to get a few more winks of sleep. But if there
is scarce mention the night before that hotcakes will be served
for breakfast, the fellows will come out of their ho.les ·a ll over
town and converge on the kitchen a quarter of an hour early.
Our orderly room has taken on an air of distinct gaiety
despite the,w ar. Pin-ups are increasing in number on the walls.
Marche, 24 December 1944

There was one crys•t al clear moment last night that we all
would have liked to have preserved; Chdstmas caTols on the
radro, the w.a rm comfort radiated from this well-decorated
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room and its small heater. A definite refinement and peace,
marred .only by our dirty uniforms and heavy army equipage ... just seated around the room, no one saying anything,
and with the "Battle of the Bulge" shaping up scarcely a
mile distant.
Gros Chene, 25 December 1944
Christmas Day was, for the most part, just another day in
the war. Our favorite breakfast of hotcakes was served at the
usual 0700 to 0730. ·For our noon meal we had ham, potatoes,
green peas and cofrfee. Our "big" meal with turkey, po.tatoes,
brown gravy, corn, hot tea, grapefruit juice, (We could have
a 46 oz can apiece if we wished), hard sugar candy and fruit
cocktail, ·w as served at 1900 .... The Luftwaffe in the form
of a lone FW190 came over about 1300 and, after strafing our
barn, dropped a bomb aimed at the nearby intersection which
fell into an adjacent field, causing little damage but tossing
huge chunks of frozen earth all over the surrounding ground
for several hundred yards.
Gros Chene, 27 December 1945

The sky is clear today and the air is full of our planes.
High in the blue one can see the vapor trails oif same fighters
winding their way into the Rhineland to the east. To their
right and much higher, 32 Fortresses are moving steadily
across the sky .. they seem to hang there without a sign of
motion they are so high . . Flak is blossoming quietly above
the German lines.
Biron, January 1945
The house housing our CP is also occupied by an old man,
his wife and thee children. And, oh yes, •three cows. One of
the children is always singing .t he " Star Spangled Banner," fiat.
T/5 Claude A. Martin of Forest Hills, Louisiana, was up front
driving last night and reported back to the OP that he had
gone too far do.wn the wrong road and had run smack into a
Nazi convoy and had turned around and beat it before the
Jerries had realized what he was. (Note: The Germans at
this time are using many of our vehicles which they had
captured during .t he initial successes of Rundstedt's offensive).
T/5 Martin observes that the Jerries are not making any
effort to heed blackout precautions and that their trucks are
lit up like Christmas tres.
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Capt Richard Steinhausen

Lt Julius H . Porter -

14

Lt Robert F. Jordan ·- WOJG Allen L. Law

Lt Charles B . Raymond -

Cpl Robert Willimon -

1st Sgt Adam M. Yablonski

Cpl George Tullus -

S j Sgt Ed. Skeldon

Eyg-elshoven, Felbruary 1945
Hundreds of hungry civilians crowd around our mess.
Wlhen the me'a l is over and the scraps and leavings are
brought out by the cooks for disposal, the civilians --most
0f them very young children, scoop the buckets they carry
into the swill and make their way jubilantly ba•c k through
the throng. A little girl about 5 years of age wears a German
rifle thong of beadlike construction about her neck a nd a
American E'TO ribbon on her little coat.
Service Company's job is primarily t o "get the suppLies
through." This is what Service Company did. Our greatest
cr.edit should go to those who supervised and drove 0ur
convoys up to the carrying pa>rties, convoys loaded with vital
supplies: Oapt Benjamin H. Tuthill, Jr., Lt Charles B. Ray mond, Lt F·rank A. Pinto, Lt Robert F . Jordan, Lt Ronald L.
Nonnemacher, S/Sgt Edgar C. Skelton, S /Sgt Walter A . Clements, S /Sgt Herman N. Gibson, Cpl George A. Tullos, Cpl
Donald A. Price, Cpl Estle M.Woods, Sgt Burdell F . Schwartz,
and their assistants.
E:each of us has our memories of fear and action. Many
of us consider what happens to us as trivial in the light of
the much la•r ger events happening just ahead of us. We were
all aware that anyting could happen at any time. The
picture we will all carry with us from the war will b e that
of several GI's loading packing cases of material onto the
sturdy back of the familiar 2 ;\-j) ton truck. That was ·o ur
mission; that was what w e did.
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IN THE THICK OF IT . ·
Defense .of the Hotton-Marche line was a Battle of the
Bulge "must". If the German breakthrough suceeded at this
point the vital Liege road would almost certainly be cut. To
defend this line against mechanized attack, Anti-Tank Company was assigned to three key points.
Capt Harry M. Deck disposed his defenses at road points
on which the enemy's armor was most likely to appear. The
third platoon placed its 57mm AT guns at Verdenne at the
extreme right flank; the first platoon took the center at Menil;
and the second gun platoon was emplaced at the extreme left
flank at Hampteau. The mine platoon was centered at Menil
and laid mine fields at all three positions. Before many hours
had passed each of these units w:as involved in hot actions.
At Verdenne the AT units consisted of three 57mm guns.
Other units including a platoon of rifle troops and a section
of heavy machine guns were deployed in the area. At 1600
24 December German infantry began infiltration to a point
about 300 yards from the positions a:t the right flank of the
town. Under cover of heavy mortar and artillery fire the
enemy charged. The 57mm gun was knocked out and its
squad withdrew to the guns at the center and left.
Concentrated enemy small arms fire soon made the center
position untenable although the grew put up what resistance
it could with small arms and a bazooka. By this time, all
friendly units except .one heavy machine gun squad and the
Afi' gun Platoon had withd.rawn from the ·town. !Then five
Mark V tanks approached from the southeast.
Unable to man the AT guns, the men of the squad fir.ed
bazookas and small arms but did not stop the enemy. About
1800 10urs orders came for a withdrawal into the woods northeast of Verdenne. However, two men, TfiSgt Cranston Bolling
and S/Sgt Arthur Lewis, were cut off by 'the tanks .and were
obliged to take shelter in a house. From this position they ,
sniped at enemy f.oot troops in the vicinity.
A counter-atta·ck by regimental units was made a few
hours later and Verdenne was rdaken. AT gun .crews w2re
among the first elements and these men manned their guns
to fire at the retreating enemy vehicles.
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S j Sgt Arthur Lewis -

Pfc Raymond Beauchamp

~i

Lt Carl Palm

Cpl Earl I. Mirsky

At Hampteau the sEcond platoon beg.an its action by
attacking two enemy strong points which overlooked
the town and p:rev.ented any movement of second battalion
troops. The first squad under '8/Sgt Ray ·T. Harner eliminated
these enemy posts after some excellent firing by the gunner,
Cpl Earl I. Mirsky.
On 26 December at 1600 the AT positions were attacked
by numerically superior folt'ces of an estimated company
strength. Lacking rifle support the second squad was soon
overrun. ll'hey, with members of the mine and mine clearing
platoon, then withdrew according to orders to ta more
advantageous position already o:c cupied by the first and
third squads.
The full force of this drive hit the second platoon positions
which were reinforced by a squad of men from E Company.
The viciousness of the enemy attack soon forced the platoon
from the hill black into town. There the unit was reorganized
and with the support of machine gun fire from E Company
the platoon launched a successful c-ounter-attack. Quick action
of the third squad under S/Sgt Everett D. Hicks brought AT
fire to bear on · the woods occupied by retre.ating enemy
and prevented the Germans from reorganizing. The enemy
withdrew with his wounded under the cover of darkness.
The AT platoon at Menil was attacked at 1800 26 December by German armor and infantry. With a well-outlinsd plan
of action in mind, the AT gun squads waited tensely as the
columns of vehicles approached. But chance played its part
and the ensuing events hardly could have been anticipated.
It all started when the lead tank, finding difficulty in
negotiating the narrow roadway, had to swerve slightly into
the ditch to pass. It struck a daisy chain of mines W<hich AT
men had planned to pull across th·2 path, and was knocked
out. The second tank, clos•e behind·, stopped and fired around
at the neaTby house, and was abandoned. As if in parade
formation, other tanks and vehicles swung across the field
to the east, echeloned to the right rear and ran head on into
a large mine field.
Three half-tracks missed this field but wheeled around
to hit 18-mine road block which knocked them out. The
to-tal number of vehicles destroyed by mine fields was four
M.a:rk V tanks, 13 half-tracks, and eight motorcycles. Nearly
200 prisoners •were taken in this decisive action.
2'15

WE PAY TRIBUTE ...
To every man in the 334th "November 18" and "Prummern" will always be the keys to a store ,of memories. Only
a few men can speak with mutual understanding of those
trying days when the impossible was achieved simply !because it had to be done.
The Medics earned the respectful prais:e of every Railsplitter in their trial before the Siegfried defenses and their
deed's since then have been no less admired. 'T he men who
wore theRedCross brassard on their sleeves and the brightlypainted Red Cr,oss on their steel helmets performed their
duty with honor.
These pages, we hope, will serve as some acknowledgment
of the debt every man in the regiment owes to the officers
and men of the Medics. Consistently, they forgot self and
performed their service in the face of great danger. Their
story is not that of a single day.
First Battalion doughboys remember their medics' devoted
service at Prummern. That first day, No.vemlb er 1-8, these
men cared for 102 casualties, more than half of them fr'om
other units of the 334th, 405th, and the British Sherwood
Rangers. And for days ,t hat follarwed, the aid station was
crowded with more than 50 casualties daily.
This service was rendered despite constant artillery,
mortar, and small arms fire, for the aid station itself was
within 100-150 yards 'OJ the front lines. For a time it was
necessary to maintain the station in the open and several
medics and infantrymsn were wounded while in or near
the area.
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The very real threat of capture faced the medics when
they set up their station in Prummern. Battalion pulled out,
leaving the medics virtually surrounded by enemy troops,
but they chose to remain to attend the 20-25 casualties
awaiting evacuation. For thvee days aid station personnel
had to evacuate wounded from the front to the aid station
and from there to rear. Ambulances could not reach them.
Aid station personnel evacuated casualties to the rear
by jeep, passing over roads krotwn to be mined. Evacuation
from the front was entirely by hand litter-carry for distances
up to 1000 yards, so broad was the front being covered. Many
times this litter carrying was through mine fields.
Deeds like these and many others a·re what the infantryman thinks of wlhen he speaks of what the Medics have done.
They must of necessity be thanked as a group, but every
man will think of S'ome particular Medic that h elped a buddy
in his dark hour.
They are the men such as T /4 Robert E. Ward - "Doc"
Ward to his friends in the S.e cond Battalion- who lived to
become a battlefield legend, who gave unselfishly through
shellfire and bitter weather, who died during the Roer
breakthrough •a s he always wanted: with scissors and bandage
in his hands while h e dressed the 'wounds of a fallen so.ldier.
There is Pfc Archie Nail, the Company A aid man, who,
during the first h ellish minutes of the First Batttalion's
baptism of fire, wandered from wounded to wounded, disregarding his own safety, giving aid •and comfort to an
injured soldier even while his own legs were ripped by
m mtar fire and death was only a few hours off.
Soldiers like Archie Nail and "Doc" Ward buried once
and for all the "pill rollers" tag that had haunted the medics
fr om Camp Howze days until the jump-off on November 18,
1944. Never again would the front-line soldiers scorn the
men whose only weapons were a medical kit and soothing
words. They had won their rightful place in the ·a ffections
of the doughboys.
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. . . . Following this page is a list of the men who died in
the actzons of the 334 th Infantry Regiment.
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I
Headquarters Company
Capt Roher! L. Kimmel
S/ Sgt Howa!nd V. Isbell
Cpl Robert R. Wi.Jiett

T/5 Rus·S•e·ll B. Brooks
Pvt Oliver P. Wimmer

Anti-Tank Company
T/ 4 WiiJi,a:m F. Myers
Pfc Raber! L. HaH Jr

Pte John H. Herrman
Pvt Donald C. Black

Cannon Company
S/Sgt Charle·s A . Strebel

Medical Detachment
S/ Sgt Buck R. Ha·le
T/ 4 Robe·rt •E. Wa1r·d
T/ 5 William E. Mathria·s
T/5 Vir<g<il L. Pmk·er
Pte Hoover H. Kemp
Pte Clarence R. Miller

Pte
Pte
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Archie N. NaH
John •G. Wmgo
Pat C. Campbell
RoJ.en S. I. Cl'ine
George D. K·irsch

Headquarters Company First Battalion
S,'Sgt Will·i·am G. T•hompson
T/ 4 Lo·uis J. Tuscano
T/ 5 Fred Gratzon

Pte Roger A . Jacobs
Pvt Davi·d P. Keimel

A Company
2d Lt
T/ Sgt
S/ Sgt
S/Sgt
S/Sgt
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William R. Marsh
Fred Huty
Leo H. Angiol.in1i
Jes.sie 0. Hooper
George G. Pearson

Sgt
Sgt
T/5
T/ 5
Pte

E'dw,and B. Acuna
Luther E. Snipes, Jr
Angelo J. DiBlasi
Charl·ie M. Jones
Haden E. Barkley

;
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
p;fc

Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
P.fc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pk

Elv.er J. Brown
John Buck
Fnank w. Che·ng·a
Francis J. Dari·ley, Jr
Robert F. Davi·dson
Emil.io Dri Benedetto
Harry J. Fars•sold
Willioam E. Fry
Jack Fuller
Max E. Ga.rrett
En~ique G. Garzo
Cha.rles E. G.ibbons
Dona•lrd F. Gottfri•erd
Donarlrdl R. Hadden
'I}J;il.l.iom R. Hanny.e
B·arrt W. K•iem·an
Leo Li·oht·en
John R. Malinowski
Cha.rles M. Mane•e-r
Edward A. Narhaney
Olin D. Neil
Lively E. Nunn
Hmry J. Rog•ers

Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Dona·l,d R. Schne•ider
Horace L. Sherry
lrv•ing W. Skaff
A ~nol1d E. St·armper
Frarnk F. Tamandli
Wrilbur S. Theuerkra•u f
Jo·se C. vma,senor
Hemy J. Bell
Davri·d rL. Castro
ls.ac W. Frazi.er
Steprhen G·allegos
Faris M . Glover
Eugen.e·sz Janicki
He·rbert A . Kelch
No.~be, rto c. Martrinez
Sidney B. Meyer
T•homars R. Olding
Sirdney L. Schiffman
Maynard F. Simpson
Ma,rshal.l R. Sims
Lourie F. So•snoski
Anthony L. Val.enti
Ha.ro'l·d B. Woo·dman

B Company
11st Lt Howard M . Buchanan
S/ Sgt Ant<hony J. Cavallo
S/ Sgt Byron T. Coveney
S/ Sgt Oliver F. Dwyer
S/Sgt Robe·rt O 'Horo
S/Sgt Jame•s M. Stone
S/ Sgt James G. Watson
Sgt Geo-rge M . Asmus
Sgt Fre·d A. Le•s,se·r
Sgt Raymond F. Stahler

S.g•t
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc

Richmd P. Youngblood
Kenmit C. Bowl.i·ng
A!rboert E. B·a-rilow
G·eorge C. Clark
Segal Q. Coon
Wayne M . Cox
Ch·a•rle·s T. Ea.des
Micha·e•l A . Garippo
Donal•d R. Ho,u tz
Jo·s·eph T. Kon,drat
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;
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
P.fc
Pfc
P·fc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pvt

Fred A. K1U'IImar, Jr
Harry D. Locker
Clennie Man1hburn
John C. McDaniel
David C. Myers
Adri,an L. Paci
Pa1ul P. Ribe•ra
Cha1rles A. Rocchio
Rob•e rt L. Slocum
Abraham I. Smith
Stephen Stanoik
Howa·rd J. V·anas
Ro·ger T. v .an Tuyl
John A . Zipoy
Edward F. Bowle•s

Pvt Gl·e•n M. Brown
Pvt J.ames W. Byrum
Pt Leo F. Corwin
Pvt Lloy·d E. Davis
Pvt Robert J. Fort·i er
Pvt W.illi<e B. Gallimore
Pvt Lym~:m W. Gresham
Pvt Herb·ert L. Ke·lly
Pvt Jos·eph N. La.81ane
Pvt Cla·rence J. Merchant
Pvt G·era·ld F. Ro·s·enfe·ld
Pvt Lorenzo Sa l.g>ado
Pvt Norman A. Sanders
Pvt Theo·dore D. Sechrist

C Company
Pfc Forre·st B. Koontz
Capt Woodrow W. Fox
Capt Earl L. Jackson
Pfc Clancy V. Lucas
2·d Lt Robert E. Ba,l·aban
Pfc Faustino R. Lara
2d Lt Henry G . DeGrummond, JrPfc Ira P. Lawless, Jr
T/ S.gt Orvis F. Hill
Pfc Phil·ip W. Mutchler
T/ Sgt Edward T. Ma,rshok
Pfc Antho·ny T. Na·gy
T/ Sgt Clyde L. WiiiHord
Pfc Jame-s H. Nu,gent
S/ Sgt James E. Fannin
Pfc Billy F. Parker
Pfc John E. Plast·er
S.gt Thomas A. Forr·s•st
Pfc Ghar·les F. Pritchard
S·gt Charle•s G. Rapp
Pfc Howell L. Re,aves
T/ 5 Ru·ssel•l C. J. Marik
Pfc Larurence T. Benson
Pfc Dave L. Reese
'Pfc DaV'i·d Carson
Pfc Holly A. Rkhards
Pfc Frank R. Die-si
Pfc Walter Stimach
Pfc Patrick B. Dillon, Jr
Pte Robe·rt C. Washack
Pfc Spem T. Eugenis
Pvt ·Ermal E. Armstrong
Pfc Roy W. Ev.ans
Pvt Walter G. Berteletti
Pfc R·alph V. K. Jones
Pvt Patrick J. Halp,in
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Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Haro.ld V. Ha•rdrick
Donald A. Heinen
Fema.ld J. Hillman
Tha·dde,u•s A . Kwi•atkowski
Benny M. La•spa1gnole.fta
WHI1iam H. ua•usf.e·r
Rioha,rd >E. uaver

Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

W i llie V. Lea.th
Leo Minkoff
E·u·gen.e E. Mudd
Alvtin H. Smith
John J. Snook
Harold H. W.ay, Jr
Miller A . Yates, Jr

D Company
I·S! Lt Don Smith
Sgt John J. Bresky
Cpil Bruce C. Grubb
Pfc Ma,urice W. By•a ll
Pfc George F. Chappelle
Pfc Micha·el C. ·Espo·s·ito
Pfc Cliffond A. Goodnoh
Pfc Glenn L Humbert
Pfc Morris F. Knox, Jr
Pfc John F. ·La·ne
Pfc Clyde A . Puckett

Pfc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Ostbome Sam
Gharle•s M . Traylor
Jame E. .A.ma•son
Thomas D. Biery
Androdu1s R. Fisher
Ne,il E Jun~in
J.ame•s F. Maloney
SHv·i>n D. Ma.theny
Gordon P. Matfoioson
Will·i:am F. Mont.gomery
Caserio J. Ton1iola

Headquarters Company Second Battalion
Lt Co·l Jos,eph Wil.liams
Major Jame.s V. Johnston
Capt Se~mour B. S;ton.e
l·st Lt Guy W. Eames!
Sgt Wi·l liam M. Smith

Cpl
Pfc
Pfc
Pvt

Da.ryl E. Pr.ice
Ch1a1rle•s R. Altom
Warren C. Ri.e·g·er
Duane S. Campbell

E Company
2nd Lt Marvin W. Jamison
2nd Lt Cly•de S. La,urent, Jr
2nd Lt Harr·el R. Needham
T/Sgt ·St•e phen J. Banik

15

Tf.Sgt V·i:nceont Clementi
S/.S:gt Antone Angotti
Sgt Z·aca•ria•s D. E·sparza
Sgt Lmen R. Ha:ll
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a
Sgt
Pte
P,fc
Pte
Pk
Pte
P·fc
Pte
Pte
Pte
Pte
Pfc
Pte

P.ark M. Prine
Robe,rf A. Ashmore
Sa:mu.e:l .F. .Biddl·ecomb
Homer A . Compton
J,e,weH I. Dil's,aver
Lyman B. Hart
Rob-ert ·B. Hayman
William M. Lamb
K·enne1t.h L Lov;ing
Harold J. Morrison
v.ann 1B. Na•sh
A•loi·s .P. Re,is.er
Thoma•s F. Schultz

Pte
Pte
Pfc
Pte
Pte
Pte
p,fc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Je,an W. Scogg.in
Merle F. Shepherd
Milton B. Smit1h
Hubert W. Spivey
Troy W. Sw:indeH
WaH:er Talik
Samuel H. Vi oke,rs
Oaxton 0. Ward
Nel•son G rant
Norman S. LaPo.i nte
G . C. :E. •Le·tt
Josepih T. Lippi
.Eug•e ne Stobak

F Company
2n1d Lt Harry C. Kelly
S/Sgt B·ema nd ·Bems.tein
S/Sgt John G .re:sl.ick, Jr
S/Sgt :Fnands L. Hins·on
S'/Sgt Gra,dy C. Morr-is
S/Sgt Ra,lph H. Ree,d
S/Sgt Clifford .H . T·ayilor
Sgt AIJbi,n J. Molen
Sgt G·eonge J. Wlas•a:k
T/ 5 Thoma·s P. Ma-rt·in-i
p,te EidrWii,n E. •Brock,le-sby
P.fc -Ro'bert E. Colebank
P.fc C•a1rl •F. -Dan ajovits
P,fc John G. Er.d res
Pte Raymon.d .Fu,sse,lm an, Jr
Pte Robert R. Ha·i nl,ine
Pte ·Eidrwa·11dl .P. JK!a•rpov;ich

2Q16

Pte
Pte
Pte
Pte
Pk
p,fc
Pte
Pte
P:fc
Pte
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Johnni.e J. Minghelli
Wiill.i,am S. Moran
Rlaymond M. Ober-d orf
1EI.woq di D. Miska
Henbert B. Ronk
Albert Teti
Ca•lVlin F. To•wne
Michael J. Vene-z iale
Frank L. WaHers
W'iHiam J. Warenyi
Jemel H. Hurt
Da VIi,d McGr·aiW
Lloyrd H. Redfem
Cl.aw n 0 . Ree·d
Oeme•nte R·ibera
Edw:a,rd E. Sedl·acek
Robert E. Town1s·en.d

G Company
1st Lt Glenn L. Van Ocker
2nd Lt Claude W. Hinsley
2nd Lt Harold L. Howdieshell
T/ Sgt W,il-liam B. Hawk
T/S.gt Bernandl S. Reed
S/S.gt Leon J. Re,ed
S/ S.g't Michael J. Skrhich
Sgt Do·ssie L. Dixon
Pic Slanley Amdur
Pic Thoma's R. A~usl'in
Pic Horace M. Franklin
P,lc G'Uiill,e·rmo M. G·amez
Pfc Theodo-re W. Kue·tt
Pfc A~dolph S. Negni
Pfc Nonman Nessimoff
Pfc ·Emil H. Schenke,l
Pic Christopher Schiraldi
Pfc .E,I,sworth L. Se·el
Pfc James A. Seitz
P·fc Leroy K. Shettl.er
Pfc Ralph Stallworth

Pfc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Theodore Wthit~e
Franci·s Yankos.ky
Micha.el S. Adamczyk
Randolph D. Avstin
Le·Wii's R. Banni ster
Alex G . Barber
Sa·lvat-ore P. CanniC'i
Canmelo Cemino
Robert G. Chaddock
Ale~ander F. Ei·sin,ger
Georg~e A . G·erstenmaier
Severin M . Meildg·aa·rd
J. C. McMahan
Mari,ano T. Ro•driguez
Arnol F. Ry,an
J. M. Scharf
Arthur D. Smith
Frank L. Tor·eHi
Joseph W. Von D·uring
EmHe D. Wolford

H Company
1st Lt Dean C. Harding
2nd Lt Dani•e,l L. Foche·sato
S/Sgt K. C. Mu:l,anex
T/ 5 T.ip Hancock
Pfc Freddie E. Hill·iand
Pfc WilHam D. Kelley
Pfc Frank Longoria, Jr

15*

Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Cla~u,de

H. P.erk•ins
Stanley A. Be.U
Thelbert D. Lambert
Ronal·d E. A. Maclatu,ghlin
Lawrence J. McDona;ld
A,u.gustine D. Nelli
Edward G. Smith
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I
Headquarters Company Third Battalion
l·st Sgt Joseph B. Eisenha·u er
SISgt L·eon H. Deck
Pfc William W. Applewhite

Pfc Joihn E. Cu,llen, Jr
Pfc Miller D. Womble

Company
1st Lt Ralph B. Smith
T/S.gt Walt·er K. Smith
S/Sg·t ·Perry P. Corder
S/ Sgt Willilam C. Emmons
S/ Sgt Rkhmd C. Smiley
S/ Sgt Wenda! W. Verser
Sgt Rodger B·all
Sgt Ernest L. G.orLJim
Sg,t Jame·s B. St Clair
Sgt Conwell H. White
T/5 Herbert Z. Davidson
Pfc St·anley N. Botdorf
P.fc Lester Bllount
Pfc Patrick H. Bruc·e
Pfc Charle·s W. Cope
Pte Cha1rles A. Flana,gan
Pte Rona•ld Gardner
P,fc Fre1d G . Gonzales
Pfc Henry A . Gost
Pfc ·Pet•er J. Handley
Pfc A1ustin J. Hersh
Pte E·dwa nd Princ.e
Pfc Sotio C. RossHto
P.fc Hymen R. ·Rothblut
Pfc John H. Rouse
Pfc George W. R1ushmore
Pfc G·lynn W. W,hitfield
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Pvt Royall E. Barnes
Pvt Peter V. Car.l,i no
Pvt Orr•in H. Ca.rl,son
Pvt Elbert I. Dark
Pvt .Arthur F. Collett
Pvt Al.len Collins
Pvt Ro·s1s C. Danford
Pvt Ceabern J. De.rauf
Pvf Mel'.'in R. Elizer
Pvt Owen J. Gra,dy
Pvt Gfl.enn C. Harri•s
Pvt Clarence B. Hog·g
Pvt Jame•s F. KeHy
Pvt Antone Kokai
Pvt Floy1d D. Koz,iol
Pvt Wii·Ham R. Lackie, Jr
Pvt Silvio P. LaNumi·ata
Pvt Cleo McCall
Pvt Cl,a,nenoe E. McCollum
Pvt Duane G . Ne•wman
Pvt Eway R·i,der
Pvt Melvin A . Robert.s
Pvt LesH.e H. Ros·eberry
Pvt Jos•e ph M . Ros1s
Pvt E·dlw.a•rd Schalit
Pvt Ralph C. Stkkle
Pvt Edward L. Worley

K Company
Is! Lt Harry E. Queer
2nd Lt Bruce C. Chapman
2nd Lt Loyal E. Le·f fler
2nd tt •Edgar M . Rothschild
2nd Lt Mercer A . Y.ea,g·e r
T/ S:gt Donarld E. Z.ug
S/'S.g1t Jo•se'hp A. Carafa
Sgt Curma.n J. ·Be•gnaou.d
Sgt Thoma·s N. Bl·ack,Jr
Sgt Nicholas C. Got•se·s
Sgrt Carlton 0. Harris
~gt John •B. Lov.e·ly
Sgt W.i·IJ!i<am S. McFadden
Sgt John D. Schantz
Sgt Ma·nley R. Yeckley
T/ 4 Peter M. Mohs
Cpl G ,erald R. Burm
Cpl Orva.J J. Grell!
Pfc Woffo·rd H. .Brown
Pfc Ell G . oDa!niels
Pfc WiHand G. Gibson
Pfc Raymond Gui.ducci
Pk John T. Gun.t.er
Pfc Marl'in Kost•i k
Pfc Hyman Litzky

Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
P•fc
P.fc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
P.fc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pv.f
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Frank C. Poland
DaVIi.d T. PoweH
Jack A. R·eynolds
Robert Ro.sik, Jr
Jos·ehp E. Santore
Robert A . Schmidt
Oliver R. We•i.ss.ert
Frank A. W.erner
Cha,rle•s L. We·scott
Jes,se J. Wri·ght
G1l•e:nn L. Be·lcher
R. C. Booth
Benjamin H. Goodlman
16u.genio Gonza·le•s
•Eidlwand J. tamorie
Jame1s S. McCl-ure
Wii1J:i.a1m H. R·eede•r
Ofc.a r L. Reouff
.P.eter J. Roiso
Ha-rrison L. R·unyon, Sr
Robert F. Savin
6dWiar.d G. She·e-ts
Hen.ry A. St·a·rk
Howard W. Whitmer
De·wey W. Willis

l Company
T/S·gt
S/ S.gt
S/S:gt
S/Sgt
S/Sgt
S/ S·gt

Will·iam B. Salyer
Alfre·d Fa1u•s•ak
Joel N. Grubb, Jr
Robert E. Holme•s
Dave W. Ka·ufman
Joseph J. Mo:nte·leon

Slgt
Sgt
Sgt
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc

W<ils.on H. La:nca,st•e r
Me1lvin H. Pr·ice
Alphonse J. Simard
Edmund B•iles
Floy.d W: Brim
Ha rol.d J. ·Brogan

2'29

;
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc
Pfc

Os.ca,r T. Claxton
Wes.ley R. Doty
Jame's E. Falk
Theodore W. K·a,u fman
Knneth S. Latham
I r.a 0. Lawrence
Hudson J. Moak
D,eri·s L. Morri·s
L1uchi•s G . Overton
John M. Owens
Richmd M. Pett.er
Barnet C. Rams.e y

Pfc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

J·ame•s L. Rotbi,s•on
Joe W.eHs, Jr
c ,u nliis W . .Be1hnke
Merl·e G. Bork
Frank A . Cox
Jo,seph R. Knack
Edward J. Schroe•der
Bernard S.e,emon
Morris Shuldiner
Henry J. Stmits
.Melvin .E. St·e'inmueller

M Company
Capt E.dwand T. -La,tta
T/ Sgt K.enne·~h L. Ltindsay
S/Sgt P,a;u l L. Mon.t•g omery
Sg·t Milton K . RabeH
Sg,t Robeft ·F. .Ro1ss
Cpl Wii lltiam A. Young
Pfc Edg.ar L. Fo,rd
Pfc ·Rob<e·rt 1E. G'e·e
Pfc A,rthur Herbin
Pfc 'Loutie Kaloczkowski
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Pfc
Pfc
Pk
Pfc
Pfc
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt
Pvt

Jame·s W. Ray
Samu,el A. Rizzo
Al·fre,d L. Ro,ush
B:enedict G . Schmitt
Tihatddeus C. Sopyla
Earl R. :Bill·ings
Joihn Franco
Cha,rle•s N. Leshman
George B. Lynch
Jos·eph B. Versatg·gi
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